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This dissertation is an examination of particularity in Victorian fiction, biological 
science, and empirical philosophy.  Focusing on works by Charles Dickens, Charles Darwin, 
George Eliot, John Stuart Mill, and Walter Pater, this study shows how Victorian writers sought 
to engage their readers with the seemingly insignificant details of ordinary life—as a way of 
troubling conventions and habits of thought that deaden human existence and as a means of 
inciting human capacities of thought, feeling, and imagination.  These writers, I argue, shared a 
common conviction that the challenges of modern social, political, and intellectual life could 
only be met through a closer engagement with the unnoticed specifics of everyday life.  In 
some cases, these texts bring a heightened attention to the aesthetics of material life (as we see in 
Bleak House, Marius the Epicurean, or even The Origin of Species).  In other cases, it is a 
greater sympathetic notice of the details of human nature (as in Bleak House and Daniel 
Deronda).  In still other cases, it is a matter of bringing intellectual notice or scientific analysis to 
the seemingly irrelevant specifics of social and natural life (as we see in On Liberty or The 
Origin of Species).   
Recent literary critical scholarship on the Victorian period, shaped by twentieth-century 
poststructuralist thought, has shown a lack of interest in the era’s own self-estimation—in a 
sense of purposefulness integral to the major literary, scientific, and philosophical works of the 
day.  In correction to this criticism, I read the primary texts of this dissertation as purposive, as 
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seeking to have some effect upon the minds of their readers and the conditions of their historical 
present.  At the same time, I read these works as textual performances, and argue that their 
discursive form is a central component of the moral, intellectual, or political interventions they 
aim to make in their contemporary moment.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
“And in the process something new and elemental appeared: nothing less than the wealth of 
reality and depth of life in every moment to which we surrender ourselves without prejudice.”   
-Erich Auerbach 
 
The central texts of this study are educations in noticing, in paying attention.  They are 
works that seek to intervene in their Victorian moment, to act upon their audience, to make some 
difference in their reader’s relationship to reality.  Awakening their readers to the unnoticed 
details of life in time, they aim to make everyday life educational, in the broadest sense of the 
word.      
Each of the diverse texts of this dissertation attends to the social or natural world at the 
level of the particular: to the peculiarities of individual character, the minutiae of material 
existence, the slight irregularities of plant and animal life, or the singular feelings of a moment in 
time.  Each exhibits and encourages an attunement to the specifics of life that are left out or left 
behind when we only understand life in the abstract.  Focusing on works by Charles Dickens, 
Charles Darwin, George Eliot, John Stuart Mill, and Walter Pater, this study shows how 
Victorian writers sought to engage their readers with the seemingly insignificant details of 
ordinary life—as a way of troubling conventions and habits of thought that deaden human 
existence and as a means of inciting human capacities of thought, feeling, and imagination.     
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An interest in the smaller stuff of life was a part of a general turn toward more individual, 
local, and historical thinking in an age that saw the rise of industrial economy and democratic 
culture.  We see this turn in the realist novel, at its height in the mid-Victorian period, with its 
special concern for the small happenings of ordinary human existence.  We recognize it in 
Victorian efforts to extend the empirical principles of the enlightenment into historical sciences 
like geology and sociology.  But for the writers studied in this dissertation, attention to detail is 
more than just a component of the individual and local representations of the novel or the 
“inductive” methodology of the empirical sciences.  It is a common conviction that the 
challenges of modern social, political, and intellectual life demand a closer engagement with the 
unnoticed details of life in time.   
The writers studied here sought to inspire in their readers a renewed engagement with the 
specifics of everyday life; at the same time, they recognized that their treatment of reality had to 
be somehow different from their readers’ routine experience of it.  The realist novel aimed to be 
like reality in its subjects, but unlike reality in its effects.  The scientific and philosophical essay 
sought to find ways of presenting reality anew, so that the reader could bring a new set of eyes to 
problems of organic change or social policy.  Paying better attention to reality, in this way, 
required a certain artistry or creativity on the part of the writer.  How did these texts accomplish 
this?  In this study, I answer this question by giving special focus to the discursive techniques 
and styles of these works.   
Each of the writers studied here employs the imagination to expand and amplify 
experience, and to trouble habits and conventions of thought that limit human thinking.  In his 
fiction, Dickens creates poetic or romantic representations of everyday life that aim to awaken 
his readers’ imaginations and affections; as we will see, he creates a way of seeing the mundane 
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details of human existence anew by concentrating upon their aesthetic or formal qualities.  
Through the use of thought experiments, Darwin and Mill invite readers to use their imaginations 
to test established interpretations of the natural and social world and to visualize the complex 
processes of historical change.  In Eliot and Pater’s imaginative histories of human life, the 
routine details of ordinary existence become the beginnings of a broadened knowledge of human 
life and an expanded sympathy for humanity.   
These writers also take advantage of the pliable forms of the novel and essay to 
encourage a renewed attention to the details of routine existence.  Employing “mixed discourse,” 
or a combination of discursive styles, these texts ask the reader to bring a greater flexibility and 
freedom of mind to the examination of life.  We see this in the interjections of the narrator in 
Daniel Deronda, which interrupt the immediate action of the novel with philosophical 
commentary, bringing more mindful and sympathetic notice to the small happenings of social 
life.  We also see it in The Origin of Species, which combines scientific argument and concrete 
description to trouble conventional thinking about the social and natural world, and to encourage 
a greater attunement to species difference.   
1.1 VICTORIAN REFORMS OF MIND 
Through their writing, Charles Dickens, Charles Darwin, George Eliot, John Stuart Mill, 
and Walter Pater sought to address a troubling disconnection in Victorian culture: between the 
specifics of life and the ideas and ideals that made it possible to think and talk about social and 
natural life in general terms.  Dickens, for instance, spent his career dramatizing the incongruity 
between Victorian principles of justice, philanthropy, or charity and the material details of 
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modern social existence.  Eliot devoted her writing life to creating what I call a “history of the 
unhistorical” in the novel, giving special attention to the internal lives of unexceptional 
individuals—to the small shifts in feeling, perspective, or understanding that make up larger 
developments of human mind.  This kind of fictional history, in Eliot’s estimation, offered an 
alternative to summary narratives of human experience that dominated Victorian public life—
such as those provided by utilitarian philosophy, Christian orthodoxy, or “whiggish” history.  
Mill’s critical essays set about reevaluating the institutions and ideals of Victorian culture in light 
of the specific conditions of contemporary life, correcting a conventional understanding of the 
concept of character in On Liberty, and critiquing the institution of marriage in The Subjection of 
Women.   
The writers studied here contributed, in this way, to a broader Victorian endeavor to 
reevaluate inherited ideas.  In some instances, this reevaluation was in the spirit of conserving or 
resuscitating traditional ideals: we see this in the cultural and literary criticism of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, Thomas Carlyle, and Matthew Arnold, or in the rearticulation of natural theology in 
the Bridgewater Treatises.1  In other cases, it was in the spirit of reform, as in the utilitarian 
philosophy of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, or in John Stuart Mill’s philosophy of scientific 
logic.  Dickens, Darwin, Eliot, Mill, and Pater may each be called reformers in some sense of the 
word, although not all of them relished this role.   
                                                 
1 Published between 1833 and 1840, the Bridgewater Treatises were a series of works 
treating different areas of scientific investigation within the framework of natural theology, 
in the tradition of William Paley’s 1802 Natural Theology.  The treatise on physics and 
astronomy was authored by William Whewell, and the treatise on geology and mineralogy 
by William Buckland.   
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Each of the works studied here similarly registers the force of inherited ideas in 
contemporary life.  Eliot describes this force in her 1851 review of R.W. Mackay’s The Progress 
of the Intellect: “Our civilization, and, yet more, our religion, are an anomalous blending of 
lifeless barbarisms, which have descended to us like so many petrifactions from distant ages, 
with living ideas, the offspring of a true process of development.  We are in bondage to terms 
and conceptions which, having had their root in conditions of thought no longer existing, have 
ceased to possess any vitality, and are for us as spells which have lost their virtue.”2  Eliot’s 
portrayal of a contemporary moment held captive by ideas and ideals that have too little 
connection to present life is shared by the group of writers studied here.  Inherited customs and 
habits of mind are only insidious, in Eliot’s estimation as in Mill’s, when they are cut off from 
active thought, from the “living ideas” of the historical present.  These entrenched ideas have a 
deadening effect upon our minds like “spells,” limiting human capacities of learning and 
development.  
1.2 LIVING IDEAS   
What were the “living ideas” of the Victorian period, the concepts that sprang from the 
specific conditions of the present?  Chapters on Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species and 
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty and The Subjection of Women bring two contemporary 
                                                 
2 George Eliot, "R.W. Mackay's the Progress of the Intellect," in George Eliot: Selected 
Critical Writings, ed. Rosemary Ashton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 19.  The 
strength of Eliot’s criticism here may be somewhat misleading, being directed primarily at 
religious tradition; while Eliot urges a careful reevaluation of received ideas in her 
criticism and fiction, she by no means advocated throwing out all human custom.   
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developments to the forefront of this study.  The first is a turn toward historical and relative 
thinking in the biological and human sciences, following advancements in geology, biology, and 
social science.  With its gradualist and actualist3 approach to geological study, Charles Lyell’s 
three volume Principles of Geology, published between 1830 and 1833, made geological “deep 
time” a subject of serious scientific discussion, paving the way for Charles Darwin’s work on the 
problem of species origins.  At the same time, Jeremy Bentham and James Mill formulated a 
utilitarian system of social science, making man and society an object of scientific analysis; John 
Stuart Mill’s 1843 Logic historicized this system of social science, making the study of human 
society and character a condition of both the basic laws of psychology and the complex 
conditions of history.   
The writers studied here understood themselves to be living in an era increasingly defined 
by a historical and relative worldview.  Whether this was a liberating idea or a sad reality, they 
sought to prepare their readers for a world in which “nothing is, or can be rightly known, except 
relatively and under conditions.”4  They did this by creating works that encourage a heightened 
attention to the unnoticed details of life in time—and by connecting these details to larger 
categories of intellectual, cultural, and political history.  We see this, for instance, in the way that 
the narrator of Daniel Deronda links the small happenings of the world of the novel to the larger 
events of a greater “historical stream”: referencing, for instance, the events of the American civil 
war in the midst of a scene in which Gwendolen struggles to decide whether she will accept 
                                                 
3 An “actualist” methodology asserts a uniformity of process; it understands that the 
geological past can be fully explained by processes currently in action.  A “gradualist” 
theory asserts uniformity of rate, seeing geological change as slow, steady, and gradual.    
 
4 Walter Pater, "Coleridge," in Appreciations, with an Essay on Style (London: Macmillan 
and Company, 1910), 66. 
 
 6 
Grandcourt’s proposal of marriage.  We see this in the way that Marius the Epicurean concretizes 
the broad terms of intellectual history through a depiction of the everyday experiences of the 
novel’s central character Marius.   
These writers also did this by promoting capacities of mind best suited to a historical and 
relative world: most centrally, an acuteness of attention to historical difference, a flexibility of 
thought required for comparative perspective, and a breadth of imagination to think in both 
concrete and abstract terms.  The novels Bleak House, Daniel Deronda, and Marius the 
Epicurean invite a multiplied view of human life.  The Origin of Species promotes a flexibility of 
mind, showing how natural selection works abstractly and concretely, locally and globally.  The 
arguments of On Liberty and The Subjection of Women employ comparative historical analysis 
as a way of bringing a fresh set of eyes to contemporary social existence. 
  
The second development is the transformation of the British political system following 
the 1832, 1867, and 1883 Reform Acts; these reforms began a slow extension of parliamentary 
power to the middle and working classes and a gradual enlargement of the electorate—granting 
the vote first to a portion of middle class men and then later to all middle and working class men.  
As political reforms brought the country closer to a democratic system of government, mid-
Victorian writers like John Stuart Mill, Thomas Carlyle, Matthew Arnold, and John Ruskin 
contributed to public discussions of these reforms and their effects.  They asked whether new 
members of the electorate were ready for the responsibilities of suffrage, and disagreed about the 
best means of preparing the middle and working classes for a greater role in government.       
Mill was more optimistic about these changes than most mid-Victorians, but he too 
worried about the growing political and economic strength of the middle classes and the 
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extension of the vote to the largely uneducated working classes.  On Liberty weighs the difficult 
relationship between equality and freedom in a democratic society, and urges the importance of 
liberal culture in a democratic state.  For Mill, liberal culture required a level of attentiveness—
to each other and to the conditions of our historical moment—too often stunted in contemporary 
society.  For this reason, anything that frees the mind from the deadening effects of convention 
and habit, and brings our attention to ways of life different from our own is a benefit; any means 
of awakening human capacities of thought, feeling, and imagination—of cultivating the mind—
ought to be cherished.   
The Victorian realist novel, in the hands of writers like Dickens and Eliot (and even to 
some extent Pater), sought to accomplish all of these things; and in this sense the novels studied 
here shared a common purpose with the liberal philosophy of Mill.  Victorian literary critics 
acknowledged this connection; an 1870 article on Dickens in The Spectator, for instance, asserts 
that Dickens “has taught us by his humour, as nothing else could have taught us, how full to 
overflowing what is called ‘vulgar’ life is of all the human qualities, good and evil, which make 
up the interest of human existence.  His delight in the grotesque has done far more than ever Mr. 
John Stuart Mill by any philosophical defense of liberty could do, to make us tolerant toward 
individual eccentricity of almost every shade, and even to teach us to pat it with something like 
parental fondness…”5  Dickens’s fiction, in this reviewer’s estimation, is democratic in its form 
and liberal in its aims.  It sheds light on details of social life that go unnoticed by the wider 
world, finding “human qualities” in the most unlikely of places.  In this way, it brings something 
                                                 
5 This was one of many articles that appeared in the year following Dickens’s death that 
provided a retrospective of the writer’s career.  "Charles Dickens." The Spectator (1870): 
716-717.   
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to the examination of social life that Mill’s critical essays are lacking—a ready affection for the 
peculiarities of human character. 
As Eliot articulates in her literary criticism, the realist novel is specially equipped to 
bring this kind of sympathetic attention the specifics of human existence.  Unlike science, 
philosophy, or history, the realist novel promotes not only a broadened and more reflective 
knowledge of human life but also an amplified sympathy for humankind.  In this way, the novel 
encourages capacities of mind required for a mindful and compassionate participation in 
democratic culture.  Eliot’s fiction, like that of Dickens and Pater, actively promotes these 
capacities, inviting readers to bring a broader perspective, more flexible imagination, and readier 
sympathy to the contemplation of human life.   
1.3 CONNECTIONS 
 With chapters on Dickens’s Bleak House, Darwin’s The Origin of Species, Eliot’s 
Daniel Deronda, Mill’s On Liberty and The Subjection of Women, and Pater’s Marius the 
Epicurean, this project finds unexpected affinities among a diverse selection of literary, 
scientific, and philosophical texts.  I will give a brief sketch of some of the most significant 
connections I see among these texts here.   
The fiction of Dickens, Eliot, and Pater is not typically studied together.  But in the pages 
that follow, we see how each of these writers saw the special capacity of art to check the 
benumbing effects of convention in contemporary society, to work against entrenched habits of 
mind, and to reanimate human capacities of thought, feeling, and imagination.  Each wrote 
novels that create what I call a history of the unhistorical, depicting broad historical events, 
 9 
social and cultural norms, and abstract moral principles in the concrete terms of unexceptional 
individuals.  Each used fiction as a way of extending experience by giving imaginative and 
reflective notice to aspects of life and mind that appear useless, inconsequential, or irrelevant.   
Reading these writers together reminds us of their many and various ties to British 
romantic thought.  We see their common commitment to a form of British literary realism that is 
realist in its objects but romantic or humanistic in its aims.  These writers not only created fiction 
that was, in the broadest sense of the word, educational—fiction that spurred human thinking.  
They also wrote fiction that aimed to make life more educational, preparing the minds of their 
readers for a more vital and mindful engagement with the details of everyday experience.  In this 
sense, their allegiance was not to art itself but what art could do in the world, what difference 
fiction could make in the minds of its readers.   
Of course, Pater’s aims were decidedly narrower than those of Dickens and Eliot; he was 
not comfortable with the idea that art should have civic responsibilities beyond its capacity to 
animate individual experience.  Pater, writing a generation after Dickens and Eliot, is usually 
read as a figure of British aestheticism, and might seem an unlikely writer to include in this 
study.  But Pater did, however, write a novel—in his estimation the art form best suited to 
modern existence.  Reading Pater alongside more canonical Victorian realist novels like Bleak 
House and Daniel Deronda, we begin to see how Marius the Epicurean bridges the concerns of 
mid-Victorian realism and late-Victorian aestheticism.  As Pater asserts in The Renaissance, the 
novel has the ability to promote a modern form of humanism, which is defined by its attention 
to—and sympathy for—all things human; by this standard, Pater’s own novel joins those by 
Dickens and Eliot in its humanistic aims.   
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Reading Darwin’s The Origin of Species together with the critical essays of Mill is not 
much of a stretch: both men were a part of and contributed to a tradition of British empiricism 
that has its roots in Baconian science and Humean philosophy.  Both celebrated the inductive 
method and used empirical analysis in their published works to qualify and correct a-priori 
interpretations of the natural and social world.  What my readings enlighten is a commonality 
between their works that is not frequently noted by historians of science.  This is their mastery of 
a form of writing that also has its roots in the work of Bacon: the essay.  In my chapters on 
Darwin and Mill, I study the qualities of their writing that are most essayistic: how their works 
move nimbly from one form of discourse to another, appeal directly to the familiar experience of 
their readers, and reform conventional knowledge about the natural and social world through an 
attention to the details of everyday life.   
The essay is notoriously difficult to define as a discursive form, but if we look at Bacon’s 
Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral,6 for instance, we recognize a style of writing that combines 
information, analysis, and counsel—all with a congeniality of tone that expresses the writer’s 
familiarity with and interest in everyday life.  This congeniality of tone is, perhaps, a quality seen 
more readily in Darwin than Mill.  But in the chapters that follow, we see how both writers 
create arguments that are multiply oriented—that seek at once to inform, examine, and advise.  
Their work shares an objective that was central to the Baconian essay: the analysis of abstract 
ideas that are thought to be sufficiently well-understood.  Bacon’s Essays or Counsels includes 
essays such as “Of Truth,” “Of Envy, “Of Friendship,” “Of Empire,” “Of Discourse,” and “Of 
Custom and Education” that deal with the ideas and ideals that define social, intellectual, and 
                                                 
6 Francis Bacon, Francis Bacon: A Critical Edition of the Major Works, ed. Brian Vickers 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 341-456. 
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political life.  The scope of Darwin and Mill’s writing is, of course, narrower than Bacon’s in 
Essays and Counsels.  But they, too, sought to rethink the abstract categories of established 
knowledge, Darwin redefining the term “species” in The Origin of Species and Mill refashioning 
the concept of “character” in On Liberty.   
Focusing upon the essayistic qualities of Darwin and Mill’s writing brings their work into 
closer affiliation with the central concerns of the realist novel.  This is not only because the essay 
and the novel have certain discursive affinities.7  It is also that when we read Darwin and Mill in 
the light of British traditions of essay writing, we see how their work affirms certain humanistic 
values integral to these traditions—values shared by novelists like Dickens, Eliot, and Pater.  I 
have shown, above, how the realist novel shares some of the humanistic concerns of Mill’s 
liberal philosophy; but it is, perhaps, a strange idea to read The Origin of Species as a humanistic 
text—although not if you read The Origin as Stephen J. Gould does, both as a scientific 
argument for descent by selection and as an essay that celebrates the immense capacities of the 
human mind.8  My reading of Darwin in Chapter Two affirms this idea, showing how The Origin 
actively promotes human abilities of critical thinking and creative imagination.   
                                                 
7 In the chapters that follow, I focus on one of these affinities, a mixture of discursive 
styles seen in each of the central texts of this dissertation.   
 
8 Gould is a master of the essay form himself.  In The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the 
Magister’s Pox, he argues that science and humanistic study are not mutually exclusive 
endeavors.  Stephen J. Gould, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister's Pox: Mending 
the Gap between Science and the Humanities. (New York: Random House, 2003). 
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1.4 METHOD AND CRITICAL ORIENTATION 
Recent literary critical scholarship of the Victorian period, shaped by twentieth-century 
poststructuralist thought, has shown a level of disinterest in the era’s own self-estimation—in a 
sense of purposefulness integral to the major literary, scientific, and philosophical works of the 
day.  For critics writing at the end of the twentieth-century, this was an effect of a reigning 
critical interest in problems of textuality and interpretation that served to divorce Victorian texts 
from their social, political, and historical circumstances.  More recently, scholars who have a 
greater concern for historical context have, nevertheless, shown more allegiance to current 
literary critical categories than to the native terms of Victorian writers.  We see this, for instance, 
in the number of books and essays on the topic of Victorian subjectivity.  At the same time, 
scholars who attend more carefully to the era’s self-estimation, such as those primarily engaged 
in biography and intellectual history, often have little to say about how Victorian texts work on a 
formal or discursive level.   
I read the primary texts of this dissertation as purposive, as spirited responses to their 
contemporary moment that seek to have some effect upon the minds of their readers.  In these 
responses are clear articulations of what these writers sought to do with the written word—what 
effect they aimed to have upon the conditions of their present.  I take time in each chapter, for 
this reason, to read these works in the light of the literary critical, philosophical, or scientific 
discussions of the day.  For instance, I preface my examination of Dickens’s fiction with a 
discussion of Victorian concepts of realism; I pause to consider The Origin of Species in 
relationship to nineteenth-century standards of scientific method; and I read the fiction of Eliot 
and Pater in the light of their own literary critical work.   
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But most of all, I pay close attention to how this sense of purpose is woven into the 
textual fabric of these works.  I argue that the discursive form of these works is a central 
component of the moral, intellectual, or political interventions they aim to make in their 
contemporary moment.  I show, for instance, how each of these writers takes advantage of the 
flexible forms of the novel and essay, using “mixed discourse,” or a combination of discursive 
styles, to check conventions and habits of thought, bringing attention and imagination to the 
unnoticed details of life in time.   
Mixed discourse is employed to different effect in the texts studied here.  Looking at the 
novels, for instance, we see how active and purposeful the narrators of Bleak House, Daniel 
Deronda, and Marius the Epicurean are—how often they interrupt the immediate action of the 
story with their comments, qualifications, explanations, and corrections. 9  The narrator of Daniel 
Deronda, for instance, is a constant presence in the novel; at no point is the reader permitted to 
get too caught up in the events of the novel’s plotlines.  There is always some aspect of 
Gwendolen’s character to explain, some commonplace idea about human nature to correct, some 
moment that requires the enlightenment of the narrator’s philosophical analysis.  With these 
interjections, the narrative shows just as much interest in promoting the cultivation of its readers’ 
                                                 
9 These interruptions, which many critics call authorial interjections, are also typical of the 
comic-realist fiction of the Victorian period—especially the novels of William Makepeace 
Thackeray and Anthony Trollope.  The narrator’s treatment of Becky Sharp in Vanity Fair 
has ready affinities with the way Gwendolen Harleth is depicted in Daniel Deronda; both 
characters are subject to the narrator’s constant commentary.  Trollope’s interjections often 
speak directly to the reader; see, for instance, the number of times the narrator interrupts 
the immediate action of The Eustace Diamonds to invite the reader to bring a more critical 
eye to the contemplation of the novel’s characters.  In the fiction of Thackeray and 
Trollope, as in that of Dickens, Eliot, and Pater, these interruptions are purposive, 
exhibiting the kinds of moral and intellectual interventions these novels seek to make in 
their contemporary moment.  William Makepeace Thackeray, Vanity Fair (London: 
Penguin, 2001). Trollope, The Eustace Diamonds (London: Penguin, 1986). 
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minds as it does representing the moral transformations of its central characters Daniel Deronda 
and Gwendolen Harleth.    
 
While I rely primarily upon sources contemporary to the five writers studied here, there 
are a range of critical and theoretical sources in the background of this project that predate and 
postdate the Victorian period.  Reading the central texts of this dissertation in terms of both their 
historical situation and discursive form has made for an unlikely mix of critical works on my 
bookshelf.  These are texts that I return to again and again, not necessarily because my 
conclusions always match theirs, but because they grapple with the same set of problems I am 
concerned with here.  
My readings of the Victorian novel are informed by the central works of German and 
British romantic thought, taking into account the ways that Romantic writers articulate the aims 
of art and the value of aesthetic experience.  Working with Victorian reviews of Dickens’s later 
social novels that loosely employ the key terms of romantic poetics in Chapter One, I have read 
and reread William Wordsworth’s “Preface” to the second edition of Lyrical Ballads and Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria.  Alongside Victorian critics like George Henry Lewes, 
David Masson, Walter Besant, and Henry James, I try to make sense of the realist novel’s 
relationship to romantic concepts of human imagination and emotion, the structure of literary 
form, and the moral value of literature.   
My readings of Dickens, Eliot, and Pater are informed in many ways by Friedrich 
Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man, which articulates the purpose of art as a means of 
education—as a way of liberating the mind from the limitations of both interior mind and 
exterior world.  Twentieth-century critics that rework the aesthetic philosophies of Schiller and 
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Hegel, such as Georg Lukacs and Erich Auerbach, have also informed this study.  Mimesis has 
been a generative work for this project, on the whole, both because of its focus upon western 
traditions of literary realism and its critical practice.   
In Mimesis, Auerbach pinpoints two typical components of realist literature that are 
integral to the arguments of this dissertation: the first is the act of noticing; the second is 
narrative interruption.10  In ways similar to Auerbach, I see an important relationship between 
attention to detail and narrative interruption in the realist novel, showing how discursive 
disjunction and interruption in the novel invites greater notice of the details of life in time.  
Auerbach is interested in the significance of what he calls the “random occurrence” in the novel, 
describing how works like Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse put an “emphasis on the random 
occurrence to exploit it not in the service of a planned continuity of action but in itself.”  
Although his analysis of this modernist novel has concerns not applicable to my studies here, 
much of what he draws from his treatment of Woolf readily applies to my reading of the realist 
novel—especially Eliot’s Daniel Deronda.  In my examination of Daniel Deronda, I argue that 
the narrator’s attention to the seemingly insignificant moments of internal and external life 
promotes a broadened knowledge of human experience and amplified sympathy for humanity.  
In this novel, then, we see that “it is precisely the random moment which is comparatively 
independent of the controversial and unstable orders over which men fight and despair; it passes 
                                                 
10 See especially Auerbach’s discussion of Homer’s Odyssey in Chapter One and Virginia 
Woolf’s To the Lighthouse in Chapter Twenty.  Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The 
Representation of Reality in Western Literature (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1953). 
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unaffected by them, as daily life.  The more it is exploited, the more the elementary things which 
our lives have in common come to life.”11 
I also value Mimesis for the priority it gives to its primary texts, and the way Auerbach 
writes a literary history through textual analysis.  In this, Auerbach models a style of criticism 
that demonstrates equal interest in the history and textuality of literary works.  Like Auerbach, I 
give most of my critical attention to the interpretation of the central works of this dissertation; 
and I aim to show how the discursive techniques and styles of these texts can tell us something 
about their historical moment.  Using discursive analysis to show how these works seek to 
intervene in their historical moment, to “place themselves in the world,” I find another important 
critical model in the literary criticism of Edward Said, especially in the essays contained in The 
World, the Text, and the Critic.  Indeed, much of the work of this introduction has been to 
enlighten the specific historical circumstances that these works respond to and participate in—
and to show how the affiliations seen among these texts add to our understanding of these 
historical conditions.  Reading these works as purposive, as texts that seek to make some effect 
upon the minds of their readers and the conventions of their contemporary moment, I affirm the 
“connection between texts and the existential actualities of human life, politics, societies, and 
events.”  I understand that “the realities of power and authority—as well as the resistances 
offered by men, women, and social movements to institutions, authorities, and orthodoxies—are 
the realities that make texts possible, that deliver them to readers, that solicit the attention of 
critics.”12 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 552. 
 
12 Edward Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1983), 5. 
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Thinking about the mixed and flexible forms of the novel and essay as they are employed 
in the Victorian period, I have had recourse to a wide range of critics and theorists dealing with 
problems of narrative and discursive form.  Victorian critics, including George Henry Lewes, 
George Eliot, David Masson, Walter Besant, and Henry James, were preoccupied with problems 
of narrative uniformity and harmony.  Twentieth-century critics and theorists of the Victorian 
realist novel have also been concerned with the narrative unity of novels like Bleak House and 
Daniel Deronda; and in many ways, the feminist, Marxist, and poststructuralist readings of the 
later half of the twentieth century have sought to bring a greater coherence to Victorian fiction—
a coherence that Victorian critics found lacking.   
My priority in this dissertation is not to bring a greater unity or totality of meaning to the 
novels studied here.  Indeed, in my readings of the Victorian realist novel, I agree with Victorian 
critics and reviewers in their estimation that the realist novel is often rambling, disjointed, and 
miscellaneous; the novels studied here do not make tidy, coherent “wholes.”  But I disagree with 
Victorian critics like Lewes and Bagehot who see this lack of narrative unity as an artistic 
failing.  Instead I read the mixed and multiple style of the realist novel as an important aspect of 
its engagement with the conditions of modern social life.  In the chapters that follow, I show how 
the mixed, multiple, and often disjointed discourse of the Victorian novel troubles habits and 
conventions of mind and invites a greater attunement to the unnoticed details of life in time.    
Although I cannot agree with his estimation of the realist novel in S/Z, Roland Barthes 
has helped me to be more precise in the ways that I describe the narration of each of the novels I 
study here: to be patient, for instance, with the narrator’s interjections in Daniel Deronda, giving 
a more comprehensive account of what they do for the text and the reader.  I agree with Barthes 
that narrative interruption invites a greater independence of mind in the reader; and by 
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illustrating how the novels studied here encourage a certain freedom of mind, in some sense I am 
showing how they are “writerly” rather than “readerly” texts.  But in my argument, this freedom 
is not textual but liberal: these texts invite not so much a multiplication of meaning as a plurality 
of understanding and perspective that is best described as liberal-mindedness.          
1.5 CHAPTERS 
Chapter One, “The Discrete Details of Bleak House,” reads the novel Bleak House 
(1852-1853) in the light of Victorian discussions of literary realism in order to rethink the 
novel’s depiction of the unnoticed details of social life.  I focus upon the earlier chapters of the 
book where the third person narrator creates an overview of the world of the novel that hovers at 
the level of aesthetic detail.  I argue that the novel’s double narration makes this overview 
possible by separating the objective perspective of the third person narrator from the personal 
viewpoint of Esther Summerson.  Before the reader has been tapped into the central plotlines of 
the novel in Esther’s narrative, the third person narrator gives a survey of the details of society 
without totalization or generalization by concentrating upon aesthetic surface.  The overview of 
the third person narrative both counters and replicates the institutional overview that Dickens 
critiques in Bleak House.  Promoting a way of seeing the discrete details of society without 
collapsing their differences, it corrects the totalizing forces of convention that the novel 
condemns. 
 In Chapter Two, “The Peculiar Facts of The Origin of Species,” I contend that The 
Origin (1859) is both an argument for the theory of descent by natural selection and a text that 
prepares the minds of its readers for understanding the organic world as Darwin depicts it—a 
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world subject to chance variation and natural selection.  I show how Darwin employs a mixed 
style of discourse in The Origin to unsettle established ideas about organic change, inviting 
readers to bring a greater flexibility and freedom of mind to the contemplation of the natural 
world.  With the use of imaginative descriptions and thought experiments, Darwin’s writing 
encourages a heightened attention to the small and seemingly insignificant irregularities of 
organic life, just as the other central tests of this dissertation promote a greater attunement to the 
unnoticed specifics of social life.   
Chapter Three, “George Eliot’s History of the Unhistorical,” reads Daniel Deronda 
(1876) alongside Eliot’s literary criticism, which describes the capacity of the realist novel to 
cultivate the minds of its readers.  I show how Daniel Deronda gives special attention to the 
small events of internal human life: to the small shifts in feeling, perspective, or understanding 
that make up larger developments of mind.  While Daniel Deronda depicts reforms of mind in 
central characters Daniel Deronda and Gwendolen Harleth, it simultaneously encourages 
transformations of mind in its readers.  Looking at the narrator’s commentary on the immediate 
action of the novel, I illustrate how the narrative’s mixed discourse invites a more noticing, 
flexible, and sympathetic contemplation of the novel’s subjects.  The narrator’s interruptions 
correct commonplace ideas about human life with the specifics of character and event, and bring 
broader sympathetic attention to the seemingly insignificant details of life and mind.   
Chapter Four, “A Moral Philosophy of Attention,” focuses on John Stuart Mill’s essays 
On Liberty (1859) and The Subjection of Women (1869).  I show how Mill’s writing, like 
Darwin’s, encourages critical practices of attention that heighten our awareness of individual, 
local, and historical specificity—and incite our interest in the unnoticed details of life in time.  
For Mill, a critical attunement to the specifics of life is the central practice of liberal culture and 
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the special responsibility of the liberal social critic.  In these essays, Mill acknowledges that a 
renewed attention to the details of everyday existence requires a certain liberty of mind too often 
dampened by convention and habit in contemporary culture.  I demonstrate how Mill takes 
advantage of the mixed and flexible form of the essay in On Liberty and The Subjection of 
Women, making arguments for liberal culture while simultaneously encouraging liberal-
mindedness.  
Chapter Four, “Walter Pater and the Art of Paying Attention,” concentrates on the 
relationship between Pater’s aesthetic criticism and his novel Marius the Epicurean (1885).  I 
argue that, in Pater’s criticism, the seemingly useless particulars of everyday life are the source 
of a new aesthetic stance towards the external concrete world—a stance that has the capacity to 
reanimate the colorless existence of modern life.  As in prior chapters, I focus on the 
combination of discursive styles in Marius, examining the relationship between the novel’s 
modern narrator and its depiction of the concrete world of ancient Rome.  While the novel’s 
central character Marius searches for a more vital aesthetic experience of the material world, the 
narrator seeks to enliven ancient concepts that have become dislocated from their original 
contexts—through an attention to the aesthetic details of everyday Roman life.  The novel’s 
narration transforms, in this way, the abstract teachings of Epicureanism, Stoicism, and early 
Christianity into the kind of aesthetic experience Pater promotes in his criticism. 
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2.0  CHAPTER ONE: THE DISCRETE DETAILS OF BLEAK HOUSE 
Recent Dickens scholarship, shaped by twentieth-century poststructuralist thought, has 
produced criticism that is highly interesting in its own right, J. Hillis Miller’s for instance, but 
that seems oddly separate from the actual experience of reading Dickens’s fiction and 
problematically divorced from the literary critical terms of the novelist’s own period.  This 
critical trend has leant Dickens’s most unwieldy novels a unity of meaning that most Victorian 
critics, like George Henry Lewes or Walter Bagehot, found lacking in Dickens’s fiction.  But it 
has also shown a certain disregard for what Dickens and his contemporaries thought the novel 
should be and should do, and exhibited a level of inattention to what Dickens’s Victorian critics 
estimated as his greatest strength, which was his attunement to the distinct and miscellaneous 
details of social life.   
For instance, recent critical interpretations of Bleak House (1852-1853) have focused 
almost exclusively upon themes of detection and inspection in the novel.  Following the work of 
J. Hillis Miller, D.A. Miller, and Nancy Armstrong, 13 readings of Bleak House have focused on 
                                                 
13 See especially Miller’s 1971 Introduction to Bleak House.  J. Hills Miller, 
"Introduction," in Bleak House, ed. Norman Page (New York: Penguin Books, 1971).  See 
D.A. Miller, The Novel and the Police (Berkeley, California: University of California 
Press, 1988).  Although Armstrong does not give special focus to Dickens in her 1987 
Desire and Domestic Fiction, her ideas about Victorian subjectivity (or perhaps more 
precisely, her reading of Foucault’s ideas about subjectivity) have informed numerous 
readings of Dickens’s novels, Bleak House among them.  Nancy Armstrong, Desire and 
 22 
those aspects of the novel most integral to the unfolding of its mysteries—especially on 
characters like Esther and Inspector Bucket who make narrative connections and uncover secrets.  
But with so much attention given to the later sections of the novel, there are fewer readings that 
concentrate on the social landscape presented by the third-person narrator at the start of the 
novel, apart from its significance for the novel’s detective storyline.  The exception to this are 
critics primarily interested in Dickens’s representation of society and social forms, with an 
emphasis upon the novel’s topicality, in the spirit of Barbara Hardy, Raymond Williams, or 
Jonathan Arac. 14 
In agreement with many of Dickens’s own contemporaries, I read Bleak House as a novel 
more interested in noticing than understanding, more committed to paying attention to the 
multiple details of social existence and the differences of individual character than to 
comprehending the deeper meanings of the world.  Unlike his contemporaries, I see this 
commitment not as an artistic failing but as a purposeful engagement with the conditions of 
Victorian social life.  This becomes clear when we consider Dickens’s own evaluation of the 
proper aims of realist fiction, as articulated in his correspondence and editorial commentary.  
Fiction, in Dickens’s estimation, had a special ability to mediate the forces of convention in 
contemporary life.  These forces included the operations of institutions (of government, law, 
education, or charity) that were, for Dickens, alarmingly disconnected from the specifics of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1987). 
 
14 See Barbara Hardy, Charles Dickens: The Later Novels (London: Longmans, Green & 
Company, 1968).  Also Barbara Hardy, The Moral Art of Dickens (London: Athlone Press, 
1970).  See Williams’s reading of Dickens in The English Novel.  Raymond Williams, The 
English Novel: From Dickens to Lawrence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).  
See Jonathan Arac, Commissioned Spirits: The Shaping of Social Motion in Dickens, 
Carlyle, Melville, and Hawthorne (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). 
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human existence.  They also included habits of thought that limited his readers’ emotional and 
imaginative experience of the world.   
As Dickens asserts throughout his editorial career, fiction should be like reality in its 
subjects but unlike reality in its effects, because experiencing fiction as we do everyday life 
accomplishes little.  Fiction must be somehow more than, or perhaps other than, routine 
experience in order to break through the conventions of thought that block life’s vividness of 
detail and action and that stunt feelings of sympathy.  While habitual experience often prevents 
us from seeing the basic truths of reality, fictional representations of reality have the capacity to 
cut through habit to exhibit what is most important or most meaningful about human life.   
Fictional experience, then, can be a better conduit of truth than actual experience.  But access to 
this truth requires that the reader become newly captivated with the familiar, with the everyday.   
In Dickens’s fiction, as in the other central texts of this dissertation, only the 
particularities of human existence have the capacity to correct conventions of life and mind, and 
prompt a reengagement with the everyday.  Only the discrete details of social life can reawaken 
readers to the interest and charm of ordinary experience.  Creating individuality of character and 
specificity of detail above and beyond his contemporaries, Dickens’s novels work against 
convention by bringing life and color to those aspects of life that have little value outside of the 
aesthetic realm of fiction.  These are details that mean little to social policy or empirical science, 
or for that matter, the rules of Victorian morality.  They go unnoticed by the social institutions 
that Dickens so often takes as his subjects.  But in the fictional world of his novels, Dickens’s 
attention to these unnoticed details demonstrates a way of seeing the world alternative to rational 
analysis, empirical examination, or moral estimation.  This is because, for Dickens, these 
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particularities need only be appreciated aesthetically to be the beginnings of an enlivened 
imagination and an enlarged affection.    
This alternative stance toward the external social world is the focus of my reading of 
Bleak House, which deals primarily with the earlier chapters of the novel where the third person 
narrator creates an overview of the world of Bleak House that hovers at the level of aesthetic 
detail.  The novel’s double narration makes this overview possible by separating the objective 
perspective of the third person narrator from the personal viewpoint of Esther Summerson.  
Before the reader has been tapped into the central plotlines of the novel in Esther’s narrative, the 
third person narrator manages to give a survey of the world of Bleak House without totalization 
or generalization by concentrating upon its aesthetic surfaces.  In these chapters, each detail of 
everyday existence strikes the reader anew, affecting a re-enchanted—if disjointed—picture of 
British social life.  The overview of the third person narrative both counters and replicates the 
institutions that Dickens critiques in Bleak House.  Promoting a way of seeing the discrete details 
of this world without collapsing their differences, it corrects the totalizing forces of convention 
that the novel condemns.   
2.1 DICKENS AND REALISM 
While mid-Victorian novelists like Thackeray or Eliot shared his interest in the details of 
everyday life, Dickens held a singular place among other Victorian realists.  By mid-Victorian 
standards of realism, Dickens was a realist in his subjects but not in his style; for Victorian 
critics, he inhabited a kind of middle ground between Victorian realism and more romantic 
and/or dramatic literature (for instance, the romances of Scott or the gothic novels of Wilkie 
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Collins).  Dickens’s reviews over the course of his lifetime reveal an increasingly predominant 
Victorian critical ideal, at its height in the 1860s and 1870s, which placed the fiction of 
Thackeray and Eliot over that of Dickens.  This realist ideal, formed in the last three decades of 
Dickens’s life, articulated a set of rules for what a novel should be—a set of rules that Dickens’s 
own fiction did not fully follow.   
Twentieth century critics who study Victorian responses to Dickens, such as G. H. Ford 
and Richard Lettis, describe the status of his fiction in contemporary discussions of the novel.  At 
the start of his career, during the period of Pickwick Papers through David Copperfield, the 
novel had barely been acknowledged as a legitimate art form, worthy of the kind of literary 
critical attention given to poetry or drama.  Reviews of Dickens’s earliest works were almost 
entirely positive, but were shaped by no apparent literary standards for the novel.  But by the 
time Dickens began to write his “social novels,” beginning with Bleak House in 1850, mid-
Victorian critics of the novel like David Masson, Walter Bagehot, and George Henry Lewes had 
developed a set of critical standards for the novel.  There were critics like Masson who upheld 
the “ideal” style of fiction over the “real,” believing that novels should put their readers in touch 
with something higher and better than what they could meet with in everyday life.15  But by the 
                                                 
15 Ford explains that “what differentiates Masson from most critics of the 1850s is that he 
was not so obsessed with the virtues of realism as to rule out Dickens’ kind of art.  Instead 
of insisting that realism is better, he indicates that it is different.  In his view, both kinds 
are legitimate.  Dickens, he says, has an ‘essentially susceptible and poetic nature,” and his 
style, while often exaggerated, reaches heights of which Thackeray is incapable…” which 
is similar to that of Homer, Shakespeare and Cervantes.  George H. Ford, Dickens and His 
Readers: Aspects of Novel-Criticism since 1836 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1955), 116.  For Masson’s comparison of Dickens and Thackeray, as representative 
of the “ideal” and “real” styles, respectively, see his “‘David Copperfield.’ ‘History of 
Pendennis’” in The North British Review (1851).  Reprinted in Fred. G. Kitton, ed., 
Dickensiana: A Bibliography of the Literature Relating to Charles Dickens and His 
Writings. (New York: Haskell House, 1971), 106-09.  See also David Masson, "Pendennis 
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last two decades of Dickens’s life, critics promoting the “real” style of fiction outnumbered those 
who saw value in more idealized or romanticized representations of reality.  Dominant ideas 
about the novel created a hierarchy of fiction which placed the realist novel at the top and more 
“fanciful” fiction (such as the gothic novel or domestic romance) at the bottom.  During this 
time, Ford explains, the “most persistent advice of [Dickens’s] reviewers was to avoid 
exaggeration and imaginative distortion…‘Art’ to those critics was looked down upon as a 
contrived distortion of reality such as one finds in romances or in poetry and drama.  It was 
hoped that the novel would be something different from other forms of literature, an untouched 
transcript of real life as accurate and uncolored as history.” 16     
A reviewer for the Athenaeum in 1841 expressed a view of the novel that would be 
commonplace by the time of Dickens’s death: 
Is it not that a novel is, or aims at being, a picture of daily life,—a 
reflex of human nature under the modifications of an actual state of 
society? … A romance, on the contrary, pretends to no such 
fidelity of delineation.  It strives to paint man as a being of passion 
alone; its view of life is taken by the flare of torches … dazzling 
brilliancy and fathomless gloom … If this definition be correct, a 
romance is at variance with the spirit of the present age.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Copperfield: Thackeray and Dickens," in Victorian Fiction: A Collection of Essays 
from the Period, ed. Ira Bruce Nadel (New York: Garland, 1986), 57-89. 
 
16 Ford, Dickens and His Readers: Aspects of Novel-Criticism since 1836, 131. 
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nineteenth century is distinguished by a craving for the positive 
and real—it is essentially an age of analysis and criticism.17 
This passage echoes one of the earliest definitions of the novel, by Samuel Johnson in 1750, as 
an “exhibition of life in its true state, diversified only by accidents that daily happen in the 
world”18 and prefigures the literary criticism of George Henry Lewes.  Here the reviewer 
compares the reality of the novel with the fancy of romance in order to stress the compatibility of 
the novel with the empirical spirit of the nineteenth century.  The focus is upon the novel’s 
subjects, its discursive techniques seemingly invisible (it is simply a “picture of daily life”); but 
with romance, the primary concern is its style.  With this contrast, the reviewer suggests that the 
novel somehow avoids the fictionality of all other forms of literature.  It, like history or science, 
can facilitate the “analysis and criticism” of human life; it speaks to the head rather than the 
heart, presuming man to be a rational rather than passionate being.  There is, in this passage, 
little possibility that more imaginative fiction might be able to convey truth—presumably 
because in an empirical age legitimate truths can only spring from the rational analysis of 
concrete reality.  In other words, the novel suits an age in which the real is synonymous with the 
true. (There is no acknowledgment here that realist fiction, like history and science, uses as many 
discursive techniques to represent the world as romance does.)   
                                                 
17 Quoted in Ibid., 131-32. 
 
18 In Samuel Johnson’s short piece for The Rambler, dated the thirty first of March, 1750, 
he asserts that the defining characteristic of contemporary fiction is its relationship to life: 
“The works of fiction, with which the present generation seems more particularly 
delighted, are such as exhibit life in its true state, diversified only by accidents that daily 
happen in the world, and influenced by passions and qualities which are really to be found 
in conversing with mankind.”  Samuel Johnson, "The Rambler, No. 4," in Selected 
Writings, ed. Patrick Cruttwell (New York: Penguin, 1968), 149. 
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Dickens consistently claimed that his novels were accurate depictions of real life,19 but 
did little to counteract critical misunderstandings of his fiction during his lifetime.  He provided 
only short prefaces to his novels and was usually silent on the subject of his own fiction in his 
personal and editorial correspondence.  But occasionally Dickens’s correspondence does offer 
some window into his ideas about realist fiction—and some sense of what it meant to create 
fiction that was at once faithful to reality and different from our daily experience of it.  In a letter 
written in 1859, Dickens explains the importance of novelistic artistry in the representation of 
reality—and in the communication of truth:  
It does not seem to me to be enough to say of any description that it is the exact truth.  
The exact truth must be there; but the merit or art in the narrator, is the manner of stating the 
truth.  As to which thing in literature, it always seems to me that there is a world to be done.  
And in these times, when the tendency is to be frightfully literal and catalogue-like—to make the 
thing, in short, a sort of sum in reduction that any miserable creature can do in that way—I have 
an idea (really founded on the love of what I profess), that the very holding of popular literature 
through a kind of popular dark age, may depend on such fanciful treatment.20 
The distinction here is clear: for Dickens, fiction might represent reality but not convey 
truth.  Anyone might create fiction that has “exact truth” in it, but it takes an artist to present 
truth in such a way that the reader actually recognizes it.  A “catalogue-like” representation of 
                                                 
19 See, for instance, his preface to Oliver Twist.  However, as both Ford and Lettis have 
argued, Dickens’s prefaces are often misleading because they were usually direct responses 
to reviewers who criticized the lack of reality in his fiction.  Because of this, they tend to 
overstress Dickens’s adherence to the kind of strict realism that demands an uncolored 
“transcript of real life.”  
 
20 Quoted in Forster’s biography.  Ford, Dickens and His Readers: Aspects of Novel-
Criticism since 1836, 135. 
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the world, Dickens suggests, may actually appear less true than a more artful one.  Here Dickens 
uses the word “true” to describe fiction that not only represents the actual facts of reality, but 
also has a life of its own in the reader’s mind.  A “dry as dust” sum of reality has little chance of 
communicating the truths of human life to its readers because its depictions are simply 
uninteresting.  The truths contained in this kind of fiction have no effect because the “manner of 
stating the truth” fails to captivate the reader’s imagination and affection.  Without art, in short, 
our experience of realist fiction is too much like our experience of real life, its dullness and 
tedium offering little reminder of what is most valuable, meaningful, or interesting about human 
existence.21   
Dickens expresses a similar sentiment in the first number of Household Words, in the 
“Preliminary Word” which describes the publication’s spirit and aims: 
No mere utilitarian spirit, no iron binding of the mind to grim 
realities, will give a harsh tone to our Household Words.  In the 
bosoms of the young and old, of the well-to-do and of the poor, we 
would tenderly cherish that light of Fancy which is inherent in the 
human breast; which, according to its nurture, burns with an 
inspiring flame, or sinks into a sullen glare, but which (or woe 
betide that day!) can never be extinguished.  To show to all, that in 
all familiar things, even those which are repellent on the surface, 
there is Romance enough, if we will find it out:–-to teach the 
hardest workers at this whirling wheel of toil, that their lot is not 
                                                 
21 In this, Dickens’s view is closer than that of his contemporaries (such as Thackeray or 
Eliot) to an Aristotelian concept of the techniques and social benefits of mimesis.   
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necessarily a moody, brutal fact, excluded from the sympathies and 
graces of imagination; to bring the greater and the lesser in degree, 
together upon that wide field, and mutually dispose them to a 
better acquaintance and a kinder understanding—it is one main 
object of our Household Words.22   
Here Dickens reconfigures the tension between realism and romance that shaped so much of 
mid-Victorian literary criticism.  He begins with an apparently clear-cut distinction between a 
utilitarian viewpoint, which sees the world through the light of science, and that of Household 
Words, which looks at the world through the light of fancy.  While fancy or imagination is innate 
to all human beings, Dickens says, it is in short supply in the current climate of England—a 
climate that values empirical analysis over all other human pursuits, including those of 
imaginative invention or sympathetic communion.23  But in the middle of the passage this strict 
distinction between realism and romance is softened: Household Words does not intend to turn 
away from fact and escape entirely into fancy.  While the start of the paragraph might easily be 
describing a view of the world transformed by a kind of poetic vision, it soon becomes clear that 
the focus here is not upon the artist or poet and his capacity for transforming familiar objects 
through imaginative invention.  Instead, Dickens explains, Household Words will concentrate 
                                                 
22 Quoted in Charles Dickens, The Writings of Charles Dickens, ed. Gilbert Ashville Pierce 
(New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1894), 44. 
 
23 With this complaint, Dickens echoes Wordsworth’s estimation of the nineteenth century 
in the “Preface” to Lyrical Ballads.  William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 
Selected Critical Essays, ed. Thomas M. Raysor (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1958).  
John Stuart Mill expresses a similar sentiment in his Autobiography, which describes the 
deficit of imagination and emotion in his strictly utilitarian upbringing.  See Chapter Four 
and Five in J.S. Mill, Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press, 1955).  
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upon these everyday details themselves—upon the surfaces of life that appear uninteresting or 
even repellent at first glance.  These surfaces will not be transformed but rather seen anew; they 
will not be colored by art but rather art will allow us to see them again with a difference.  Here 
fancy is a tool rather than a place of escape, allowing the reader to see the romance—the interest 
and charm—in the everyday facts of their existence. 24  Indeed, fancy is already at work in the 
“Preliminary Word” itself: “fact” in this passage is no longer value-free, divorced from the 
“sympathies and graces of imagination,” but has been given emotions and intentions—it is 
“moody” and “brutal.”   
Dickens’s priority, then, was to write novels that had a vitality of impression—to write 
fiction that created parallel realities.  He often stated that one of his goals as an author was to 
produce fictional characters that would become a part of the daily lives of his readers, a 
sentiment echoed in the printed description of The Household Narrative, a monthly supplement 
to Household Words, which states that the journal would “aspire to live in the Household 
affections, and to be numbered among the Household thoughts, of our readers.”25  The 
                                                 
24 The “Preface” to the first edition of Bleak House expresses a similar idea, Dickens 
stating that “in Bleak House, I have purposely dwelt upon the romantic side of familiar 
things.”  Robert Newsome’s book-length study of Bleak House takes its thesis from these 
words, using them as a touchstone for understanding Dickens’s peculiar brand of realism.  
He sees Dickensian realism not so much as a mix of romance and realism as a productive 
tension between two genres, which imposes “upon the reader a kind of unsettled and 
unsettling double perspective which requires us to see things as at once “romantic” and 
“familiar.”  See especially Newsome’s “Introduction.”  Robert Newsome, Dickens on the 
Romantic Side of Familiar Things: Bleak House and the Novel Tradition (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1977). 
 
25 Quoted in Richard Lettis, Dickens on Literature: A Continuing Study of His Aesthetic 
(New York: AMS Press, 1990), 138.  In the years immediately following his death, most 
critics attested to Dickens’s ability to create fictional characters that lived among the 
British public as if they were real people.  In an 1870 article in St. Pauls Magazine, 
Anthony Trollope asserted that “No other writer of English language except Shakespeare 
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independent life of his novels was so important that he avoided disrupting it by asserting his own 
persona as author.  His view, stated many times throughout his life, was that art should speak for 
itself, and should require no authorial interference to be understood.  He felt that authorial 
interference, which he called “dissection,” detracted from the reality of fiction.  He was critical 
of this kind of authorial presence in contemporary fiction and advised against it in his editorial 
commentary.26  Long prefaces detailing a novelist’s intentions or aims, authorial interjections 
explaining characters’ motivations, or too-apparent plotting devices only reminded the reader 
that they were reading a fictional creation rather than experiencing a parallel reality.   
But Dickens’s reluctance to comment on his own fiction added to the critical opinion that 
his novels were more amusing than thought-provoking.  Acknowledging the vividness of his 
fictional creations, critics like George Henry Lewes and Walter Bagehot judged that Dickens’s 
tendency to stay at the surface of reality showed a lack of interest in the psychological lives of 
                                                                                                                                                             
has left so many types of character as Dickens has done,–characters which are known by 
their names familiarly as household words, and which bring to our minds vividly and at 
once a certain well-understood set of ideas, habits, phrases, and costumes, making together 
a man, or woman, or child whom we know at a glance and recognise at a sound—as we do 
our own intimate friends.”  Quoted in Kitton, ed., Dickensiana: A Bibliography of the 
Literature Relating to Charles Dickens and His Writings., 432-33.  In the same year, a 
writer for The Spectator asserted that the British public not only read Dickens’s novels but 
“lived with” their cast of characters as if they were real people. “The Genius of Dickens.” 
The Spectator (1870): 749, 51.  A reviewer for St. James’s Magazine repeated Dickens’s 
own words from Household Words to describe his characters: “All his books are household 
words; all his characters are our friends or our foes…”  “Charles Dickens.  With a 
Portrait.”  St. James’s Magazine.  (1870): 696, 99. 
 
26 For instance, Lettis states that “though he liked some things about Wilkie Collins’ The 
Woman in White, he criticized its propensity to ‘give an audience credit for nothing, which 
necessarily involves the forcing of points on their attention…’  In his ‘Address’ in the 
Cheap Edition of Pickwick Papers (1847) he wrote ‘It is not for an author to describe his 
own books.  If they cannot speak for themselves, he is likely to do little service by 
speaking for them.”  Lettis, Dickens on Literature: A Continuing Study of His Aesthetic, 
164. 
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his characters and an absence of coherent thought on the part of the author.  In this view, the 
narrative fragmentation characteristic of Dickens’s novels (acknowledged by most nineteenth-
century critics) was a result of the inadequate intellectual sophistication of Dickens himself.  In 
his influential 1858 article for the National Review, Walter Bagehot saw in Dickens much lively 
detail but little coherence of thought, asserting that “vivid facts stand out in his imagination, and 
a fresh, illustrative style brings them home to the imagination of his readers; but his continuous 
philosophy utterly fails in the attempt to harmonize them—to educe a theory or elaborate a 
precept from them…His abstract understanding is so far inferior to his picturesque imagination 
as to give, even to his best works, the sense of jar and incompleteness, and to deprive them 
altogether of the crystalline finish which is characteristic of the clear and cultured 
understanding…”27  For Bagehot, Dickens’s strength is in his ability to create illustrations that 
surprise readers into attention to everyday life, and that enliven their imaginations with the vivid 
specifics of human existence.  But in Bagehot’s analysis, Dickens’s strength is also his 
weakness; failing to create a coherent theory of human nature or a moral lesson for social life, 
the details of his narratives give a sense of “jar” and “incompleteness” to his writing.  His novels 
do not transform the varied and miscellaneous particulars of social life into polished and 
harmonious wholes, but stage a series of imaginative encounters with real life that are often only 
casually connected.28   
                                                 
27 Bagehot, W. "Charles Dickens." The National Review (1858).  Excerpted in Philip 
Collins, ed., Charles Dickens: The Critical Heritage (London: Routledge, 1995), 403-12. 
 
28 Several other critical summations in the years following Dickens’s death praise 
Dickens’s attention to detail but regret the superficiality of his fiction.  For instance, see 
the London Quarterly Review’s 1871 article, in which the author discusses the qualities 
that prevented Dickens’s collected works from achieving the status of “high art.”  He 
describes Dickens’s style as having an “eye receptive of the whole surface, whether the 
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In his derisive “Dickens in Relation to Criticism,” George Henry Lewes describes 
Dickens’s talent as an “animal intelligence”: he asserts that “thought is strangely absent from his 
works.  I do not suppose a single thoughtful remark on life or character could be found 
throughout the twenty volumes.  Not only is there a marked absence of the reflective tendency, 
but one sees no indication of the past life of humanity having ever occupied him; keenly as he 
observes the objects before him, he never connects his observations into a general expression, 
never seems interested in general relations of things.”29  For Lewes, as for Bagehot, Dickens’s 
fiction is characterized by its striking details but marred by its lack of reflective and abstract 
thought.  Dickens’s representations have immediacy but no philosophy, Lewes asserts, offering 
no general theory of human life or coherent system of thought.  
                                                                                                                                                             
object were a character or a landscape, and he painted the same things with a hand 
reproductive of a whole surface in perfect distinctness, often rising to an impetuous 
vividness peculiarly his own: but his representations generally leave the impression, not so 
much of men and woman whose life is a deep and serious thing, but of persons who have 
assembled on a stage to amuse other persons, or to appeal to the senses of the same…”  
“Charles Dickens.” The London Quarterly Review (1871).  Excerpted in  Charles Dickens: 
The Critical Heritage, 565-67.  H. A. Taine’s History of English Literature, published in 
1871, similarly laments Dickens’s enthusiasm for the numerous small details of life over 
and above the high-minded and/or beautiful.  H.A. Taine, History of English Literature, 
trans. H. Van Laun (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1871). 
 
29 Fred. G. Kitton, ed., Dickensiana: A Bibliography of the Literature Relating to Charles 
Dickens and His Writings (New York: Haskell House, 1971), 475.  George Eliot expresses 
a similar, although more tempered, estimation of Dickens in her essay “The Natural History 
of German Life”: “We have one great novelist among us who is gifted with the utmost 
power of rendering the external traits of our town population; and if he could give us their 
psychological character—their conceptions of life, and their emotions—with the same truth 
as their idiom and manners, his books would be the greatest contribution Art has ever made 
to the awakening of social sympathies.” George Eliot, "The Natural History of German 
Life," in Selected Essays, Poems, and Other Writings, ed. A.S. Byatt and Nicholas Warren 
(London: Penguin, 1990), 264. 
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Bagehot and Lewes, among other Victorian critics, portray Dickens as having an 
overdeveloped sense of the particular and an underdeveloped sense of the abstract, which 
resulted in fiction that was more interested in exteriors than interiors, that was more devoted to 
portraying difference than creating narrative coherence.  Twentieth-century critics have 
attempted to bring greater unity to Dickens’s novels.30  But in many ways, my reading of 
Dickens’s fiction has more in common with the criticism of Dickens’s contemporaries.  Like 
Bagehot and Lewes, I read Dickens’s fiction as more about noticing than understanding, more 
about striking the reader with the miscellaneous details of social life than searching out the 
deeper meanings of human existence.  Unlike these critics, I read Dickens’s interest in the 
surfaces of life not as an artistic failing, but as a purposive engagement with the conditions of 
contemporary life.   With his attention to detail, Dickens sought to act upon his readers: to 
surprise them out of habits and conventions of thought, to awaken human capacities of feeling 
and imagination, and to enlighten truths of human life that are often effaced in routine 
experience.  In this, Dickens’s allegiance was not to art itself—to the coherence of his fiction or 
the reigning ideas of his representations—but what art could do in the world, what difference his 
fiction could make in the minds of his readers.   
                                                 
30 The problem of narrative unity in Dickens’s fiction has continued to be a major concern 
for literary critics into the twentieth century.  While the criticism of George Henry Lewes 
and Henry James is very different from, say, the psychoanalytic and Marxist readings of 
the first half of the twentieth century or the post-structuralist and feminist criticism of the 
late twentieth century, they share a critical attention to problems of unity in Dickens’s 
novels.  Whether the aim has been to find hidden order in Dickens’s fiction (a quality of 
early twentieth-century psychoanalytic and Marxist readings) or to show that the disorder 
of the novels has an underlying ideological significance (a more recent trend in criticism 
that draws from poststructuralist thought), this attention has led to readings more interested 
in the “insides” of Dickens’s novels than in their “outsides.”   
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2.2 BLEAK HOUSE 
My reading of Bleak House begins by considering what the world of the novel looks like 
with only the third person narrator as our guide.  Studying the opening chapters of the novel, we 
see how the third person narration effects a re-enchantment of the scenes of everyday social life 
by matching its narrative style to its central subjects.  These chapters introduce the Court of 
Chancery and the Dedlock family, both worlds in which there is an alarming distance between 
appearance and reality.  In Chancery law and aristocratic tradition, all is performed according to 
custom regardless of whether these rules have any contemporary use or value.  Here the form of 
the system itself is more important than the purpose it was originally intended to serve, more 
pressing than any individual who might benefit or suffer from it. Convention, dislodged from the 
concrete details of human life, has taken on a life of its own in these two worlds.  
Like these two systems, the third person narrator is interested in the appearance of things 
over their substance, in form separated from its uses and effects.  Here characters as well as 
places and objects are depicted as mere surface, differentiated from other surfaces only by 
certain exterior characteristics.  Like the workings of Chancery law or the conventions of the 
British aristocracy, the opening chapters of the novel have movement and activity but little 
progression or development.  Here the third person narrator transfers the reader from one scene 
to another, from one chapter to the next, but does little to further the novel’s central plot lines. In 
this way, the third person narrator is more of a surveyor than a storyteller at the start of Bleak 
House, 31 the narrator’s collections of details creating more of a landscape or map than a story in 
                                                 
31 Of course, this is a narrative mode characteristic of mid-Victorian omniscient narration 
in general, although Bleak House combines a panoramic point of view with narrative 
fragmentation—not something readily seen in George Eliot, for instance.  For a historical 
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any traditional sense of the word. 32  Beginning the novel with “In Chancery” and “In Fashion,” 
the third person narrator places the reader in the landscape of Bleak House, but we must wait for 
Esther’s first chapter, “A Progress,” to give us a narrative path to follow within this landscape. 
By matching style and subject, the third person narrative strikes the reader with the truths 
of these two British institutions that are effaced in everyday experience: their self-fulfilling 
repetition, social uselessness, and perverse effects upon the human beings that are subjected to 
their rules and operations.  It also, ironically, creates a view of social life that counters the kind 
of totalization of human experience upheld by such institutions.  Representing British social life 
at the level of aesthetic detail, with characters, objects, and events divorced from their emotional 
or moral significance, it introduces the reader to the world of Bleak House without totalization or 
generalization.  Of course, the totalization that the third person narration resists is not 
institutional but discursive, the disjointed storytelling of the first two chapters prohibiting the 
kind of hierarchization of detail required for building clear plotlines and creating fully-drawn 
characters.  Creating a “democratization of detail,” the third person narrator invites a certain 
                                                                                                                                                             
contextualization of the importance of narrative “overview” in Victorian fiction and 
culture, see Arac, Commissioned Spirits: The Shaping of Social Motion in Dickens, 
Carlyle, Melville, and Hawthorne.  For the relationship between fictional and scientific 
“overview” in the Victorian period, see the first two chapters of George Levine, Darwin 
and the Novelists: Patterns of Science in Victorian Fiction (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1992). 
 
32 The third person narration stands in sharp contrast to Esther’s narration, which is linear 
and developmental; it is a narrative of “progress” as her first chapter attests.  While 
Esther’s view is much more limited than the third person narrator’s, her depiction of 
characters and scenes is more comprehensive—having none of the narrative fragmentation 
characteristic of the other half of the novel.  Like Dickens’s own David Copperfield, Great 
Expectations, or Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre, Esther’s half of the narrative is in the spirit 
of a “novel of education.”  It is what Mikhail Bakhtin calls a biographical narrative in his 
discussion of the bildungsroman in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays.  Mikhail 
Mikhailovich Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, trans. Vern W. McGee 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 22. 
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expansiveness of mind and breadth of attention in the reader.33  Before the reader has been 
tapped into the central plotlines of the novel and introduced to its key characters, we are 
presented a picture of social life remarkably unlike our everyday experience of it—in which 
every detail strikes us with equal importance.   
But the third person narrative also replicates the totalizing institutions that the novel 
critiques, having no power to intervene in the world it depicts.  In other words, there can be no 
benevolence in the overview presented in the opening chapters of the novel.  The third person 
narrator has access to a broad and multiple view of British society, but has no capacity to act in 
this world—for good or ill.  This is because, as Esther’s narrative makes clear, goodness can 
only come from the individual in Bleak House.  Famous for skewering British philanthropy and 
organized charity, any systematic effort to better the lives of individuals is suspect in Bleak 
House.  There is an important critique, then, in the early sections of the third person narrative, 
which is easily lost if we focus our critical attention upon the second half of the novel.  This is a 
critique of the solutions that Esther’s narrative offers to the social problems depicted by the third 
person narrative.  These solutions, the third person narrative suggests, are distressingly narrow 
because they are limited to the random good deeds of individuals (such Esther and John 
Jarndyce).   
                                                 
33 In Bleak House, as elsewhere in this dissertation, narrative interruption invites new 
freedoms of mind in the reader.  Here we can say that the third person narrative of Bleak 
House invites a more “writerly” reading, in Roland Barthes’s sense of the word.  Roland 
Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974). 
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2.3 IN CHANCERY 
The first two chapters of Bleak House establish the central subjects of the third person 
narrative, two British institutions: the Court of Chancery and the Dedlock family, a branch of the 
aristocracy.  In these chapters, “In Chancery” and “In Fashion,” we are introduced to the worlds 
of Chancery law and aristocratic fashion as if we are one of their regular inhabitants.  For 
instance, the opening passage of the novel represents Chancery not only as a place (both the 
court and surrounding neighborhood) and an institution of law (governing estate disputes), but 
also an experience of a system of useless and circular activity.  The readerly experience of this 
passage is like the daily life of the characters whose lives move within the circles of Chancery 
law, such as Mr. Gridley or Miss Flite.  For the reader, as for these characters, Chancery is a 
world of perpetual activity but no progression, allowing no rest for its inhabitants and offering no 
means of escape.  The Court is a closed and self-fulfilling system: once you are “in” Chancery it 
seems impossible to get “out” of it.   
The narrator establishes the atmosphere of an unrelenting and yet unproductive system in 
the opening analogy of the novel, which compares the workings of the Court with the miserable 
London weather.  With this metaphor, the third person narrator makes the familiar strange by 
transforming the abstract legal system of Chancery law into a vivid sensory experience:  
London.  Michaelmas term lately over, and the Lord Chancellor 
sitting in Lincoln’s Inn Hall.  Implacable November weather.  As 
much mud in the streets, as if the waters had but newly retired 
from the face of the earth, and it would not be wonderful to meet a 
Megalosaurus, forty feet long or so, waddling like an elephantine 
lizard up Holborn Hill.  Smoke lowering down from chimney-pots, 
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making a soft black drizzle with flakes of soot in it as big as full- 
grown snowflakes—gone into mourning, one might imagine, for 
the death of the sun.  Dogs, undistinguishable in mire.  Horses, 
scarcely better; splashed to their very blinkers.  Foot passengers, 
jostling one another’s umbrellas, in a general infection of ill 
temper, and losing their foot-hold at street-corners, where tens of 
thousands of other foot passengers have been slipping and sliding 
since the day broke (if this day ever broke), adding new deposits to 
the crust upon crust of mud, sticking at those points tenaciously to 
the pavement, and accumulating at compound interest.34 
Discursively this passage has a cumulative effect, speeding up as its sentences grow longer, 
moving from the staccato of its first three sentences to the longer rhythms of its middle section.  
Reading this passage is like slowly being submerged into the world it presents—or perhaps more 
accurately, being gradually inundated by it as if by a rainstorm or mudslide.  Because many of 
the lines are missing verbs, and there appears at first to be little connection between them, the 
forward movement of this passage is accumulative rather than progressive.  The action verbs are 
almost all in present progressive tense, denoting events that are ongoing: the Lord Chancellor is 
“sitting,” smoke is “lowering,” foot passengers are “jostling,” “slipping,” “sliding,” “adding,” 
and mud deposits are “sticking,” and “accumulating.”  The action in this passage is always 
happening and never concluded: the weather is, has been, and will be terrible; the Lord 
                                                 
34 Charles Dickens, Bleak House, ed. Nicola Bradbury (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), 
13.  Hereafter cited as BH.   
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Chancellor sits in Lincoln’s Inn Hall in the past, present, and future.  There is perpetual 
movement, but no change.   
Chancery, in the reader’s experience of it, has no beginning, middle, or end: the style of 
the third person narration matches the repetitions and accumulations of the Court of Chancery, 
and the continual but never concluded actions of the opening passage (the “jostling,” “slipping,” 
and “sliding”) correspond with the interminable case of Jarndyce and Jarndyce.35  As I have 
noted, this is characteristic of the third person narrative in the novel as a whole, its style of 
representation having none of the teleology of Esther’s narrative.  What connects all the elements 
depicted in the first paragraph of the novel—what links the Lord Chancellor, the weather, the 
foot passengers—is seemingly only their location in the neighborhood of Chancery.  They are all 
“in Chancery,” but their relationship beyond spatial proximity is unclear.   
This passage does employ forms of connection alternative to linear storytelling, such as 
accumulation, which is depicted both thematically and discursively in the first chapter.  There is 
an increasing buildup of mud in the streets, just as there is an ongoing accretion of legal 
documents in the case of Jarndyce and Jarndyce, just as there is a steady accumulation of 
repeated words and phrases in the opening passages of the novel.  This discursive accumulation 
continues throughout the first chapter, the narrator returning to phrases such as “High Court of 
Chancery” and “Lord Chancellor,” as well as “Lincoln’s Inn Hall” again and again, and 
mentioning in almost every paragraph the words “fog” or “mud.”  Importantly, this repetition of 
                                                 
35 Dickens began writing Bleak House following a series of exposés, published in the 
Times in 1850, on the Court of Chancery which detailed several cases that had run on so 
long that court costs absorbed all available funds, much like Jarndyce and Jarndyce.  Paul 
Davis, Critical Companion to Charles Dickens: A Literary Reference to His Life and Work, 
2nd ed. (New York: Facts on File, 2007), 42. 
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certain words and phrases does nothing to expand their description or characterization in any 
substantive way.  In most cases, there is nothing of significance added with each repetition.  The 
effect of these words is stylistic: the repeated sound of them and the repeated look of them upon 
the page create a kind of alliterative accumulation—what amounts to a kind of geological 
layering of certain words and phrases within the other details of the chapter.  Like the jostled foot 
passenger caught in the rain and fog, or the law clerk standing in the midst of the documents of 
Jarndyce and Jarndyce, the reader has to slog through these layers of accumulated words.   
In this chapter, characters are named in a peculiar kind of metonymic short-hand, the 
whole of a person being represented by a single part of their body or dress.  For instance, in the 
description of the Court of Chancery, Mr. Blowers does not wear an “eminent silk gown.”  He is 
an eminent silk gown.  When the Lord Chancellor calls Jarndyce and Jarndyce before the court, 
it is “maces, bags, and purses” not whole persons that laugh at the Lord Chancellor’s joke. 36   
The woman we will later come to know as Miss Flite is a “little mad old woman in a squeezed 
bonnet.”37  In this narrative short-hand, distinct people, places, and objects are dwarfed by the 
larger atmosphere of fog and dirt encompassing Chancery and those that inhabit it.  With an 
accrual of both the words written in the case of Jarndyce and Jarndyce and the words repeated 
throughout the chapter, it is as if the few human characters named here are buried or being buried 
by an accumulation of words.  
Combined with the image of the Megalosaurus, described in the opening scene of the 
novel, this geological accrual of words in chapter one suggests an analogy for the place of 
                                                 
36 BH, 17. 
 
37 BH, 15. 
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individual characters within the world of Chancery: fossilization.38  If the literal and discursive 
build up of words creates something like “strata,” we can imagine the few human characters 
buried within these layers as “fossils.”  Depicted in the metonymic short-hand of the third person 
narrator, Miss Flite is in a similar state in the first chapter as was the Megalosaurus skeleton 
before it was discovered and reconstructed.  Like the Megalosaurus fossil, Miss Flite is barely 
visible within the accumulations of this chapter, requiring the expanded portrayal of Esther’s 
narrative to transform the “little mad old woman in a squeezed bonnet” into a fully drawn human 
character.  Of course, we can see this only retrospectively, because the narration in Chapter One 
offers no indication that any of the sparsely-drawn characters mentioned in this chapter are of 
any particular significance to the novel as a whole. 
Indeed, in the first chapter, all details appear equal, the third person narrator achieving a 
kind of “democratization of detail” in the depiction of the world of Chancery.  The difficulties of 
dogs and horses in the mud-filled streets seem no more or less important than the same struggles 
of the foot passengers.  Most of the people present in Lincoln’s Inn Hall are unnamed, and 
appear to be interchangeable, there being no apparent reason to be interested in one lawyer or 
law clerk over another.  There is no central actor in this chapter, and no sense that we are meant 
to follow any particular character with special attention.  The Lord Chancellor is certainly at the 
center of the scene, and his appearance is given more description than most; but there is a sense 
that this depiction is merely another feature of the landscape being sketched, rather than a 
                                                 
38 The incomplete skeleton of the Megalosaurus was discovered in 1823 by William 
Buckland, who constructed a complete picture of the animal from a collection of separate 
fossils discovered deep within the earth’s strata.  Buckland describes the fossil in the first 
published description of a dinosaur in the 1824 article “Notice on the Megalosaurus or 
Great Fossil Lizard of Stonesfield.”  William Buckland, "Notice on the Megalosaurus or 
Great Fossil Lizard of Stonesfield," Transactions of the Geological Society of London 1 
(1824). 
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characterization of an individual that will be central to the novel as a whole.  Nor do the 
individuals depicted in the first chapter appear to act from any internal motivation or interest.  
Instead, they act according to the roles prescribed to them by the Court, every decision and 
action apparently dictated by a larger system of legal rules and conventions. They are more like 
automatons than human characters, performing as if a part of one large machine.  They can only 
be called characters in the alphabetical sense: formal differences define them, rather than actions 
or personalities.  They are just another exterior feature of the map of Chancery and the reader can 
only see their importance as a part of the larger landscape of this scene.   
2.4 IN FASHION 
In the second chapter of Bleak House, which turns from Chancery to the Dedlocks’ 
London house, locations are not linked in any way they would be in Esther’s narrative: through 
action (for instance, Esther walking from one to the other to visit a friend) or through emotion 
(for instance, each place having personal significance for Esther).  Instead, Chancery and 
Chesney Wold are connected by analogy.  Chapter two, “In Fashion,” begins: “It is but a glimpse 
of the world of fashion that we want on this same miry afternoon.  It is not so unlike the Court of 
Chancery, but that we may pass from the one scene to the other, as the crow flies.”39  The 
narrator can move “as the crow flies” from one scene to the other, from Chancery to the Dedlock 
family, because both the world of fashion and the world of Chancery run on the same laws of 
“precedent and usage.”  In this way, it is a stylistic affinity that links these two different British 
                                                 
B BH, 20.   
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institutions.  Importantly, this analogy is made possible through the third person narrator’s broad 
survey of the world of Bleak House.  In the narrator’s disjointed short-hand, with little explicit 
narrative connection between things, other kinds of relationships suggest themselves—just as 
analogy does here. 
Like Chancery, the world of the British aristocracy is a system in which the present has 
already been decided by the past, the new prevented or curtailed by the traditions of the old.  
According to the narrator, they are both systems that have lived beyond their time; they have 
overslept “like Rip Van Winkle or Sleeping Beauty,” only to awake in a world for which they are 
unequipped.40  In other words, the laws of these two worlds—the rules of Chancery law in the 
one and the conventions of aristocratic society in the other—are at a disconnect with the contexts 
of the present.  They have become separate from the purposes they once served in the past, 
having outlived their original usefulness.  The system itself has become more important than the 
individuals it was created to serve, the personal always being second to the traditional, the 
conventional, the precedented.  The third person narrator tells us that the aristocracy “is a world 
wrapped up in too much jeweler’s cotton and fine wool, and cannot hear the rushing of the larger 
worlds, and cannot see them as they circle round the sun.  It is a deadened world, and its growth 
is sometimes unhealthy for want of air.”41  In the third person narrator’s eyes, this world has as 
little humanity as the Court of Chancery.  It does not acknowledge the importance or even 
existence of human society beyond its own boundaries.  Its own traditions and habits order all 
that is acknowledged to exist.  This state of isolation has consequences not only for the outside 
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world it ignores, but also for its own inhabitants, who are dwarfed by the aristocratic conventions 
that rule them.   
There is just as little human action and interest here as there was in the first chapter, the 
third person narrator devoting the majority of this chapter to describing states of being rather 
than speech or action: “Sir Leicester is honorable, obstinate, truthful, high-spirited, intensely 
prejudiced, perfectly unreasonable man.”42 Mr. Tulkinghorn “is surrounded by a mysterious halo 
of family confidences; of which he is known to be the silent depository.” 43  This chapter is 
primarily about what Sir Leicester Dedlock, Lady Dedlock, and Mr. Tulkinghorn are rather than 
what they do or say, and the sense is that these are rather unchanging states of being.  What they 
are now is what they have been in the past and will be in the future.  The repetition of certain 
phrases in this chapter, such as “My Lady Dedlock,” supports the idea of each character as a 
steady state.  The passages that introduce each of the three central characters are mostly 
structured in the same way, the sentences following a subject / verb / adjective pattern.  For 
instance, the paragraph on Sir Leicester begins: “Sir Leicester is twenty years, full measure, 
older than my Lady.  He will never see sixty-five again, nor perhaps sixty-six, nor yet sixty-
seven.  He has a twist of gout now and then, and walks a little stiffly.”44 
In this chapter, there is only sparse dialogue, and the conversation between Sir Leicester, 
Lady Dedlock, and Mr. Tulkinghorn on the subject of Jarndyce and Jarndyce is slow and halting.  
There is so little apparent human interest, so little evident animation in this dialogue that the 
reader wonders whether there is anything of importance in the exchange—that is, until Lady 
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Dedlock becomes suddenly engrossed in the law-hand of the document Mr. Tulkinghorn is 
reading.  Even Lady Dedlock’s fainting spell, which is the most dramatic event of the chapter by 
far, is not particularly dynamic, because the third person narrator describes no change or 
movement in her face or manner until Mr. Tulkinghorn has started from his seat and exclaimed 
that she is ill.  Here, as elsewhere, the style of the third person narrative matches its subject, the 
depiction of the Dedlocks in Chapter Two being defined by a kind of disinterested detachment 
from the human beings being presented.  It is as if the narrator is wrapped up in “jeweler’s 
cotton,” allowing us to get only so close to the characters depicted in this chapter.  We get a 
detailed picture of what these characters are in general—My Lady Dedlock is a chilly woman, 
Sir Leicester is a proud man, Mr. Tulkinghorn is a rusty legal type—but very little information 
about them in the present scene of the Dedlock’s drawing room.  We are certainly not close 
enough to our subjects to see the expression on Sir Leicester’s face as he dozes by the fire or the 
style of handwriting on the affidavit that draws Lady Dedlock’s attention.   
In this chapter, as in Chapter one, the third person narrative is both like and unlike the 
institution it presents, depicting aristocratic characters in a way that discursively exhibits certain 
truths about the British system of aristocracy.  Importantly, these are truths that may never be 
recognized in routine experience or readily seen in Esther’s narration, but strike the reader with 
full force in the third person narrative.  In the narrator’s depiction of the court of Chancery, we 
recognize this institution’s self-fulfilling repetition, social uselessness, and perverse effects upon 
those who have been named by one of its suits; in the portrayal of the aristocracy, we recognize 
this system’s disconnection from the wider world of human life and its suffocation of the 
emotional and imaginative lives of those that live under its rules.       
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2.5 THE SURFACE OF CHARACTER  
In the first two chapters of the novel, the third person narration centers upon three central 
areas: Chancery and the two Dedlock homes (the London house and Chesney Wold in 
Lincolnshire).  These three areas constitute the initial borders of the third person narration’s map 
or landscape.  After these chapters, the third person narrator returns to survey these areas 
repeatedly, sometimes adding a new location within or adjacent to their borders.  For instance, 
after Esther’s narrative in Chapters Three through Six, the third person narrator revisits Chesney 
Wold in Chapter Seven.  This chapter depicts a few key locations within the Dedlock estate: the 
inside of Chesney Wold, presided over by its housekeeper Mrs. Rouncewell, and the path of lime 
trees known as the “ghost walk.”  In Chapter Ten, the third person narrator returns to Chancery 
to designate three more sites within this neighborhood: Snagsby’s shop, Tulkinghorn’s residence, 
and Nemo’s room in Krook’s shop.  This map gets significantly larger at the point of Bucket’s 
introduction to the novel, when he takes Mr. Snagsby through Tom-All-Alone’s in Chapter 
Twenty Two.  Of course, all of these places become significant in the central plot lines of the 
novel—particularly for the mystery surrounding Esther’s parentage.  Nevertheless, as we have 
seen, early in the novel the reader is unsure of the relationships between each of these locations 
as they are marked by the third person narrator.   
 The third person narrator’s representation of characters is performed in a similar 
way: as the novel progresses, the narrative gradually includes more characters within each of 
these central locations.  This supports a certain non-differentiation of character and material 
world in Bleak House, since characters are marked by the third person narrator in much the same 
way as physical locations.  Further, most of the characters exclusive to the third person narration 
are introduced by their location in the landscape of the novel, the narrator giving more details 
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about the physical aspects of their home than about the characters themselves.  In this way, we 
can almost imagine the large cast of characters in Bleak House as constituting a “landscape” in 
and of themselves.  The third person narrator turns his eye upon some characters repeatedly 
throughout the whole of the novel, such as Miss Flite, Lady Dedlock, Sir Leicester, Mr. 
Tulkinghorn, and later Mr. George and Mr. Bucket.  Others only get one or two mentions and are 
never heard from again, such as Mr. Tangle, a lawyer named in the first chapter, Guster, Mrs. 
Snagsby’s serving-woman, Little Swills, a performer at the Sol’s Arms, or Mrs. Piper and Mrs. 
Perkins, who have one conversation together in the street following Krook’s death.  Other 
characters appear in several chapters over the course of the novel, but then drop from view, like 
Mr. and Mrs. Chadband or Mr. and Mrs. Bagnet.  These incidental characters, literally only 
relevant to the incident or episode at hand, are never fully drawn for the reader in the third 
person narrative.  Similar to the condensed characters of the opening chapter of the novel, these 
incidental characters are portrayed in only a slightly more expanded metonymic short-hand.  
They are each known by a particular aspect of their dress, speech, or manner, of which the reader 
is reminded each time they appear: Guster has seizures, Mr. Chadband’s head is an “oil 
refinery,” Young Smallweed wears an overly-large hat in imitation of Mr. Guppy, and Mr. 
Weevle (a.k.a Jobling) “grows up” as he eats his food.  Mr. Smallweed is a bag of clothes 
slumped in a chair and calls his wife “poll-parrot.”  Phil is lame and gets from place to place by 
sliding along walls.   
Characters that get more page-time do not fare much better: although the third person 
narrator does have “central characters,” like Lady Dedlock and Mr. Tulkinghorn, their portrayal 
expands very little with each appearance.  As I have suggested, the exterior surface of these 
characters is the third person narrator’s primary subject, and we are offered little more beyond 
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appearances and overt actions.  Lady Dedlock is always bored and looking out the window; her 
facial expressions are almost always bland, revealing very little about her inner thoughts and 
desires.  Mr. Tulkinghorn is rusty and secretive, with the ability to fade into the woodwork 
whatever his setting.  Mrs. Rouncewell, in her stomacher, is a proud old lady.  Mr. Guppy wears 
a large hat and ends his sentences in exclamation points!  Mr. Snagsby says “not to put too fine a 
point on it” after most sentences.  Hortense is French and shrewd, and Rosa is mild and beautiful.  
Mr. George has a military manner, standing as if waiting for an order and sitting as though his 
sword still hung by his side.       
It takes Esther’s personalized narrative to expand the portrayals of several of the novel’s 
central characters, as well as to create connections between characters that appear unrelated in 
the third person narration.  However, Esther’s narrative does not entirely abandon the short-hand 
caricatures of the third person narrator.  For characters that reappear in Esther’s narrative after 
being established in the third person narrative, the peculiarities of dress, manner, or speech are 
still present, but are added to and contextualized.  Mrs. Flite still wears her tight bonnet and 
carries her bag full of “documents.”  George still has his military mannerisms, and Lady Dedlock 
continues to reveal little in her facial expressions.  Characters exclusive to Esther’s half of the 
narrative also have their little characteristic peculiarities: Mr. Jarndyce worries about the east 
wind, Richard has a silly logic about money, and Mr. Skimpole is “a child.”  Mr. Boythorn has a 
canary that perches on his head, Charley is a child in a grown-up’s clothes, and Mr. Turveydrop 
has deportment.  But in Esther’s narration, these peculiarities are depicted with affectionate 
interest, while in the third person narration they offer only a low-level differentiation of one 
character from another. 
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This kind of characterization has important effects for the novel as a whole.  To start, 
these caricatures allow the inclusion of a larger number of people in the novel than would be 
possible if every character were fully developed.  In a novel as long as Bleak House, there are 
practical difficulties in depicting a great number of characters, especially when the majority of 
people included in Bleak House are not a part of the story for the whole length of the book.  With 
fifty-plus characters, to count only those named, there is an apparent danger that the reader will 
forget who is who.  This is particularly problematic when characters move in and out of the 
story, for instance, first appearing in an early chapter and then only reappearing ten chapters 
later.45  The short-hand characters depicted in the third person narrative, and to some extent in 
Esther’s narrative, serve to mark individuals with what makes them peculiar—with what makes 
them distinct from others.  For the third person narrator, who is more interested in broad 
overviews than personalized storylines, immediately recognizable characters encourage the 
reader to take in more details of a particular scene at once.  These caricatures allow the narrator 
to move quickly from one detail to the next, giving little more attention to any one character than 
to any one part of the material world.  Caricatures, then, allow for the kind democratization of 
detail that we see, for instance, in the opening passages of the novel, where every detail of the 
social scene strikes us with equal importance.   
The way that the third person narrator chooses to introduce characters that will later 
become important in the novel’s central plot lines shows a further attempt at this kind of 
democratization of detail.  Central characters are presented as if they are merely a part of the 
landscape in a given scene, no more important than anything else—and perhaps just as likely to 
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disappear in the next chapter as any other character.  These characters are slipped into the third 
person narrator’s surveys as if they are part of the furniture, as in Chapter Ten’s introduction of 
Mr. Snagsby:  
On the eastern borders of Chancery Lane, that is to say, more 
particularly, in Cook’s Court, Cursitor Street, Mr. Snagsby, Law 
Stationer, pursues his lawful calling.  In the shade of Cook’s Court, 
at most times a shady place, Mr. Snagsby has dealt in all sorts of 
blank forms of legal process; in skins and rolls of parchment; in 
paper—a foolscap, brief, draft, brown, white, whitey-brown, and 
blotting; in stamps; in office-quills, pens, ink, India-rubber, 
pounce, pins, pencils, sealing wax, and wafers; in red tape, and 
green ferret; in pocket books, almanacks, diaries, and law lists; in 
string boxes, rules, inkstands—glass and leaden, penknives, 
scissors, bodkins, and other small office-cutlery; in short, in 
articles too numerous to mention; ever since he was out of his 
time, and went into partnership with Peffer.”46 
Here as elsewhere, the third person narrator begins Chapter Ten by focusing on the location of 
Mr. Snagsby’s stationary shop within the larger landscape of the novel, giving the specific 
location of Cursitor Street in the neighborhood of Chancery.  The syntactical structure of the first 
sentence frontloads details about locality and backloads details about character, the specific 
aspects of Cook’s Court seeming to be more important than Mr. Snagsby himself.  Indeed, 
reading further, the name Mr. Snagsby is absolutely dwarfed in the paragraph as a whole by the 
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list of law-stationer products he sells.  This list is engrossing in its subjects and style.  A reader 
unfamiliar with the trappings of the legal trade will puzzle over the specifics of each product and 
perhaps wonder about its particular uses.  Stylistically this paragraph has affinities with the 
opening passages of the novel, giving a similar sense of continuous action: Mr. Snagsby has 
dealt in these numerous articles since his apprenticeship and will continue to do so through the 
imaginable future.  Here, too, there is an accumulation of both products and words: even though 
Mr. Snagsby sells “articles too numerous to mention,” the third person narrator does mention a 
great number of them.  Almost buried under an accumulation of paper products, Mr. Snagsby 
himself is only named twice. 
In this way, the third person narrator introduces characters who will play a key role in the 
novel as a whole on the sly, so to speak.  The reader is put in a position, particularly at the start 
of new chapters, very similar to that of Mr. Snagsby in Chapter Twenty-two, when he is 
surprised at the sudden appearance of Mr. Bucket in Mr. Tulkinghorn’s office:  
Mr. Snagsby is dismayed to see, standing with an attentive face 
between himself and the lawyer, at a little distance from the table, 
a person with a hat and stick in his hand who was not there when 
he himself came in, and has not since entered by the door or by 
either of the windows.  There is a press in the room, but its hinges 
have not creaked, nor has a step been audible upon the floor.  Yet 
this third person stands there, with his attentive face, and his hat 
and stick in his hands, and his hands behind him, a composed and 
quiet listener.  He is a stoutly-built, steady-looking, sharp-eyed 
man in black, of about middle age.  Except that he looks at Mr. 
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Snagsby as if he were going to take his portrait, there is nothing 
remarkable about him at first sight but his ghostly manner of 
appearing.47 
In this scene, somehow Mr. Bucket has managed to become one with the furniture in Mr. 
Tulkinghorn’s room, no more out of place than the press or table until Mr. Snagsby notices his 
figure all at once as if he has appeared by magic.  Notice that what is wholly missing from this 
passage is any overt action on the part of Mr. Bucket.  One minute Mr. Bucket is not there, and 
the next he is.  This is the experience of both Snagsby and the reader, since the reader’s gaze 
follows Mr. Snagsby’s in this scene.  Tulkinghorn’s rooms are already familiar to us, as they are 
to Mr. Snagsby: in their description at the start of this chapter, we see familiar aspects of the 
room: the painting of Allegory on the ceiling, the dusty furniture, the large table, etc.—but no 
Mr. Bucket.  But then, all of a sudden, he is there.  Here readers recognize their own experience 
in Mr. Snagsby’s reaction.  Reading Bleak House, we too are often “dismayed to see” that key 
characters and details have snuck up upon us unawares in the third person narrative.  Introduced 
as a part of the landscape of the novel, we are apt to give them no special notice until their 
importance is brought immediately into view (usually by Esther or Mr. Bucket).    
2.6 COLLECTING 
I have described the style of the third person narrator as that of a surveyor rather than a 
storyteller, a kind of a collector of locations, people, and objects rather than a builder of overt 
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storylines.  Collection is also, of course, a prominent theme in the novel. Both narratives are 
populated with characters that collect: early on in the novel, Miss Flite shows Esther her growing 
collection of birds which appear somehow connected to the group of “documents” she carries to 
court every day.  Esther happily accepts an assortment of housekeeping keys to Bleak House, 
“the large bunch” for the housekeeping and the “little bunch” for the cellars.  Of course, not all 
the collectors in Bleak House acquire material objects: some collect information, like Mr. 
Tulkinghorn or Mr. Bucket, while Mr. Jarndyce appears to amass not objects or information but 
people—especially orphaned children, like Esther, Richard, Ada, Charley, and Jo. 
The novel makes an explicit link between the style of the third person narrator and the 
theme of collection in its depiction of Krook’s rag and bottle shop.  Krook’s shop is an overt 
metaphor for the Court of Chancery, and a kind of metaphoric microcosm of the law profession 
as a whole.  Among his neighbors, Krook is known as the “Lord Chancellor” and his shop is 
called the “Court of Chancery.”  Echoing the opening scenes of Chancery in the first chapter of 
Bleak House, Krook’s shop illuminates both the valuelessness and uselessness of the Court’s 
endless operations.  As Esther tells us, in Krook’s shop “everything seemed to be bought, and 
nothing sold...”  Chancery’s suits are similarly devalued, as we have seen, within the court’s 
unproductive cycles of paper and ink.  In other words, nothing of value has ever come out of 
either the real court of Chancery or Krook’s “Court,” because neither Krook’s pile of junk nor 
Chancery’s “wall of words” provide anything useful to anyone in the outside world.  Of course, 
the irony is that hidden within the mess of Krook’s shop is a piece of paper that could decide the 
case of Jarndyce and Jarndyce once and for all.  Krook has a vague awareness of this document, 
knowing he has within his collection something that might be extremely valuable.  But because 
he is unable to read, he cannot apprehend the exact value of the final Jarndyce will.   
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There is an apparent correlation between Krook’s collection of useless objects and the 
accumulation of places, people, and things in the third person narration: in both, we are initially 
unsure which things are worthless and which have value.  But it isn’t until a chapter narrated by 
Esther that we see Krook’s shop as a metaphor for the relationship between the two narratives of 
Bleak House.  After visiting Miss Flite’s lodgings one afternoon, Esther passes back through 
Krook’s shop and sees him hard at work storing waste paper.  As he puts each packet of paper 
down, he makes a “crooked mark on the paneling of the wall” with a piece of chalk.  Beckoning 
to Esther,  
He chalked the letter J upon the wall—in a very curious manner, 
beginning with the end of the letter, and shaping it backward.  It 
was a capital letter, not a printed one, but just as such a letter as 
any clerk in Messrs Kenge and Carboy’s office would have made.  
“Can you read it?” he asked me with a keen glance.  “Surely,” said 
I.  “It is very plain.”  “What is it?”  “J.”  With another glance at 
me, and a glance at the door, he rubbed it out, and turned an a in its 
place (not a capital letter this time) and said, “What’s that?”…He 
went on quickly until he had formed, in the same curious manner, 
beginning at the ends and the bottoms of letters, the word 
JARNDYCE, without once leaving two letters on the wall 
together.  
Krook explains to Esther that he has “a turn for copying from memory” but can “neither read nor 
write.”  As the course of the novel reveals, Krook is actually copying letters from the final 
Jarndyce will.  Here there is an apparent thematic parallel between Krook’s inability to 
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apprehend the value of the Jarndyce will and the Court of Chancery’s incapacity to conclude the 
case of Jarndyce and Jarndyce.  But more importantly, this scene between Krook and Esther 
offers an analogy for the relationship between the two narratives of the novel.  Though these 
passages are narrated by Esther, Krook’s awkward chalk letters strangely correspond to the style 
of the third person narrator.  Or rather, the readers of Bleak House are oddly allied with Krook’s 
“reading” when faced with the chapters related by the third person narrator, especially early in 
the novel.  Krook can copy individual letters but cannot connect these linguistic parts into a 
whole word; for him the word Jarndyce is merely a collection of letters without apparent 
meaning.  We stand in a similar position as readers of Bleak House: we see the collection of 
parts presented by the third person narrator, but cannot make a coherent story out of them 
without help from Esther’s narrative.   
2.7 ESTHER AS CONNECTOR                  
I have explored how the third person narration surveys locations and characters within 
the map or landscape of Bleak House.  Once introduced, these sites become central to the plot 
lines of the novel—particularly to the mystery surrounding Esther’s parentage and Tulkinghorn’s 
murder.  But as I have suggested, with merely the third person narrator as guide, the reader has 
only a short-hand understanding of the links among the numerous places, people, and things that 
make up the world of the novel.  The third person narrator admits as much in chapter sixteen, as 
if speaking for the reader, asking: “What connexion can there be, between the place in 
Lincolnshire, the house in town, the Mercury in powder, and the whereabout of Jo the outlaw 
with the broom…?  What connexion can there have been between many people in the 
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innumerable histories of this world, who, from the opposite sides of great gulfs, have, 
nevertheless, been very curiously brought together!”48  The double narrative of Bleak House 
actually offers two answers to this question, the third person narrator bringing things together 
spatially or stylistically (as a part of a landscape or through analogy) and Esther making 
connections affectively (by means of her own personal relationships, choices, and actions).   
But of course it is Esther who “curiously brings together” the collections of the third 
person narrator into a coherent storyline.  There are several key scenes in which a place or person 
previously established by the third person narrator reappears in Esther’s narration.  In Chapter 
three, in which Esther travels to London for the first time, we are reintroduced to the 
neighborhood of Chancery through her personal narrative.  In front of Kenge and Carboy’s law 
offices, as Mr. Guppy helps Esther from the coach into a fly, she asks “whether there was a great 
fire anywhere?  For the streets were so full of dense brown smoke that scarcely anything was to 
be seen.”  She looks from the window and relates what she sees: “We drove slowly through the 
dirtiest and darkest streets that ever were seen in the world (I thought), and in such a distracting 
state of confusion that I wondered how the people kept their senses, until we passed into sudden 
quietude under an old gateway, and drove on through a silent square until we came to an odd 
nook in a corner, where there was an entrance up a steep, broad flight of stairs, like an entrance 
to a church.”49  Esther provides a second look at the streets of Chancery, which takes the 
condensed descriptions of the third person narrator and expands them through her personal 
narration.  In this way Esther’s “long-hand” narration translates the third person narrator’s short 
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hand into complete sentences and coherent descriptions.  Through Esther’s eyes, Chancery is a 
more lucid world of streets and buildings—new to Esther but by no means fantastical.  Each 
aspect of the landscape is given shape and coherence by Esther’s direct relationship to it—by her 
interest in it or by its interest in her.50 
  Esther’s narrative “fills in” characters much like she describes the landscape of 
Chancery.51  When Esther meets Miss Flite for the first time in chapter three, she initially repeats 
the third person narrator’s characterization from the first chapter, except that the “little mad old 
woman in a squeezed bonnet” becomes in Esther’s words “a curious little old woman in a 
squeezed bonnet.”  This is not so different (“mad” is softened to “curious”) but Esther’s 
characterization does not conclude here.  Over the course of her personal narration, the short-
hand “little mad old woman” is enlarged into a fully-drawn character.  Miss Flite, through 
Esther’s descriptions, becomes a character with a face and voice, a home and belongings, 
neighbors and friends.  Importantly, it is Esther’s emotional relationship to other characters that 
most markedly distinguishes her style of narration, her affection for Miss Flite, Mr. Gridley, 
Lady Dedlock, or Jo bringing another dimension to characters that often only have a single 
feature in the third person narration.  In short, characters become humanized in Esther’s 
sympathetic portrayals.  They also become independent from their surroundings: Miss Flite, for 
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51 Even when Esther does not personally connect characters and places, the idea or thought 
of Esther performs a similar function in the actions of other characters.  That is, 
connections and contexts are often formed by other characters who have an interest in 
Esther—who seek to assist or please her in some way.  For instance, in order to impress or 
oblige Esther, Guppy attempts to unravel the mystery surrounding the relationship between 
Esther and Lady Dedlock.   
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instance, is no longer just one aspect of Chancery’s landscape, but a human being with a will of 
her own.  Emotional interest is what brings all of the characters of Esther’s narrative into 
relationship with each other, just as disinterest maintains emotional distance between the 
characters of the third person narrative. 
2.8 CONCLUSIONS 
In Esther’s personal narrative, there is no question as to the importance of a particular 
event or character because everything is understood in relationship to Esther herself: for Esther, 
particular people, places, and things have apparent emotional, intellectual, or moral value.  We 
never wonder why Esther is relating a particular conversation or describing a certain character’s 
actions.  Even the details she makes some attempt to disguise, mostly regarding her feelings for 
Alan Woodcourt, are hardly unintelligible to the reader.  But in the third person narrative, it is 
often difficult for the reader to figure out which of various details portrayed are (or will be) 
important to the novel’s central plot lines.  Given its short-hand style description and tendency 
toward narrative disjunction, one thing may appear as significant as another in the third person 
narrative, resulting in a kind of democratization of details.  Because we only get the surface of 
things, nothing more, the reader merely takes in each aspect of a particular scene, rather than 
differentiating between the inconsequential and important.  If the development of a story is the 
(ultimate) aim of the novel, it is only possible to describe this characteristic of the third person 
narrative as negative, as it frustrates the story rather than furthering it.  But if we think about the 
third person narrator as surveyor rather than narrator, it is this democratization of details that 
makes an overview of the world of Bleak House possible.  When aspects of a scene are 
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differentiated as consequential and inconsequential, significant and insignificant, there is a 
hierarchization of detail which causes the majority of details to slip away—because they are 
forgotten as soon as they are read.52  The style of the third person narration, particularly in the 
opening chapters of the novel, prevents this—inviting the reader to hold in mind all the 
miscellaneous details of social existence without collapsing their differences.   
Since access to the multiple and vivid particulars of social life is central to Dickens’s 
novelistic project, we can see that the democratization of details in Bleak House has value 
beyond its role in the novel’s detective storyline—beyond its support of the novel’s mysteries.  If 
we ask what the novel would be missing if Esther was its sole narrator, one important answer 
would be the aesthetic overview created by the third person narrative—a kind of poetic survey 
that presents the details of society without totalization or generalization.  It is not only that 
Esther’s personal view brings hope (if only on the small scale) to the bleakness of the third 
person narrative, but also that the third person narrative brings a breadth of view to the 
narrowness of Esther’s narrative.  Let me be clear: it is not that Esther’s world is narrow in the 
majority of the novel.  For a Victorian heroine, she meets a great number of characters and sees a 
great deal of London.  But her ending at the close of the novel, at the miniature Bleak House in 
Yorkshire, belies the multiple connections of her earlier life.  It suggests that a model of human 
benevolence based merely on individual connections provides only a slim hope for humanity as a 
whole.  
And yet, Bleak House suggests no larger system of benevolence; the third person 
narrator, unlike Esther, has no power to intervene in the world of the novel.  Optimism, it seems, 
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can go no further than a hope for human goodness on a personal level.  But, as the double 
narrative of Bleak House underlines, fiction can be preparatory to individual acts of kindness by 
presenting a view of social life alternative to that of British institutions (such as law, religion, 
organized charity, etc.).  This is not by offering any kind of systematic moral intervention, but 
merely by giving readers the opportunity to see everyday life again with a difference.  Fiction 
holds this promise because only an artist values all the unnoticed and seemingly insignificant 
details of human existence that are, for Dickens, the beginnings of a reawakened imagination and 
an enlarged sympathy in his readers. 
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3.0  CHAPTER TWO: THE PECULIAR FACTS OF THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 
The Origin of Species (1859) urges a reorientation to the known facts of the natural 
world.  But this reengagement with the particulars of organic life requires that certain habits of 
thought be revised or set aside, especially those that uphold an understanding of life as fixed and 
unchanging.  The Origin is, then, both an argument for the theory of descent by natural selection 
and a text that invites a certain freedom of mind required for understanding the organic world as 
Darwin depicts it—a world subject to chance variation and natural selection.53  The mixed 
discourse of this work promotes this freedom of mind by unsettling the reader’s relationship to 
the natural world, just as the varied discourse of the other central works of this dissertation 
troubles the reader’s relationship to the social world.  Combining scientific argument with 
concrete description and creative narration, The Origin brings both attention and imagination to 
details of organic life that have been previously overlooked or considered irrelevant. 
While most of Darwin’s readers (professional or otherwise) doubted theories of species 
transmutation or evolution, even the most cursory observation of plant and animal life showed 
that variation within species existed.  Using an abundance of familiar examples taken from local 
British life in The Origin, Darwin has the opportunity to draw from his readers’ own 
                                                 
53 Here I mean chance in the sense of following no synthesized teleology or “plan” of 
change.  All organic change follows fixed and natural laws, but the results of these laws 
can only be predicted with probability—never with certainty.   
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observations to confirm the evidence for his theory, but only if his readers bring a new set of 
eyes to their experience of organic life.  Concentrating upon organic difference, Darwin’s factual 
descriptions bring interest to even the most ordinary aspects of organic life.  The representation 
of the natural world in The Origin is, like Dickens’s depiction of the social world in Bleak 
House, both like and unlike the reader’s everyday experience of it, its factual examples somehow 
both familiar and unfamiliar, both ordinary and strange.   
Darwin’s vivid and imaginatively drawn depictions of organic difference encourage the 
reader to develop an attunement to the small and seemingly insignificant irregularities of organic 
life, just as the works of Dickens, Mill, and Eliot promote this kind of attunement to the 
unnoticed differences of social life.  Darwin does this even before he shows the full importance 
of these organic “exceptions” for his theory of species change.  These are aspects of life that 
have been previously considered unimportant in established interpretations of organic history, 
which were at this time underwritten by an epistemology of natural kinds.54  Indeed, the details 
of organic life that Darwin is most keen to bring to his readers’ attention would not have been 
deemed “facts” (in the sense of evidence contributing to systematic knowledge) for the majority 
of Darwin’s professional audience.  In the leading theories of the origin of species, slight 
variations seen among individuals of a species or variety did not have the status of facts.  This is 
                                                 
54 This epistemology understands the organic world in terms of a natural order of 
metaphysical kinds.  In Darwin’s own day, the most prominent scientists in geology, 
botany, and anatomy maintained essentialist interpretation of organic history—although 
this essentialism took several forms.  See Chapter Five, “Essences,” in Hull.  David Hull, 
Darwin and His Critics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 67-77.  Also Elliot 
Sober, "Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism," in Conceptual Issues in 
Evolutionary Biology, ed. Elliot Sober (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980).  John Beatty, 
"What's in a Word?  Coming to Terms in the Darwinian Revolution," in Nature Animated: 
Historical and Philosophical Case Studies in Greek Medicine, Nineteenth-Century and 
Recent Biology, Psychiatry, and Psychoanalysis (Dordrecht, Holland, 1983). 
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because in a system of natural Kinds, these small differences are meaningless.  But the reader 
need not consider these differences as “facts” in the sense of constituting scientific proof, at least 
initially, in The Origin.  Indeed, Darwin uses their non-evidentiary status to his advantage in the 
performance of his argument in the opening chapters of The Origin, captivating the reader with 
concrete descriptions of organic difference before providing a full explanation of the mechanism 
of natural selection.   
While Darwin’s factual descriptions bring a greater attunement to organic “exception,” 
there remains a distance between recognizing the reality of species variation and accepting the 
efficacy of natural selection as the sole mechanism behind all species history.  There is, in other 
words, a significant disconnect between a concrete understanding of species difference and an 
abstract knowledge of species change.  Making this connection obliges not only a renewed 
attention to organic detail but also the capacity to recreate and reconfigure these details in the 
imagination.  Darwin models this capacity through the use of thought experiments throughout 
The Origin.  These imaginative experiments, which Darwin supplies in place of direct evidence 
of descent by selection, create pictures of natural selection in action.  They materialize, in this 
way, the operations of mind that Darwin had to undertake to develop his theory of species 
change.   
They also exhibit the kind of imaginative extrapolation that the mixed discourse of The 
Origin invites even when no thought experiment is provided.   Throughout the text, Darwin’s use 
of factual example serves to break up his scientific argument, prompting the reader to consider 
organic change in the concrete.  These examples invite the reader to visualize how familiar 
aspects of organic life might have been (or might be) effected by the mechanism of natural 
selection.  These visualizations, like Darwin’s thought experiments, have the potential to test the 
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strength of both the theory of descent by selection and competing theories of “special creation.”  
Seen in this light, every example in The Origin is an opportunity to practice the kind of 
independent, imaginative thinking necessary for all future scientific work on the origin of 
species.   
3.1 INDUCTION AND THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 
Studying the role of factual description in The Origin, we see that the text is a subtle 
negotiation of Victorian standards of scientific methodology—a mediation between the strict 
inductivism that Darwin’s readers expected and the imaginative speculation that his study of 
organic history required.  We can pinpoint several different expectations of empiricism that a 
Victorian reader may have brought to The Origin.  The first is a general expectation of naïve 
empiricism that had become commonplace in popular scientific writing, and that was supported 
by a preference for realist representation in broader Victorian culture, in both literature and the 
visual arts.55  The second is a requisite assurance that scientific theories have been developed 
inductively without any “flights of speculation,” a requirement that was softened later in the 
Victorian period.  The third is the requirement that scientific arguments demonstrate inductive 
proof.  As we will see, Darwin’s use of factual example in The Origin appeals to the first two 
standards: to both the general reader’s expectation of naïve empiricism and the specialist reader’s 
                                                 
55 See Chapter One of this dissertation for a discussion of Victorian literary critical 
standards of realism.  See also the first and second chapters of George Levine’s Darwin and 
the Novelists for an overview of the relationship between literary realism and scientific 
empiricism in the Victorian period. Levine, Darwin and the Novelists: Patterns of Science 
in Victorian Fiction. 
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requirement of an inductive method of discovery.  While he could not fulfill the standard of 
inductive certainty demanded by many of his professional readers, Darwin’s depiction of factual 
detail in The Origin is integral to his demonstration of the “explanatory potential” of natural 
selection—which is the strongest inductive proof Darwin can provide in The Origin.   
The Origin was written just at the moment when the standards of empirical method or 
induction were being newly articulated by British philosophers of science.  Beginning with John 
Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (1830), a group of 
Victorian thinkers became occupied with the problem of scientific method, returning to the 
questions of empirical methodology that originated in Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum and 
seeking to better articulate the methods Newton had used to develop his theory of universal 
gravitation.  In the years Darwin was working on the problem of species change, the so-called 
“induction debates” between William Whewell and John Stuart Mill brought the topic of 
scientific method to the forefront of scientific discussion.  These published disagreements over 
the nature of the inductive method were widely read.  Whewell’s argument for an intuitive 
system of inductive science in The Philosophy of Inductive Sciences, as Founded upon their 
History (1840) and Mill’s massive treatise on scientific logic System of Logic: Ratiocinative and 
Inductive (1843) went through multiple editions in the 1840s and 1850s.56   At the center of 
Herschel, Whewell, and Mill’s examinations of scientific method were questions about the 
relationship between fact and theory in the scientific enterprise, and the role of speculation in the 
                                                 
56 Recent studies by Laura J. Snyder have given these debates thorough examination.  See 
Laura J. Snyder, Reforming Philosophy: A Victorian Debate on Science and Society 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2006).  Laura J. Snyder, "The Mill-Whewell Debate: 
Much Ado About Induction," Perspectives on Science 5, no. 2 (1997).  Laura Snyder, "It's 
All Necessarily So: William Whewell on Scientific Truth," Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science 25, no. 5 (1994). 
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generation and presentation of new scientific knowledge.  Although each of these thinkers 
recognized the role of speculation in the actual practices of science, all agreed that certain 
knowledge was best obtained by adhering to the inductive method and avoiding more deductive 
methods.  This was the way, they agreed, to bring the successes of the physical sciences to the 
“younger” natural sciences.  
The initial reception of The Origin was significantly shaped by these newly articulated 
standards of scientific method.  The term “induction” was used in one of two ways in the early 
reviews of The Origin: 57 to describe the proper process of discovery in scientific practice and/or 
a method of presenting proof in a scientific argument.  Darwin insisted on his adherence to an 
inductive method of discovery throughout his published works.  In his Autobiography he asserts 
that he had developed his theory of species change by working “on true Baconian principles and 
without any theory collected the facts on a wholesale scale”58  In the opening paragraph of the 
“Introduction” to The Origin, Darwin sketches the history of his species studies with the 
                                                 
57 Many reviewers faulted The Origin for not being “inductive enough.”  See especially two 
early reviews of The Origin in 1860, written by two of Darwin’s most severe critics:  
“Objections to Mr. Darwin’s Theory of the Origin of Species” written by Adam Sedgwick 
for The Spectator, and “Darwin on the Origin of Species,” written by Richard Owen for the 
Edinburgh Review.  Both reviews were published anonymously.  See Hull for these 
reviews and Darwin’s responses to Sedgwick and Owen’s critiques.  Hull, Darwin and His 
Critics, 155-70, 71-215. 
 
58 Darwin says in his Autobiography: “After my return to England it appeared to me that by 
following the example of Lyell in Geology, and by collecting all facts which bore in any 
way on the variation of animals and plants under domestication and nature, some light 
might perhaps be thrown on the whole subject.  My first note-book was opened in July 
1837.  I worked on true Baconian principles, and without any theory collected facts on a 
wholesale scale, more especially with respect to domesticated productions, by printed 
enquiries, by conversation with skillful breeders and gardeners, and by extensive reading.” 
Charles Darwin, The Autobiography of Charles Darwin 1809-1882 (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company, 1993). 
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assurance that he had developed his theory of natural selection through a long and careful 
process of induction: 
When on board H.M.S. “Beagle,” as naturalist, I was much struck 
with certain facts in the distribution of the inhabitants of South 
America, and in the geological relations of the present to the past 
inhabitants of that continent.  These facts seemed to me to throw 
some light on the origin of species—that mystery of mysteries, as 
it has been called by one of our greatest philosophers.  On my 
return home, it occurred to me, in 1837, that something might 
perhaps be made out on this question by patiently accumulating 
and reflecting on all sorts of facts which could possibly have any 
bearing on it.  After five years’ work I allowed myself to speculate 
on the subject, and drew up some short notes; these I enlarged in 
1844 into a sketch of the conclusions, which then seemed to me 
probable: from that period to the present day I have steadily 
pursued the same object.59 
This examination started, as Darwin portrays it, merely with a “striking” impression of certain 
facts of geographical distribution in South America.  These facts appeared to “throw some light” 
upon the question of how species originate, not the other way around.  Darwin’s initial years of 
study consisted in gathering as many facts related to this problem as he could, reflecting upon 
                                                 
 59 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species by Mean of Natural Selection: A Facsimile of the 
First Edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998), 1.  Hereafter 
cited as OS.  
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each in turn but not allowing himself to “speculate” in a theoretical way until he had completed 
five years work.  The question that Darwin allowed himself to ask at this point in his studies was 
“What theory of species origins can adequately explain all of these difficult and various facts?”  
It was not, Darwin promises, “What facts can I gather to provide evidence for my theory?”          
Darwin was less assured regarding his critics’ second requirement of inductive proof.  On 
the one hand, some of Darwin’s most combative critics (such as Adam Sedgwick and Richard 
Owen) required a level of proof now understood to be impossible in the historical sciences.  The 
Origin helped to show that this standard of inductive certainty (for instance as it is understood by 
John Stuart Mill in his Logic) is untenable in the study of organic life—because it is underwritten 
by an epistemology of natural Kinds.  Arguing in The Origin that species are historical entities, 
Darwin could not satisfy critics like Sedgwick and Owen who believed that species were fixed 
and “real” (in the sense of corresponding to natural Kinds).  The Origin is devoted, after all, to 
showing how an essentialist interpretation of organic life (which underwrote theories of “special 
creation”) is insufficient to explain the many and diverse facts of nature.60   
On the other hand, even readers inclined to consider the possibility of species change 
questioned the strength of Darwin’s inductive proof in The Origin, because Darwin had not 
                                                 
60 When Victorian scientists approached the subject of the origin of species, which they 
were often loath to do, the leading theory was one of “special creation,” or the idea that 
every living species was created individually by God (or by some unknown process).  The 
idea of special creation was not confined to the work of natural theologists such as Adam 
Sedgwick or William Buckland; Charles Lyell, too, speculated in the first edition of his 
Principles that each species had been specially created at intermittent periods over the 
course of the earth’s history.  See the second volume of Charles Lyell’s Principles of 
Geology, especially Chapter Eight.  Sir Charles Lyell, Principles of Geology: Volume II 
(New York: Johnson Reprint Company, 1969). 
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provided direct evidence of the process of natural selection in action.61  What Darwin does offer, 
in place of this direct evidence, is what philosophers of science call The Origin’s “short” and 
“long” arguments.  These arguments work together to show: first, that natural selection operates 
in nature, given the laws of variation, inheritance, and struggle for existence (which is the 
argument of the first four chapters); and second, that natural selection is sufficient to explain the 
many and diverse facts of organic history, including the origination of new species (which is the 
argument of chapters five through fourteen).62  This reading is consistent with Darwin’s own 
estimation of the scientific argument he was attempting to make in The Origin, which sought to 
“establish a point as a probability by induction and to apply it as hypothesis to other parts and see 
whether it will solve them.”63   
                                                 
61 Using the standard of inductive proof articulated by John Herschel in his Preliminary 
Discourse, there was a legitimate question as to whether Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection had met the criteria for a “vera causa.”  For Herschel, this is a cause that has a 
real existence in nature and that is adequate to the phenomena that it explains.  There is a 
discussion of whether The Origin meets these criteria in James Lennox, "Darwin's 
Methodological Evolution," Journal of the History of Biology 38 (2005): 85-99. 
 
62 The exact nature of these arguments (how they fit within Victorian definitions of 
deduction and induction, as well as how they might be described in twenty-first-century 
scientific terms) is still an active subject of debate.  See especially Richard A. Richards, 
"Darwin and the Inefficacy of Artificial Selection," Philosophy of Science (1990).  Matt 
Sintonen, "Discussion: Darwin's Long and Short Argument," Philosophy of Science (1990).  
However, for the purposes of this Chapter, I will assume that the first four chapters of The 
Origin make a “short” inductive argument by inference that natural selection exists in 
nature, and then the remaining chapters of The Origin make a “long” inductive argument 
that the principle of natural selection sufficiently explains the many and diverse facts of 
organic history.   
 
63 Gavin de Beer, Charles Darwin: A Scientific Biography (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday, 1965), 142. 
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Although the standard of increased probability was not sufficient proof for many of 
Darwin’s critics, 64 his supporters described the strength of The Origin in terms of its explanatory 
potential, or capacity to account for the many and diverse facts of organic life.  For Thomas 
Henry Huxley and Charles Lyell, for instance, the probability that natural selection operates in 
the ways that Darwin says it does increased with every group of facts this theory explained.  
Noting the two parts of Darwin’s argument, Huxley asserts in On the Relations of Man to the 
Lower Animals (1863) that “it cannot be doubted, I think, that Mr. Darwin has satisfactorily 
proved that what he terms selection, or selective modification, must occur, and does occur, in 
nature; and he has also proved to superfluity that such selection is competent to produce forms as 
distinct structurally, as some genera even are.”  Huxley references, in this way, Darwin’s “long” 
and “short” arguments in The Origin, asserting that Darwin has proven, first, that natural 
selection occurs in nature and, second, that his theory of descent by selection is sufficient to 
explain the diversity of species found in the organic world.   
Huxley continues: “Now, Mr. Darwin’s hypothesis is not, so far as I am aware, 
inconsistent with any known biological fact; on the contrary, if admitted, the facts of 
Development, of Comparative Anatomy, of Geographical Distribution, and of Paleontology, 
became connected together, and exhibit a meaning such as they never possessed before; and I, 
for one, am fully convinced, that if not precisely true, that hypothesis is as near an approximation 
                                                 
64 As reception studies of The Origin show, this point was debated throughout the 
nineteenth century into the twentieth century.  See Alvar Ellegard, Darwin and the General 
Reader; the Reception of Darwin's Theory of Evolution in the British Periodical Press, 
1859-1872 (Gothenburg, 1958).  Ernst Mayr, One Long Argument: Charles Darwin and the 
Genesis of Modern Evolutionary Thought (New York: Johnson Reprint Company, 1991). 
Peter J.  Bowler, Charles Darwin: The Man and His Influence (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). Michael Ruse, The Darwinian Revolution: Science Red in Tooth 
and Claw (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999). 
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to the truth as, for example, the Copernican hypothesis was to the true theory of the planetary 
motions.”65  Here Huxley describes the explanatory power of Darwin’s theory: its capacity to 
bring together under one overarching explanation the facts of all the different disciplines of 
organic study.  Lyell, too, finally gave reluctant approval to Darwin’s theory of natural selection 
in the 1867 edition of Principles of Geology, allowing that “if we assume this principle, much 
light is thrown on many very distinct and otherwise unconnected classes of phenomenon, both in 
the present condition and past history of the organic world.”66  Again, for Lyell, Darwin’s 
achievement in The Origin is the way his argument is able to bring together so many previously 
unrelated classes of facts.      
3.2 THE FAMILIAR EXAMPLE 
Many, if not most, of the examples used by Darwin would have been familiar to both the 
specialist and non-specialist reader.  Domestic breeds and wild species local to the British Isles 
make up the majority of Darwin’s evidence, while many instances taken from the British 
colonies would not have been wholly new to the reading public.  In this way, given the variety 
and number of examples, it is easy to imagine that most of Darwin’s readers would have had 
second-hand knowledge of most examples, and personal experience with at least one or two.  
                                                 
65 Philip Appleman, ed., Darwin: Texts, Commentary (New York: Norton, 2001), 284-85. 
 
66 Ibid., 287. 
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Even the most casual reader, for instance, would know something of the different breeds of dogs 
or of the behavior of honey bees.67   
The sheer number of examples of The Origin has, in this way, a kind of democratizing 
effect in the text—offering different points of entry for different readers.  This is certainly the 
case for the popular reader, given Darwin’s frequent use of local examples.  But even for a 
specialist reader, the copious details of The Origin broaden its accessibility across scientific 
disciplines.  In The Origin, Darwin speaks to thinkers across many and different fields, making 
easy reference to the authorities, central works, and key terms in each area of study.68  Its 
chapters move nimbly from one scientific discipline to another, switching from comparative 
anatomy to embryology, from geology to geography.  By analogy, Darwin even brings in some 
of the social and human sciences, referencing the study of human population and the history of 
languages.  He also makes note of many practical sciences, including animal husbandry and 
farming.   
In Chapter One on domestic variation, local and familiar knowledge gives independence 
to the facts Darwin relates, especially for the non-specialist, because readers can confirm what 
Darwin is telling them by referring to their own experience.  For the professional reader, the facts 
of domestic breeding would have been familiar, but most likely not a part of their own research.  
                                                 
67 Considering the heuristic value of the analogy Darwin draws between artificial selection 
and natural selection, Richard A. Richards discusses the importance of familiar ideas and 
imagery in scientific arguments.  Richards, "Darwin and the Inefficacy of Artificial 
Selection," 97. 
 
68 This is an aspect of Darwin’s capacity to think and write as a “generalist” that has been 
noted by several historians and philosophers of science. This is a special focus of Janet 
Brown’s two volume biography of Darwin, which draws extensively from Darwin’s 
correspondence.  See Janet Brown, Charles Darwin: Voyaging (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995).  Janet Brown, Charles Darwin: The Power of Place (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002). 
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In this way, Darwin could assume that the majority of his audience had familiarity but not 
expertise with the subject Darwin chooses to open The Origin—which has clear advantages for 
the performance of his argument in this first chapter.  His readers having a little bit of knowledge 
on the subject, but not too much, Darwin has the freedom to reintroduce this part of the natural 
world with a heightened attention to the slight differences within and among breeds.  The reader 
does not need to recognize the importance of these small organic “exceptions” for Darwin’s 
theory of descent by selection at this point in The Origin.  Darwin’s priority in Chapters One 
through Three is not to convince his readers of the efficacy of natural selection but to encourage 
the capacities of mind they will need to understand how natural selection works—as it is 
described in The Origin and as it currently operates in nature.  The reader is better off, in this 
way, if they maintain a certain independence from any theoretical interpretation of the facts 
being presented and focus, instead, upon organic life at the level of concrete appearance and 
behavior.    
In Chapter One, “Variation under Domestication,” Darwin introduces the example of the 
domestic pigeon, initially to show the amount of variation seen in domestic breeding (which is a 
step towards establishing the first two laws upon which his theory of natural selection depends: 
the law of variation and the law of inheritance).  Darwin explains in this chapter that “Believing 
that it is always best to study some special group, I have, after deliberation, taken up domestic 
pigeons.  I have kept every breed which I could purchase or obtain, and have been most kindly 
favoured with skins from several quarters of the world…Many treatises in different languages 
have been published on pigeons, and some of them are very important, as being of considerable 
antiquity.  I have associated with several eminent fanciers, and have been permitted to join two 
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of the London Pigeon Clubs.”69  Darwin asserts a familiarity with the facts of the domestic 
pigeon on multiple levels: he has personal experience not only in observing the many varieties of 
pigeons but in keeping them himself, having made an effort to obtain as many breeds as possible; 
for those breeds he could not obtain live, he has collected skins from all over the world; he has 
read widely on the subject, including ancient texts that tell something of the history of the breed; 
finally, he has sought the expertise of current authorities on pigeons and pigeon breeding, not 
only as a scientist seeking specialized knowledge but also as an amateur fancier himself.   
But after taking time to state these qualifications, Darwin devotes the next six pages of 
Chapter One to describing the domestic pigeon from the perspective of a fascinated but naive 
observer.  He first compares the English carrier and short-faced tumbler: 
The diversity of breeds is something astonishing.  Compare the 
English carrier and the short-faced tumbler, and see the wonderful 
difference in their beaks, entailing corresponding differences in 
their skulls.  The carrier, more especially the male bird, is also 
remarkable from the wonderful development of the carunculated 
skin about the head, and this is accompanied by greatly elongated 
eyelids, very large external orifices to the nostrils, and a wide gape 
of mouth.  The short-faced tumbler has a beak in outline almost 
like that of a finch; and the common tumbler has the singular and 
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strictly inherited habit of flying at a great height in a compact 
flock, and tumbling in the air head over heals.70 
These descriptions evoke such a different readerly experience than what has come before in The 
Origin that they create a distinct pause in the pace of Chapter One.  They are more engaging to 
the ear and more captivating to the eye.  Adopting a more essayistic tone, Darwin’s syntax in 
these passages is looser and his language more playful: he uses alliteration (“elongated eyelids” 
and “singular and strictly”) and striking word choices (such as “carunculated,” which means 
having a wrinkled overgrowth of skin).  With this language, Darwin’s pigeon descriptions read 
more like portraits or character studies than scientific descriptions.  They are imaginative—
creating pictures in the mind that the reader is apt to dwell upon, even to embellish.  In this we 
take our cue from Darwin himself, who is more of a wonderer in this passage than an observer.  
Notice how many words he uses in this short passage to express his amazement over the 
differences seen among domestic pigeon breeds: the diversity is “astonishing,” there are 
“wonderful” differences in the carrier and tumbler’s beaks, the carrier has “remarkable” and 
“wonderful” characteristics, and the tumbler has a “singular” habit of flying.  Each breed is 
peculiar, in the sense of being both strange and highly distinct: like Darwin, the reader is first 
captivated by their oddity, becoming attuned to the qualities that distinguish one breed from 
another in the process.   
Darwin continues with his comparative descriptions in the passages that follow, detailing 
the external differences and similarities seen among several other breeds of pigeon: the runt, the 
barb, the turbit, the Jacobin, the trumpeter, the laugher, and the fantail.  He then proceeds to 
describe the many kinds of skeleton seen among the various breeds, noting the size and shape of 
                                                 
70 OS, 21. 
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bones and their function.  We learn all this before we get to Darwin’s central point about the 
pigeon, which is the analogy he wants to draw between the breeds of the domestic pigeon and the 
species and varieties of the wild pigeon (an important part of the larger analogy being drawn in 
the first four chapters between artificial selection and natural selection).  This is characteristic of 
Darwin’s use of factual example in The Origin, in that he frontloads the details of the domestic 
pigeon and backloads their relevance to his argument.  Indeed, there has been only one passing 
mention of natural selection at this point in the work; we may say at this moment in The Origin 
that the reader knows considerably more about domestic pigeons than the theory of natural 
selection.  In this sense, fact appears relatively independent from theory in these early passages, 
the reader being free to interpret the facts of the domestic pigeon in whatever way they see fit.  
However, these lengthy descriptions of the domestic pigeon are preparatory to the articulation of 
Darwin’s theory.  This is because they encourage the reader to attend to organic difference in 
ways that are crucial to an understanding of the mechanism of natural selection—and in ways 
that enlighten the weakness of alternative theories of “special creation.”   
Darwin’s treatment of the pigeon does not end in Chapter One: being brought into almost 
every chapter of The Origin, Darwin mentions his favorite example nearly fifty times over the 
course of the work.  For instance, in his discussion of natural selection in the wild in Chapter 
Four, he argues that the color of certain wild breeds of pigeon have been subject to selection; in 
the same chapter, Darwin returns to the example of the domestic pigeon to explain his principle 
of divergence and its role in the creation of distinct species (or breeding groups) in the wild.  In 
Chapter Five, Darwin mentions the pigeon in his discussion of the unknown laws of correlation 
of growth, which must explain features like the “feathered feet and skin between the outer toes in 
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pigeons.”71  In Chapter Seven on the natural selection of instinct, Darwin employs the example 
of the pigeon while arguing that some of the most distinctive animal behavior, such as the 
“tumbling” flying of the tumbler, might have developed over the course of many generations 
through natural selection.  In his interpretation of the geological record in Chapter Nine, Darwin 
uses the illustration of the rock-pigeon to discuss the problem of intermediate forms; in Chapter 
Eleven, he suggests the influence of birds, specifically the pigeon, in the geographical dispersal 
of plants.   
Tracing Darwin’s special example of the pigeon over the course of The Origin enlightens 
how this species easily becomes a special example of the reader as well—serving as a familiar 
touchstone in the midst of long (and sometimes dull) passages on species extinction or 
embryology.  Most often Darwin mentions the pigeon in incidental ways, as an additional 
illustration of how an individual might inherit a slight variation or as a brief demonstration of 
how natural selection within one species can explain inconsistencies in the geological record.  
With these examples creating pauses in Darwin’s argument, the reader is called to remember 
what they have already learned about domestic and wild pigeons—and to consider the theory of 
descent by selection in light of these concrete facts.  We might even call these pauses an 
invitation to put the text down in order to imagine exactly how these facts might have resulted 
from the operation of natural selection. 72   
 
                                                 
71 OS, 114.   
 
72 Indeed, the reader might use this familiar example to test different aspects of 
Darwin’s theory even when the pigeon is not being directly referenced.   
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3.3 HABITS OF MIND  
We begin to see how Darwin reintroduces his readers to the facts of organic life in order 
to encourage an independent evaluation of the different aspects of his theory of descent by 
selection.  But certain patterns of mind are apt to stand in the way of this evaluation—especially 
those that uphold the fixed and unchanging status of species.  In Chapter One, after Darwin has 
discussed his view that all breeds of domestic pigeon have descended from the wild species the 
rock-pigeon, he explains why he chose the pigeon as his special study:  
I have discussed the probable origin of domestic pigeons at some, 
yet quite insufficient, length; because when I first kept pigeons and 
watched the several kinds, knowing well how true they bred, I felt 
fully as much difficulty in believing that they could ever have 
descended from a common parent, as any naturalist could in 
coming to a similar conclusion in regard to the many species of 
finches, or other large groups of birds, in nature.  One 
circumstance has struck me much; namely, that all the breeders of 
the various domestic animals and cultivators of plants, with whom 
I have ever conversed, or whose treatises I have read, are fully 
convinced that the several breeds to which each has attended, are 
descended from so many aboriginally distinct species.  Ask, as I 
have asked, a celebrated raiser of Hereford cattle, whether his 
 81 
cattle might not have descended from long-horns, and he will 
laugh you to scorn...73   
Characteristically, Darwin allies himself first with the dominant view (the idea that all domestic 
breeds have a counterpart in the wild) and then narrates the process by which he has changed his 
mind.  When he first began to study pigeons, Darwin tells us, he was no different from most 
breeders; he was so struck by the distinct character of each breed that the possibility of their 
being descended from a common ancestor seemed impossible.  Here he compares his initial 
conclusion regarding the different breeds of domestic pigeon to the conclusions of naturalists 
studying separate species of birds in the wild.  Their mistake, he hints, is the same as the 
breeder’s. 
 Darwin offers an explanation for this insistence upon the fixity of breeds that draws 
further similarities between breeders and naturalists.  It is no wonder, Darwin suggests, that the 
naturalist, who does not have a breeder’s specialized knowledge of inheritance, does not see the 
probability that all the different breeds of domestic pigeon have descended from the same 
parents—or that two different species of wild bird have an ancestor in common.  But why does 
the breeder not see this probability?  The explanation, Darwin asserts,  
is simple: from long-continued study they are strongly impressed 
with the differences between the several races; and though they 
well know that each race varies slightly, for they win their prizes 
by selecting such slight differences, yet they ignore all general 
arguments, and refuse to sum up in their minds slight differences 
accumulated during many successive generations.  May not those 
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naturalists who, knowing far less of the laws of inheritance than 
does the breeder, and knowing no more than he does of the 
intermediate links in the long lines of descent, yet admit that many 
of our domestic races have descended from the same parents—may 
they not learn a lesson of caution, when they deride the idea of 
species in a state of nature being lineal descendants of other 
species?74 
The problem, according to Darwin, is that breeders think only about the present state of each 
breed, disregarding the historical significance of small differences within breeds—despite their 
careful attention to these same slight variations when selecting individuals to reproduce.  So 
powerful are the habits of mind that regard the organic world as a fixed natural order that even 
the breeder, who knows best the potential plasticity of domestic breeds, is prevented from seeing 
the possibility of common descent.  Local and practical knowledge, in this way, is oddly 
divorced from broader systematic understanding; where the pigeon breeder has the benefit of 
specialized knowledge, his narrowness of focus prevents him from seeing that his knowledge of 
domestic varieties might be the starting point for a new theory of organic change.75   
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75 The naturalist too can suffer from an analogous narrowness of focus, as Darwin makes 
clear in Chapter Two: “When young naturalist commences the study of a group of 
organisms quite unknown to him, he is at first much perplexed to determine what 
differences to consider as specific, and what as varieties; for he knows nothing of the 
amount and kind of variation to which the group is subject; and this shows, at least, how 
very generally there is some variation.  But if he confines his attention to one class within 
one country, he will soon make up his mind how to rank most of the doubtful forms.  His 
general tendency will be to make many species, for he will become impressed, just like the 
pigeon or poultry-fancier before alluded to, with the amount of difference in the forms 
which he is continually studying and he has little general knowledge of analogical variation 
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3.4 IMAGINARY ILLUSTRATIONS 
The majority of readers of The Origin were in the same state as the pigeon fancier, unable 
to recognize how the small differences seen within and among species might “sum up” over 
time, creating a new species or variety.  While the opening chapters of the work prompt the 
reader to give greater attention to the slight irregularities of organic life, there remains a distance 
between acknowledging the reality of organic “exception” and accepting the efficacy of natural 
selection.  Needing the reader to see what these breeders have not, but having no direct evidence 
of natural selection currently in action, Darwin uses thought experiments to create pictures of 
what organic irregularities might become given the right circumstances and enough time.  In 
these thought experiments, Darwin recreates the details of organic life in his mind’s eye, thinking 
both backwards and forwards in time to visualize how natural selection has acted in the past, is 
acting in the present, and could act in the future.     
A term used by modern philosophers and historians of science, thought experiments work 
similarly to real-life experiments except that they are performed in the mind.  In the most basic 
sense, they posit a set of hypothetical conditions and then visualize their effects in the 
imagination. But Darwin’s thought experiments in The Origin function differently than, for 
instance, Newtonian thought experiments.  According to James Lennox, Darwinian thought 
experiments are “(a) tests of a theory’s explanatory potential which, (b) posit hypothetical or 
counterfactual test conditions and (c) invoke particulars which are irrelevant to the generality of 
the theory, and which (d) are selected to instantiate features of the theory under special 
                                                                                                                                                             
in other groups and in other countries, by which to correct his first impressions.”  OS, 50-
51.   
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consideration.”76  Lennox asserts that in order to constitute support for a theory, a thought 
experiment must have three features: its objects and processes must be concrete, its illustrations 
must be plausible, and the relation of the concretes to the abstract terms of the theory must be 
clear.  Concreteness gives imaginary illustrations their feeling of experimentation, an 
“experiment” involving the manipulation and observation of concrete objects and processes.  
Plausibility provides the assurance that familiar objects are doing things we expect them to do 
under realistic conditions.  Finally, the theory (or part of the theory) being tested must be 
instantiated in the concrete illustration, so that we can see, for instance, what the struggle for 
existence might look like in a specific geographical location or how natural selection may have 
worked upon an individual of a specific species.77    
Thought experiments in The Origin all function in roughly the same way: positing a set 
of circumstances and consequences, they seek to exhibit the ability of Darwin’s theory to 
account for the known facts of organic history.  They aim to show, in this way, what is 
impossible through traditional observation and experiment, namely, how natural selection 
actually acts (or might act) upon individuals and species in a particular geographical area at a 
given time in organic history.78  In Chapter Four, Darwin moves to show how species variation, 
inheritance, and the struggle for existence act together to make natural selection possible.  
                                                 
76 James Lennox, "Darwinian Thought Experiments: A Function for Just-So Stories," in 
Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy (Savage: Roman and Littlefield, 1991), 
236. 
 
77 Ibid., 229-30. 
 
78 In the Principles of Geology, Charles Lyell also employs thought experiments to test the 
explanatory potential of his geological theory of uniformity when observation or 
experiment was impossible.  This connection is discussed in Ibid., 224-25.  
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Because he has no direct evidence of this process in the present and only indirect evidence in the 
geological record, he has to employ thought experiments to show that natural selection can work 
in the way he says it does.  Darwin begins by visualizing the probable actions of natural selection 
upon a population of wolves: 
In order to make it clear how, as I believe, natural selection acts, I 
must beg permission to give one or two imaginary illustrations.  
Let us take the case of a wolf, which preys on various animals, 
securing some by craft, some by strength, and some by fleetness; 
and let us suppose that the fleetest prey, a deer for instance, had 
from any change in the country increased in numbers, or that other 
prey had decreased in numbers, during that season of the year 
when the wolf is hardest pressed for food.  I can under such 
circumstances see no reason to doubt that the swiftest and slimmest 
wolves would have the best chance of surviving, and so be 
preserved or selected,—provided always that they retained strength 
to master their prey at this or at some other period of the year, 
when they might be compelled to prey on other animals.79   
This imaginary illustration asks the reader to hold several things in mind: the basic facts of 
wolves and their behavior, the basic facts of wolves’ prey, as well as the laws of variation, 
inheritance, and struggle for existence that Darwin has set forth in the first three chapters of The 
Origin.  In this passage, Darwin is merely asking his readers to recognize the following 
probability: given the fact that species vary and these variations are often inherited, and given the 
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“competition” among species and individuals of species for survival, a wolf with some 
advantageous difference from its fellow wolves (like increased speed or better agility) would be 
more likely to catch its prey (here, a deer) and thus would be more likely to survive and 
reproduce.   
 Darwin continues, asking his reader to think about the generational effects of 
natural selection’s preservation of individual wolves:  
Even without any change in the proportional numbers of the 
animals on which our wolf preyed, a cub might be born with an 
innate tendency to pursue certain kinds of prey…Now, if any slight 
innate change of habit or of structure benefited an individual wolf, 
it would have the best chance of surviving and leaving offspring.  
Some of its young would probably inherit the same habits or 
structure, and by the repetition of this process, a new variety might 
be formed which would either supplant or coexist with the parent-
form of wolf.  Or, again, the wolves inhabiting a mountainous 
district, and those frequenting the lowlands, would naturally be 
forced to hunt different prey; and from the continued preservation 
of the individuals best fitted for the two sites, two varieties might 
slowly be formed.80 
What this thought experiment adds to the first is a picture of natural selection operating not only 
upon individuals but also populations (here, breeding communities of wolves).  This imaginary 
illustration explicitly links the hypothesized preservation of a single wolf with greater speed and 
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agility and the known facts of existing species and varieties of wolves.  Beginning with a slight 
advantage in an individual wolf, Darwin asks the reader to imagine all that must happen between 
this one instance of preservation in the past and the current state of this species in the present.  
We can see, then, how these thought experiments fulfill Lennox’s requirements: the objects and 
processes are concrete (we can visualize the wolf, the deer, the mountain district, the lowlands; 
the struggle for food); the illustrations are plausible (the wolves behave in ways we expect them 
to); and there is a clear relationship between these objects and the theory being tested (natural 
selection).  They are tests of the explanatory power of the theory of descent by selection, 
exhibiting in what ways the mechanism of natural selection can adequately explain all the many 
and distinct species of wolf that currently exist.    
Darwin’s thought experiments in The Origin cannot, of course, demonstrate with 
certainty the effects of natural selection in any given case.  As Darwin carefully explains, these 
effects depend upon the laws of variation, inheritance, and struggle for existence, but we can 
only speculate what these effects have looked like in the past or will look like in the future.  We 
can only decide, with some certainty, that nature “selected” one variation over another in any 
given instance well after the fact.  There is no way, Darwin stresses, to know exactly how natural 
selection will act in the future.  However, it is possible to better equip ourselves to recognize the 
operations of natural selection currently in action: by bringing both our attention and imagination 
to bear upon the small irregularities or “exceptions” of organic life.   
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3.5 THE INDEPENDENT LIFE OF FACT 
Darwin’s thought experiments, many of which come early in The Origin, serve to prepare 
the reader for the kind of imaginative work invited throughout the text—even when no thought 
experiment is provided.  We have already seen how this might work with the often-cited pigeon 
example in The Origin.  But every time Darwin interrupts his argument to provide yet another 
example is an opportunity for the reader to contemplate his theoretical argument in the concrete.  
For instance, when Darwin mentions the woodpecker of La Plata in his discussion of transitional 
habits and structures in Chapter Six, the reader wonders with Darwin over the possibility of a 
member of the woodpecker species that never climbs trees—and perhaps pauses to imagine what 
series of natural events could bring about this peculiar difference.81  In Chapter Twelve on 
geographical distribution, Darwin sets out to answer how it is possible that species of fresh water 
mollusks have such a wide geographical range if they are descended from a single source.  He 
relates a brief experiment in which he suspended a duck’s feet in an aquarium full of the ova of 
fresh-water mollusks, and found that “numbers of the extremely minute and just hatched shells 
crawled on the feet, and clung to them so firmly that when taken out of the water they could not 
be jarred off, though at a somewhat more advanced age they would voluntarily drop off.”82  
Holding all the details of this real life experiment in mind, the reader has the opportunity to 
imagine how this species of mollusk developed the ability to attach to the feet of ducks by mean 
of natural selection, this adaptation allowing some shells to travel a great distance away from 
other members of its species.   
                                                 
81 OS, 184. 
 
82 OS, 385. 
 89 
If every factual example in The Origin is an invitation to test Darwin’s theory of descent 
by selection in the imagination, this kind of independent evaluation is especially important in 
sections where Darwin shows how natural selection can account for the most difficult or 
extraordinary aspects of organic life: for instance, the complexity of the human eye or the strange 
and wonderful instincts of the “slave-making” ant and the honeybee.  In Chapter Seven, which 
focuses on the problem of instinct, Darwin takes the slave-making instinct of ants as a special 
study.  He begins this topic characteristically, stressing his own “wondering” skepticism about 
this strange behavior.  In a series of lengthy stories, Darwin’s relates his own observations and 
experiments with various species of ants.  He tells us: “I tried to approach the subject in a 
sceptical frame of mind, as any one may well be excused for doubting the truth of so 
extraordinary and odious an instinct as that of making slaves.  Hence I will give the observations 
which I have myself made, in some little detail.  I opened fourteen nests of F. sanguinea, and 
found a few slaves in all.”  What follows are a series of highly detailed narratives recounting 
Darwin’s observations, a section of which I excerpt here: 
One day I fortunately chanced to witness a migration from one nest 
to another, and it was a most interesting spectacle to behold the 
masters carefully carrying, as Huber has described, their slaves in 
their jaws.  Another day my attention was struck by about a score 
of the slave-makers haunting the same spot, and evidently not in 
search of food; they approached and were vigorously repulsed by 
an independent community of the slave species (F. fusca); 
sometimes as many as three of these ants clinging to the legs of the 
slave-making F. sanguinea.  The latter ruthlessly killed their small 
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opponents, and carried their dead bodies as food to their nest, 
twenty-nine yards distant; but they were prevented from getting 
any pupae to rear as slaves.  I then dug up a small parcel of the 
pupae of F. fusca from another nest, and put them down on a bare 
spot near the place of combat; they were eagerly seized, and 
carried off by the tyrants, who perhaps fancied that, after all, they 
had been victorious in their late combat.83 
These are dramatic little scenes that have concreteness of visual detail and vividness of action.  
They are captivating, in the fullest sense of that word, in that they hold the reader’s attention at 
the level of concrete and local actions.  The reader is not thinking, necessarily, about the 
mechanism of natural selection during these scenes, and yet this story has a clear purpose in a 
chapter that seeks to show how the most complex instincts can be explained by natural selection.  
In this section, the reader is allied with Darwin, who portrays himself as both a skeptical and 
“chance” observer of these ants.  The living facts of these ants—the “spectacle” of an ant 
migration and a skirmish between two species—are what capture Darwin’s attention and prompt 
him to explain their behavior through natural selection, rather than the other way around.  That 
is, at the start of this passage, Darwin is not out looking for some instances of ant behavior that 
can be happily explained by his theory of species change.  (At least, this is not how Darwin 
portrays it.)  Halfway through the second scene, this story of casual observation suddenly 
becomes something more like demonstration, as Darwin begins to interfere with the ants by way 
of experiment.  This experiment is the first link between the details of these stories and the larger 
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aim of the chapter, which is to show how even the most unusual or specialized instincts can be 
explained by natural selection.   
But it is not until the very end of the section on the slave-making ant, after four pages of 
ant stories, that Darwin spells out exactly how natural selection might have preserved this 
instinct for gathering the pupae of other species to raise as slaves.  He does this with a thought 
experiment that creates a picture of natural selection in action—by means of imaginative 
extrapolation from the known facts of the F. sanguinea.  He assures the reader that  
By what steps the instinct of F. sanguinea originated I will not 
pretend to conjecture.  But as ants, which are not slave-making, 
will, as I have seen, carry off pupae of other species, if scattered 
near their nests, it is possible that pupae originally stored as food 
might become developed; and the ants thus unintentionally reared 
would then follow their proper instincts, and do what work they 
could.  If their presence proved useful to the species which had 
seized them—if it were more advantageous to this species to 
capture workers than to procreate them—the habit of collecting 
pupae originally for food might by natural selection be 
strengthened and rendered permanent for the very different 
purpose of raising slaves.84   
As he has detailed in the story quoted above, Darwin has direct evidence that the F. sanguinea 
species will carry off the pupae of other species in order to raise them as slaves.  But he does not 
have direct proof that this species, at some point in its distant past, brought the pupae of another 
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species back to its nest and stored it as food.  He needs to use his knowledge of other ant species 
(that are not slaving-making) to create an imaginary scenario that visualizes what might have 
happened if the pupae of a foreign species, stolen for food, had developed and proved “useful” to 
the F. sanguinea species.  Like Darwin’s other thought experiments, this imaginary illustration 
has concreteness (we can see in our mind’s eye the ants and the stolen pupae), plausibility (the 
ants are behaving in a way that is likely), and a clear connection between its objects and the 
theory of natural selection (the experiment shows how the raising of slaves might have been 
naturally “selected” over time).    
But what is most significant about this section of Chapter Seven is not that Darwin uses a 
thought experiment to demonstrate, in lieu of direct evidence, that the slave-making instinct of 
the F. sanguinea can be explained by the operation of natural selection.  It is that this imaginative 
exercise, coming at the very end of the discussion of the slave-making ant, only serves to 
materialize the kind of imaginative work that Darwin’s ant stories have already invited.  As we 
have seen, Darwin’s series of ant descriptions are both separate from and integral to the larger 
argument of The Origin.  Easily excerpted from Darwin’s theoretical argument, they have a life 
of their own as narratives.  In this way, a reader might even consider them disruptive, because 
they take us away from the main line of Darwin’s theoretical argument in this chapter.  But while 
stories like these in The Origin do not—like Darwin’s thought experiments—draw explicit 
pictures of the operation of natural selection, the pauses they create in Darwin’s argument 
encourage the reader to do imaginative “tests” of their own.  In the instance of the slave-making 
ant, readers already have the same information as Darwin (he has provided all the facts used in 
his thought experiment in the preceding ant narratives).  They need only recreate these facts in 
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their own minds, connecting them with the theoretical mechanism of natural selection, to make 
their own pictures of natural selection in action.   
There is, of course, the possibility that the reader’s own thought experiments might prove 
counterproductive to Darwin’s argument: the reader could decide, for instance, that they have 
thought of a better interpretation of this instinct or that they have found some difficulty in 
visualizing how this instinct might have been brought about through natural selection.  At the 
same time, providing the reader opportunities to independently confirm his interpretation of this 
ant behavior, Darwin strengthens his argument that natural selection can explain even the most 
difficult and strange aspects of organic life.  Moreover, any reader interested in continuing to 
study the problem of species origins outside of the pages of The Origin will need to be able to do 
this kind of independent, imaginative testing.   
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Darwin wrote The Origin with the recognition that some scientific problems can only be 
solved with the right preparation of mind.  The problem of the origin of species, in his 
estimation, required a capacity for critical and historical attentiveness discouraged by established 
interpretations of organic life.  Darwin explains in his Autobiography, that he had followed a 
“golden rule” in his many years of species study: “that whenever a published fact, a new 
observation or thought came across me, which was opposed to my general results, to make a 
memorandum of it without fail and at once: for I had found by experience that such facts and 
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thoughts were far more apt to escape from the memory than favourable ones.”85  Because the 
human mind, Darwin suggests, is apt to follow the tracks of habit, the study of the natural world 
requires a deliberate attunement to facts and ideas that escape serious notice.  Only with the 
continual scrutiny of assumption can we recognize those aspects of the natural world that do not 
fit within current scientific understanding.  This is especially important for the study of historical 
entities like species, which are constantly varying.  In the study of species change, then, this 
critical scrutiny must be constant and ongoing—the investigation of current organic change 
obliging a mind that is willing to adjust with every new observation.   
The Origin promotes this kind of mind on several levels.  Its mixed discourse works 
against habits of thought by unsettling the reader’s relationship to the facts of organic life, 
continually prompting the reader to see abstract scientific concepts in the concrete.  Its vivid and 
imaginatively drawn depictions of organic difference attune its readers to the exceptions of both 
the natural world and the scientific enterprise.  These exceptions are, as we have seen, central to 
both Darwin’s theory of species change (its mechanism of natural selection preserving 
“irregularities” beneficial to a species at a given time and location) and the performance of his 
scientific argument in The Origin (which prompts readers to attend to aspects of organic life that 
have little or no meaning in established interpretations of organic history).  Finally, The Origin’s 
employment of imaginative experimentation cultivates a freedom and flexibility of mind needed 
for future study of organic change.  All of these aspects show how The Origin sets out not only 
to transform the science of organic life, but also to reform the minds of its readers—to foster the 
critical and historical attentiveness necessary for understanding life as Darwin depicts it.     
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4.0  CHAPTER THREE: GEORGE ELIOT’S HISTORY OF THE UNHISTORICAL  
Writing what I call a “history of the unhistorical,” Eliot’s fiction offers a way of 
understanding broad historical events, social and cultural norms, and abstract moral principles in 
the concrete terms of unexceptional individuals—and a way of seeing historical possibility in the 
unnoticed details of human life in time.  While orthodox history writes an account of the 
actualities of speech and event, in Eliot’s hands, the novel creates a history of the potential by 
focusing on the small shifts of feeling, perspective, or understanding that make up larger 
developments of mind.   Eliot’s fictional histories not only create a record of the unrecorded 
through imaginative invention; they also invite more reflective and sympathetic attention to 
aspects of life and mind that are likely to escape our notice—both in the world of the novel and 
in real life.   
Daniel Deronda (1876) is a novel dedicated to creating a history of both the actual and 
the potential.  It is Eliot’s most sustained study of mental development, charting the moral 
reform of its central characters Daniel Deronda and Gwendolen Harleth.  In Daniel Deronda 
there is a primacy of internal life over external event: mental conversions can be as revolutionary 
as war within the parameters of the novel; and it is not external action but small movements of 
thought and feeling that are the major moving forces of the novel.  At the same time, reforms of 
mind in the novel are not produced apart from experience or living history, but are the result of 
extensions of sympathy.  In Daniel Deronda human thought and affection have the capacity to 
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transform the small, seemingly useless details of everyday existence into the beginnings of a 
broadened knowledge of human life and an amplified fellow-feeling for humanity.  This is a 
capacity not only depicted in the characters of Daniel Deronda but also promoted in the reader, 
the novel’s mixed discourse inviting the reader to bring a more noticing, flexible, and 
sympathetic mind to the contemplation of the details of life in time.   
4.1 NATURAL HISTORY OF HUMAN LIFE   
Eliot’s literary criticism of the 1850s outlines a novelistic project that is brought to 
fruition in her novels.  In her criticism, George Eliot elaborates aims for the realist novel greater 
than the current state of contemporary fiction, 86 describing the novel’s ability to create 
opportunities for the exercise of sympathy through its imaginative extension of experience.  The 
novel, Eliot asserts, can teach practices of sympathetic attention that have a social benefit beyond 
the pages of fiction.87  Such practices are integral to the kind of active and mindful engagement 
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87 In this essay, Eliot affirms one of the central claims of romanticism as it is articulated, 
for instance, in Wordsworth’s “Preface” to Lyrical Ballads.  Like romantic poetry, the 
novel incites a greater sympathy for humankind through the imaginative extension of 
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with the contemporary moment that is, to use Mill’s language, the foundation of liberal 
democratic culture.  In “The Natural History of German Life,” a review of the work of German 
social historian Wilhelm Heinrich von Riehl published in the Westminster Review in July 
1856,88 Eliot describes a project of fictional realism that would define her own career as a 
novelist.89  In this essay she imagines the value of a novelistic “natural history” of human life, or 
a literary representation of human experience that uses some of the methods of the natural 
sciences.90  This kind of history would be an alternative to more orthodox histories of English 
life—for instance, those of Eliot’s contemporary Thomas Babington Macaulay.  It would not 
make major figures or historic events its central study; nor would it affirm any idealized view of 
human life or grand narrative of human history.  It would, instead, begin inductively, like the 
social histories that Mill urges in the sixth book of his Logic, aiming to represent human life in 
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89 Eliot begins to write fiction herself just a few months later with Scenes of Clerical Life.  
The term “realism” is one that Eliot first uses in her brief review of the third volume of 
Ruskin’s Modern Painters, published in the April 1856 issue of the Westminster Review.  
In this piece she explains that “the truth of infinite value that [Ruskin] teaches is realism—
the doctrine that all truth and beauty are to be attained by a humble and faithful study of 
nature, and not by substituting vague forms, bred by imagination on the mists of feeling, in 
place of definite, substantial reality.”  George Eliot, George Eliot: Selected Critical 
Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 248. 
 
90 In this essay, Eliot uses the term “natural history” to mean empirical description that 
focuses upon the processes of life at the level of individual, local, and historical detail.  In 
this, we can say that Eliot’s employment of this term is more in keeping with the scientific 
treatises of her contemporaries Charles Lyell or Charles Darwin than to the works of an 
earlier generation of natural historians, like George Cuvier, that described the natural world 
as a realization of God’s plan.   
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its local, individual, and historical specificity and to understand broad social categories in terms 
of these specificities. 
It would be, in this sense, a history of the unhistorical: a chronicle of those aspects of life 
that mean little to social policy or social science—that go unnoticed by British institutions of 
government or law.  In “Natural History,” this kind of fictional history provides a window into 
the everyday details of working class life.91  In the opening passages of this essay, Eliot calls for 
more direct empirical knowledge of the working classes and demonstrates the danger of making 
decisions based upon abstract notions instead of direct experience.  Using the example of the 
word “railways,” Eliot highlights the extent to which imaginative generalization dominates the 
thinking of individuals in everyday society.  Just as the term “railways” will call up for an 
average man more abstract ideas than concrete realities, so too do the words “the people,” “the 
masses,” the “proletariat,” or “the peasantry” bring to mind almost as little concrete knowledge.  
Literature, she asserts, is too often to blame for the vague notions that shape current thinking 
about the lower classes, because its sentimental depictions do not correspond with direct 
observation.  
Even contemporary social novels, which “profess to represent the people as they are,” are 
responsible according to Eliot—with the qualified exception of Charles Dickens.  The “unreality 
of their representations” not only results in poor art but also constitutes a social danger.  “The 
                                                 
91 When Eliot talks about “social and political reformers” or “policy-makers” in this essay, 
she means—in particular—those social leaders who represent the interests of the working 
classes.  This might include factory owners, members of parliament from industrial cities 
and towns, and generally those in the middle class working toward the expansion of 
political representation.  The 1832 Reform Act brought many middle class leaders the vote 
as well as greater representation in parliament; the 1867 and 1883 Reform acts extended 
suffrage even further, giving working men the vote.   
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greatest benefit we owe to the artist, whether painter, poet, or novelist,” says Eliot, “is the 
extension of our sympathies.  Appeals founded on generalizations and statistics require a 
sympathy ready-made, a moral sentiment already in activity; but a picture of human life such as 
a great artist can give, surprises even the trivial and the selfish into that attention to what is apart 
from themselves, which may be called the raw material of moral sentiment.” 92  Here Eliot 
distinguishes the moral potential of fiction from less accessible forms of knowledge, such as 
scientific or philosophical writing.93  But the potential that Eliot locates is not for moral 
emulation or application, but for the extension of sympathy. 94  Arguments founded upon 
“generalizations and statistics” require a capacity for sympathy already activated, but “a picture 
of human life” surprises even the most thoughtless reader into sympathetic attention to what is 
separate from themselves.  This kind of sympathy is the “raw material” of moral feeling, Eliot 
says, a form of imaginative extension valuable because its starting point is not abstract ideas but 
                                                 
92 George Eliot, "The Natural History of German Life," in Selected Essays, Poems, and 
Other Writings, ed. A.S. Byatt and Nicholas Warren (London: Penguin, 1990), 110.  
Abbreviated hereafter as NH. 
 
93 In this, Eliot affirms one of the earliest articulations of the moral value of the novel by 
Samuel Johnson.  In a 1750 essay for the Rambler, Johnson asserts that this new literary 
form, which he calls “modern romance,” has the capacity to exceed the teachings of 
religious sermons, philosophical essays, or prescriptive articles: “For this reason these 
familiar histories may perhaps be made of greater use than the solemnities of professed 
morality, and convey the knowledge of vice and virtue with more efficacy than axioms and 
definitions.” Samuel Johnson, "The Rambler, No. 4," in Selected Writings, ed. Patrick 
Cruttwell (New York: Penguin, 1968), 151. 
 
94 In her criticism, Eliot maintains that fiction need not reward goodness or punish evil to 
have moral value.  In a short essay written for the Leader in 1855, “The Morality of 
Wilhelm Meister,” for instance, Eliot gives no credence to “the so-called moral 
dénouement, in which rewards and punishments are distributed according to those notions 
of justice on which the novel-writer would have recommended that the world should be 
governed if he had been consulted at the creation.”  Eliot, George Eliot: Selected Critical 
Writings, 130.  See also Ashton, George Eliot: A Life, 149.   
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representations based upon concrete observation.  In Eliot’s formulation, sympathy has an 
epistemological role: the surprise of affection for particular human beings pushes experiential 
knowledge of human life beyond the subjective, creating at the same time a more expansive 
fellow-feeling for humanity at large.95   
A fictional natural history, Eliot asserts, sets itself up in competition with other narratives 
that currently dominate mid-Victorian social policy, such as those offered by political economy, 
Christianity, or aristocratic ideology: 
Any grand narrative created by the splendid conquests of modern 
generalization, to believe that all social questions are merged in 
economic science, and that the relations of men to their neighbors 
may be settled by algebraic equations,–-the dream that the 
uncultured classes are prepared for a condition which appeals 
principally to their moral sensibilities,—the aristocratic 
dilettantism which attempts to restore the ‘good old times’ by a 
sort of idyllic masquerading, and to grow feudal fidelity  and 
veneration as we grow prize turnips, by an artificial system of 
culture,–-none of these diverging mistakes can co-exist with a real 
                                                 
95 Sympathy is not, in this way, just a heightened feeling, which merely satisfies the self.  It 
is an extension of mind that sets aside self-concerns in favor of a clearer understanding of 
human life and a fellow-feeling or benevolence for humanity at large.  In this, we see the 
similarities between Eliot’s concept of sympathy and that of Spinoza’s.  Eliot translated 
Spinoza’s Ethics in 1854-1855; this translation is excerpted in Eliot, George Eliot: Selected 
Critical Writings, 75-81. 
 
 101 
knowledge of the People, with a thorough study of their habits, 
their ideas, their motives.96   
The generalizations of these “grand narratives” reduce the complexity of everyday working class 
existence because they have more allegiance to their own conventions than to real life.  These 
narratives are, in this way, no better than the idyllic representations of pastoral painting or the 
sentimental illustrations of current social fiction, which Eliot critiques earlier in the essay.  They 
encourage a certain inattention to the concrete facts of social existence, to the pleasures and pains 
of actual working people.  There is too much that goes unnoticed, in other words, in these 
summary narratives of human life.   
With a realistic representation of the lower classes, Eliot says, “more is done towards 
linking the higher classes with the lower, towards obliterating the vulgarity of exclusiveness, 
than by hundreds of sermons and philosophical dissertations.”  Unlike religious or philosophical 
writing, “art is the nearest thing to life; it is a mode of amplifying experience and extending our 
contact with our fellow men beyond the bounds of our personal lot.  All the more sacred is the 
task of the artist when he undertakes to paint the life of the People.”97  This is especially 
important for the writer that seeks to depict “the people”: if experience is the key to a more 
informed knowledge of the lower classes, fiction’s “amplification” of experience is a way to 
communicate the material realities of the working classes to the public at large.  This is why the 
novel should not stray into the realm of the ideal: “the thing for mankind to know is, not what are 
the motives and influences which the moralist thinks ought to act on the labourer or artisan, but 
                                                 
96 NH, 112. 
 
97 NH, 110. 
 
 102 
what are the motives and influences that do act on him.”98  Sensational, sentimental, or idealized 
representations of the working classes offer no social benefit: drawing our attention away from 
the details of everyday human life, they are unable to provoke the recognition of human 
commonality that comes from an extension of sympathy.99 
This is a sentiment repeated in Eliot’s first full length novel, Adam Bede, which includes 
another articulation of the aims of her novelistic project; in Chapter Seventeen, the narrator 
speaks to an imagined critic of the novel, who recommends a more idealized picture of human 
life—so that “we shall be able to admire, without the slightest disturbance of our 
prepossessions...”  But, the narrator counters, “these fellow-mortals, every one, must be accepted 
as they are: you can neither straighten their noses, nor brighten their wit, nor rectify their 
dispositions; and it is these people—amongst whom your life is passed—that it is needful you 
should tolerate, pity, and love: it is these more or less ugly, stupid, inconsistent people whose 
movements of goodness you should be able to admire—for whom you should cherish all possible 
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99 The doctrine of literary realism articulated in this essay is, as Rosemary Ashton 
describes, “not merely a call for simple photographic realism or what Lewes later described 
as ‘coat-and-waistcoat realism.’  We are to be brought by the artists into sympathy with 
flawed, sometimes stupid characters (‘mixed and erring humanity’) because we are to be 
made to see, as Spinoza and Feuerbach urge in their philosophies, that we belong to the 
same species, share our humanity with them.”  Ashton, George Eliot: A Life, 157.  This is a 
doctrine that shapes Eliot’s scathing critique of contemporary fiction written by women in 
her October 1856 essay “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists,” also published in the 
Westminster Review, as well as “The Sad Fortunes of the Reverend Amos Baron,” the first 
of Eliot’s Scenes from Clerical Life.  In Chapter 5 of “Amos Barton,” the narrator 
interrupts the story to acknowledge that the subject of the story is “in no respect an ideal or 
exceptional character; and perhaps I am doing a bold thing to bespeak your sympathy on 
behalf of a man who was so very far from remarkable,—a man whose virtues were not 
heroic, and who had no undetected crime within his breast; who had not the slightest 
mystery hanging about him, but was palpably and unmistakably commonplace; who was 
not even in love, but had had that complaint favourably many years ago.”  Eliot, George 
Eliot: Selected Critical Writings, 326.   
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hopes, all possible patience.”  It suits us better, the narrator explains, to look at pictures of human 
existence that improve upon real life; they do not question our assumptions and firmly-held 
opinions.  But by improving upon reality—by softening actual differences of beauty, 
temperament, or intelligence—fiction gives up its ability to cultivate its readers’ minds.  Only a 
realist novel can be an education in human existence, because it asks the reader to look at, and 
care for, the raw materials of human life   
Creating a world “so much better than this” in the novel, the narrator adds, will only 
invite the reader to “turn a harder, colder eye on the dusty streets and the common green fields—
on the real breathing men and women, who can be chilled by your indifference or injured by 
your prejudice; who can be cheered and helped onward by your fellow-feeling, your forbearance, 
your outspoken brave justice.”100  The representations of the novel, by this standard, have real 
effects upon the daily lives human beings.  Idealized or sentimentalized fiction prepares the 
reader for disappointment and impatience with the actualities of life; the realist novel, on the 
other hand, can ameliorate the unpleasant details of everyday existence—not by improving upon 
life but by inviting the reader to see it anew in the light of sympathetic understanding.   
For Eliot, then, the realist novel has the capacity to be educational in the broadest sense 
of the word, expanding the reader’s knowledge of human life and cultivating human faculties of 
reason, imagination, and affection.  It is no less than a means of moral development or reform, a 
way of preparing readers for citizenship in a liberal democratic culture and a modern secular 
society.  The realist novel is, moreover, specially positioned to reform conventional ideas about 
human life that have become disconnected from the concrete details of everyday existence: for 
instance, generalizations based upon social categories of class, gender, ethnicity, or religion.  
                                                 
100 George Eliot, Adam Bede (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 178. 
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These generalities serve to divide human beings from each other, preventing extensions of 
sympathy that invoke recognitions of human commonality.  Wary of any view of social life that 
dissolves the specifics of individual and local experience, Eliot is interested in creating fiction 
that brings us closer to the mixed and diverse nature of modern social existence.  This is because 
difference is what holds possibility for Eliot, as for Mill: in the realist novel, difference is what 
surprises the reader out of habits of thought and into attention to what is separate from 
themselves.  It is the impetus for transformations of mind that have effects beyond the pages of 
fiction, instigating human choices and actions that bring the possibilities of mind into the 
probabilities of history.   
4.2 DANIEL DERONDA 
Eliot’s own novels are centrally concerned with such transformations of mind.  In 
narratives that chronicle the everyday thoughts and emotions of unhistorical individuals, Eliot 
creates a “natural history” of human mind that gives special attention to the small events of 
internal human life: to the small shifts in perspective or feeling that make up larger developments 
of understanding and sympathy.  Eliot’s most sustained study of mental development is Daniel 
Deronda, a novel that charts the moral reform of its central characters Daniel Deronda and 
Gwendolen Harleth.  With Deronda, Eliot creates what appears to be an explicit realization of 
her moral-sympathetic ideal, as articulated in both her literary criticism and fiction: a character 
whose internal potential for sympathy finds fulfillment in purposeful moral action.  But 
Gwendolen Harleth’s may be the more interesting metamorphosis of the novel because of its 
inconclusiveness.  With Gwendolen, Eliot writes a history not of the actual but of the possible.  
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Both before and after her moral transformation, Gwendolen’s internal potential exceeds the 
opportunities afforded by her social circumstances.  She is, in this way, a character better suited 
to fiction than to life: because her moral transformation does not lead to greater possibilities for 
action, the most dramatic events of her life are invisible to all but the reader.  Defined by a “play 
of contraries” in both her physical aspect and mental constitution, Gwendolen offers the narrator 
opportunities to explore those open-ended states of human mind that are a central concern in 
Daniel Deronda.  These are the aspects of human life not evidenced by concrete speech or action; 
they are wishful anticipation, moral indecision, and mixed feeling.   
Reforms of mind, dramatized by Deronda and Gwendolen, are also asked of the reader.  
With its mixed discourse, Daniel Deronda invites the reader to bring a certain kind of mind to the 
contemplation of the novel’s subjects: a more noticing, flexible, and sympathetic mind.  As we 
will see, the narrator’s continual interruption of the immediate action of the novel creates 
occasions for the reader to be multiply oriented: to attend at once to the small details of local 
experience and the large events of British history, to the peculiarities of human character and the 
generalities of social convention, to the concrete consequences of individual choice and the 
abstract aims of moral principle. 101   
This multiple orientation promotes a reformation of mind in the reader that is both 
intellectual and sympathetic.  On the one hand, the narrator brings abstract ideas into closer 
relationship with concrete reality: in the narrator’s hands, commonplace ideas about social life 
                                                 
101 Here I share the view, held by literary theorists like Roland Barthes, Gerard Genette, 
and Mikhail Bakhtin, that narrative interruption promotes freedom of thought.  Although 
the freedom I am describing is not textual but liberal.  Here Schiller’s idea of aesthetic 
“play” is perhaps the best way of describing the relationship between the narrator’s 
interjections and the immediate action of the novel.  In Schiller’s terminology, there is a 
kind of “play” here between subject (author, reader, generalized knowledge) and object 
(representations of the novel, material particulars).   
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are corrected by concrete actions and small happenings are broadened by theoretical knowledge.  
In this way, Daniel Deronda often reads more like an essay than a novel, like social criticism 
rather than social representation.  Here the narrator’s priority is to find out, first, whether 
established ideas (about society, nationality, ethnicity, and so on) hold up when we scrutinize 
actual social life and, second, whether the analysis of particular human beings can bring some 
greater understanding of general humanity.  On the other hand, the narrator’s interjections 
encourage a readier compassion for the novel’s characters, and a more extensive sympathetic 
understanding of the “mixed and erring” nature of human life.  This might seem counterintuitive: 
taking the reader away from the immediate happenings of the novel’s characters, these narrative 
interruptions appear to thwart rather than promote extensions of sympathy.  But by checking 
habits of mind and correcting conventional knowledge, the mixed discourse of the novel makes it 
difficult for the reader to be single-minded about the novel’s characters.  It asks that we not judge 
them too quickly, showing how their mistakes and weaknesses could easily be our own.   
4.3 TRANSFORMATIONS OF SYMPATHY 
In Daniel Deronda, the source of sympathy is in the small details of local, everyday life, 
the specificity of home being the beginning of both knowledge and affection in every human 
child.  The healthiest of sympathetic education, then, begins with the limited sphere of an 
established home.  “A human life, I think, should be well rooted in some spot of native land,” the 
narrator states in the opening paragraph of Chapter Three,  
where it may get the love of tender kinship for the face of earth, for 
the labours men go forth to, for the sounds and accents that haunt 
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it, for whatever will give that early home a familiar unmistakable 
difference amidst the future widening of knowledge: a spot where 
the definiteness of early memories may be inwrought with 
affectation, and kindly acquaintance with all neighbours, even to 
the dogs and donkeys, may spread not by sentimental effort and 
reflection, but as a sweet habit of the blood.  At five years old, 
mortals are not prepared to be citizens of the world, to be 
stimulated by abstract nouns, to soar above preference into 
impartiality; and that prejudice in favour of milk with which we 
blindly begin, is a type of the way body and soul must get 
nourished at least for a time.  The best introduction to astronomy is 
to think of the nightly heavens as a little lot of stars belonging to 
one’s own homestead.102    
The effect of the material world upon the mind is at its greatest in childhood, the narrator asserts, 
our native home shaping our earliest affections and creating associations of mind that will be the 
instincts of later life.  The meaning of this place and its people is not the effect of an extension of 
sympathy through an exertion of mind, but an effortless “habit of the blood.”  Affect is rooted in 
the familiar concrete world, in the everyday details of home that have little significance in the 
wider world but constitute the beginnings of moral sympathy in the individual.  Children must be 
self-centered in this way because they are not ready for the more objective habits of mind 
demanded of “citizens of the world.”  The best introduction to an abstract knowledge of 
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humankind, the narrator concludes, is through the specificity of home, its details having 
subjective meaning from which more generalized understanding may grow.   
But both the hero and heroine of Daniel Deronda are lacking the rootedness the narrator 
describes.  The passage above references the inconsistencies of Gwendolen’s upbringing, in both 
home and parenting, but is no less relevant to the uncertainties of Daniel Deronda’s early life.  
This affects the two characters’ habits of mind in divergent ways: through early adulthood 
Gwendolen maintains the egoism of a child whose world is ordered by their own likes and 
dislikes, while Deronda’s active imagination and “diffuse sympathy” prevent him from choosing 
a definite plan of life.  In other words, Gwendolen suffers from a sympathy too narrow and 
Deronda from a sympathy too broad.   
Deronda’s early life, the narrator relates, is defined by uncertainty regarding his 
parentage and his purpose in life.  Having a great capacity for sympathy with those less fortunate 
than himself, his desire to make some effect upon the world nevertheless remains at the level of 
vague intention rather than action.  A tendency toward “reflective hesitation” is encouraged by 
his social position, there being “no need for him to get an immediate income, or to fit himself in 
haste for a profession; and his sensibility to the half-known facts of his parentage made him an 
excuse for lingering longer than others in a state of social neutrality.”103  With leisure affording 
opportunities to dwell upon the problems of the world in the abstract, Deronda finds ample 
reasons to stand outside the conventions of professional society and to abstain from choosing to 
pursue any one plan of life.  Deronda’s “early-wakened sensibility and reflectiveness,” the 
narrator explains, “had developed into a many-sided sympathy, which threatened to hinder any 
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persistent course of action…His imagination had so wrought itself to the habit of seeing things as 
they probably appeared to others, that a strong partisanship, unless it were against an immediate 
oppression, had become an insincerity for him.”104  The compass of Deronda’s sympathetic 
imagination, in other words, is more dominant than any particular intention.  His mind having the 
habit of being many places at once, a strong allegiance to any one view of life feels unnatural 
and insincere.   
This capacity for “many-sided sympathy” is a virtue in Daniel Deronda, especially when 
brought into contrast with the limited sympathies of Gwendolen Harleth.  But, as the narrator 
cautions in Book II,   
A too reflective and diffusive sympathy was in danger of 
paralyzing in [Deronda] that indignation against wrong and that 
selectness of fellowship which are the conditions of moral force; 
and in the last few years of confirmed manhood he had become so 
keenly aware of this that what he most longed for was either some 
external event, or some inward light, that would urge him into a 
definite line of action, and compress his wandering energy.105 
Deronda’s sympathetic habit of mind runs counter to the choice of purpose or action; his 
reflective compassion inspires no moral response, blunting the feeling that comes with the 
apprehension of wrong and setting him apart from a larger community of men.106  What Deronda 
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106 Here there are apparent similarities between Deronda and Walter Pater’s Marius of 
Marius the Epicurean.  See my discussion of Marius’s deliberation over two contrary 
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yearns for, according to the narrator, is some event that would rouse him from the routine of his 
present life and give him some definite outlet for his mental energies.      
Deronda is urged by just such an event as he is rowing on the Thames one evening, 
singing a song from Rossini’s opera Otello.  On the riverside he sees “a figure which might have 
been an impersonation of the misery he was unconsciously giving voice to”:  a small, dark haired 
woman in a large cloak standing alone at the edge of the water, her “eyes fixed upon on the river 
with a look of immovable, statue-like despair.”107  Deronda is surprised by “the strong arrest of 
his attention which made him stop singing.”  He feels an “outleap of interest and compassion 
towards her, but the next instant she had turned and walked away to a neighboring bench under a 
tree.”  He begins to row away, “speculating on the probable romance that lay behind that 
loneliness and look of desolation,” his mind glancing   
over the girl-tragedies that are going on in the world, hidden, 
unheeded, as if they were but tragedies of the copse or hedgerow, 
where the helpless drag wounded wings forsakenly, and streak the 
shadowed moss with the red moment-hand of their own death.  
Deronda of late, in his solitary excursions, had been occupied 
chiefly with uncertainties about this own course; but those 
uncertainties, being much at their leisure, were wont to have such 
wide-sweeping connections with all life and history that the new 
image of helpless sorrow easily blent itself with what seemed to 
                                                                                                                                                             
philosophies of life, one historically aloof and sympathetically diffuse and the other 
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him the strong array of reasons why he should shrink from getting 
into that routine of the world which makes men apologise for all its 
wrong-doing, and take opinions as mere professional equipment—
why he should not draw strongly at any thread in the hopelessly-
entangled scheme of things. 108  
In a characteristic reverie, Deronda does not linger long over the particular misfortunes of this 
dark-haired girl, but allows his mind to “glance” over the misery of women in general—his 
thoughts leaping from the individual woman by the riverside, to the likely hardships of his own 
unknown mother, to a general conception of the invisibility of women’s unhappiness.  The event 
becomes meaningful for Deronda, characteristically, not on its own but because of the 
sympathetic and romantic connections it evokes with a wider web of experience and history.  
The girl by the riverside becomes, the narrator tells us, one more reason to shrink from choosing 
a profession in life—to maintain a certain passivity to the sufferings of the world.   
In this scene, Deronda’s perceptions of the wider world are speculative, his own self and 
purpose dwarfed by the larger connections of history or romance.  On his way back down the 
river, looking at the city from his boat, he “was forgetting everything else in a half-speculative, 
half-involuntary identification of himself with the objects he was looking at, thinking how far it 
might be possible habitually to shift his centre till his own personality would be no less outside 
him than the landscape—when the sense of something moving on the bank opposite him…made 
him turn his glance thitherward.”109  Seeing that the girl by the riverside is now walking into the 
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water, apparently attempting to drown herself, Deronda’s imaginative speculations are abruptly 
interrupted.  He is urged to action and, in this moment, sympathetic reflection becomes moral 
choice.  As the narrative that follows reveals, this attempted drowning is the “external event” that 
urges Deronda “into a definite line of action,” leading to his embrace of Judaism and marriage to 
Mirah Lapidoth.  A metaphor for Deronda’s moral transformation in the novel at large, 
Deronda’s rescue of Mirah by the riverside is an affirmation of Eliot’s moral sympathetic ideal: 
in this scene, thoughts shape events when internal capacities of mind are brought be bear upon 
external realities.   
This chance meeting with Mirah opens a new world of thought for Deronda.  He realizes 
his ignorance of modern Judaism and Jewish history, an ignorance typical of the British gentry.  
As the narrator puts it,  
The Chosen People have been commonly treated as a people 
chosen for the sake of somebody else; and their thinking as 
something (no matter exactly what) that ought to have been 
entirely otherwise; and Deronda, like his neighbors, had regarded 
Judaism as a sort of eccentric fossilized form which a 
accomplished man might dispense with studying, and leave to 
specialists.  But Mirah, with her terrified flight from one parent, 
and her yearning after the other, had flashed on him the hitherto 
neglected reality that Judaism was something still throbbing in 
human lives… 110  
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Deronda, like most British gentleman, regards the spiritual and intellectual traditions of Judaism 
as an anachronism, as irrelevant to the concerns of modern life.  But his relationship with Mirah, 
which chance has asserted upon his life, enlightens a “neglected reality” or unnoticed aspect of 
British culture: contemporary Jewish life and thought.  Seeing Mirah suffer the loss of her 
mother, as he has mourned the loss of his, Deronda begins to see Judaism in a new light.  This 
feeling of commonality urges Deronda’s friendship with both Mirah and Mordecai, which extend 
his experience and emends his education, opening up unseen possibilities for his life.   
  
At the start of the novel, Deronda’s character is defined by an imaginative diffusion of 
self, a hyper-awareness of existence outside of his own which dwarfs subjective experience.  
Gwendolen Harleth’s character may be described as the inverse, having a seemingly unassailable 
egoism which orders the world according to her own interests.  Our introduction to Gwendolen 
in the opening scene of the novel is significant: she is at a roulette table with a diverse group of 
other gamblers “absorbed in play.” The conventional affect of the gaming table—enacted by 
Gwendolen’s disinterested grace in both winning and losing—offers an effective metaphor for 
the first half of Gwendolen’s story, up until the point of her marriage to Grandcourt.  It is 
Gwendolen’s dissemblance of impartiality, concealing the strong self-interest that rules her in 
both gambling and life, that Deronda sees when their eyes meet across the room:  
instead of averting [her eyes] as she would have desired to do, she 
was unpleasantly conscious that they were arrested – how long?  
The darting sense that he was measuring her and looking down on 
her as an inferior, that he was of a different quality from the human 
dross around her, that he felt himself in a region outside and above 
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her, and was examining her as a specimen of a lower order, roused 
a tingling resentment which stretched the moment with conflict.111 
Under the unaccustomed feeling of critical examination, Gwendolen is compelled by Deronda’s 
gaze to acknowledge his moral scrutiny: she imagines that he is looking down on her in 
judgment as an inferior, from a standpoint both apart and above those gathered around the 
gambling table.  The reader, having knowledge of events that predate this scene but which are 
not related until later in the novel, may imagine Deronda as inhabiting a “region outside and 
above” Gwendolen in this early scene, but not in quite the way that she imagines.  At this point 
Deronda has already saved Mirah from drowning and thus entered a life “outside” of 
conventional British society.  The reader may also see Deronda as standing “above” Gwendolen 
in his habits of mind, superior at least in his capacity for sympathetic extension and action.  This 
moment marks the beginning of Gwendolen’s moral reformation, which is a gradual realization 
of both the smallness of her own life in the grand scheme of things and a slow awakening to the 
moral consequences of her actions.   
The narrative of Gwendolen’s life preceding her marriage, the narrator tells us, is one that 
may be described as a small one in the wider world but which wholly ruled the lives of those 
around her.  At the start of the novel, Gwendolen is a character who seeks to bend the 
circumstances of life to her own will and to order the world according to her own wishes.  She 
believes that while “other people allowed themselves to be made slaves of, and to have their own 
lives blown hither and thither like empty ships in which no will was present, it was not to be so 
with her, she would no longer be sacrificed to creatures worth less than herself, but would make 
the very best of the chances offered her, and conquer circumstance by her exceptional 
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cleverness.”112  What Gwendolen wants from life is not, perhaps, as specific as her resolution to 
get it; her intentions are merely, as they are expressed throughout Book One, to “do as she likes” 
and be exempt from what she doesn’t like.  The satisfaction she seeks, the narrator suggests, is 
not so much in the results of her choices but in the act of choosing itself, intending only “to do 
what was pleasant to herself in a striking manner; or rather, whatever she could do so as to strike 
others with admiration and get in that reflected way a more ardent sense of living…”113   
But Gwendolen’s need for admiration is, at least in part, a result of the narrowness of her 
social circumstances.  While she “rejoiced to feel herself exceptional, the narrator asserts, but 
her horizon was that of the genteel romance, where the heroine’s 
soul poured out in her journal is full of vague power, originality, 
and general rebellion, while her life moves strictly in the sphere of 
fashion; and if she wanders into a swamp, the pathos lies partly, so 
to speak, in her having on her satin shoes.  Here is a restraint which 
nature and society have provided on the pursuit of striking 
adventure; so that a soul burning with a sense of what the universe 
is not, and ready to take all existence as fuel, is nevertheless held 
captive by the ordinary wire-work of social forms and does nothing 
particular.114   
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Here there is a discordance between internal potential and external circumstance.  Gwendolen 
has a desire for difference, even for experiment, but sees no possibility of action outside of the 
likelihoods of upper-class feminine society.  Although she knows that she does not wish to lead 
“the same sort of life as ordinary young ladies,” she has little idea as to “how she should set 
about leading any other, and what were the particular acts which she would assert her freedom 
by doing.”115  She has no opportunity to “climb up the matterhorn,”116 as she puts it in the 
opening chapter of the novel, or to “go to the North Pole, or ride steeplechases, or go to be a 
queen in the East like Lady Hester Stanhope,”117 as she says in Chapter Seven.  So she settles for 
ruling over the people that surround her on a daily basis, such as her mother and sisters.   
To her family Gwendolen gives little notice and scant affection. As the narrator points 
out, Gwendolen’s need for supremacy among those that populate her social scene serves to cut 
her off from the sympathetic bonds of friendship and family.  To Gwendolen, who “had never 
disassociated happiness from personal preeminence and éclat,” as the narrator puts it, there 
seems no joy in life beyond the prospect of leading and mastering.  She finds it hard to care for 
other people, as she says herself to Deronda later in the novel; but then, she has had little practice 
at it.  Sympathetic affection, in Daniel Deronda, is a matter of both attention and imagination; it 
requires that we notice the specifics of each other, putting aside the self in order to visualize 
other perspectives, other ways of life.  But all Gwendolen’s attention, in the chapters leading up 
to her marriage, is absorbed by her own pleasures and pains, and her imagination rarely extends 
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beyond a visualization of future success and accomplishments.  This is why there is no chance of 
Gwendolen falling in love with Rex or Grandcourt; she has no romantic interest in marriage, and 
recoils from any overt expressions of love.  To acknowledge Rex’s strong feelings for her, for 
instance, would mean that she would have put herself in his place—to imagine his acute 
suffering upon her rejection of his romantic advances.   
Gwendolen is not entirely unaware of the smallness of her world in the wider scheme of 
things: she is liable to “fits of spiritual dread,” meaning that “solitude in any wide scene 
impressed her with an undefined feeling of immeasurable existence aloof from her, in the midst 
of which she was helplessly incapable of asserting herself.”118  The seeming inverse of the social 
persona she wishes to maintain, Gwendolen is often plagued with the vague feeling that her 
conception of the world is hauntingly incomplete—and this endangers her assurance in her 
abilities to bend others according to her own interests.  In the imaginings of solitude, she has an 
idea of her own inconsequence in the “vastness” of the wider world, but this awareness is 
dispelled when the appearance of another person allows her to turn back to her self-ordered 
existence. 
Following a series of events that bring Gwendolen uncomfortably closer to a world that is 
unbidden by her own wishes, she becomes aware of “an uneasy, transforming process.”119  One 
thing after another reveals itself to be against her and her belief in her own exceptionality: the 
surprise of Lydia Glasher’s connection to Grandcourt on the day she had planned to accept his 
proposal of marriage, her sudden ill-luck at the gaming table at Lebroune, and the revelation that 
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her mother’s entire income has been lost through a bad investment.  Her eyes are slowly opened 
to the workings of wider experience, the belief in her own power of mastery giving way to the 
realization that all she can do is brace herself for whatever circumstances may come.   
Choosing to marry Grandcourt in spite of her promise to Lydia Glasher, Gwendolen 
makes one last attempt to gain what she has lost, to recalibrate what she “expected in her lot” to 
“what it was actually to be.”120  During their engagement, she finds ways to explain away the 
discomfort she feels about doing what she had once promised herself she would not do; but when 
she is alone at night, the faces of Grandcourt’s children appear to her in her imagination, and she 
is filled with a dreadful foreboding for what is to come.  “The brilliant position she had longed 
for, the imagined freedom she would create for herself in marriage, the deliverance from the dull 
insignificance of her girlhood—all were immediately before her; and yet they had come to her 
hunger like food with the taint of sacrilege upon it, which she must snatch with terror.”121  
Gwendolen dimly perceives that her choice to marry Grandcourt will have moral consequences, 
but it is not until the delivery of the diamonds on her wedding day that she begins to imagine that 
her marriage will be a kind of punishment for past selfishness and wrongdoing.   
Gwendolen’s moral awakening urges her friendship with Deronda, and their 
conversations become a kind of sympathetic education.  Although, in a sense, Deronda’s moral 
education of Gwendolen begins well before her marriage to Grandcourt, their relationship being 
established in the opening scene of the novel in which Deronda looks disapprovingly upon 
Gwendolen’s gambling.  It is this unspoken reproach that prompts Gwendolen to speak with 
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Deronda when they meet again at Diplow during her engagement, to chastise him for “casting an 
evil eye” upon her play at roulette that changed her luck for the worse.122  When she asks 
Deronda why he thought it so wrong for her to gamble, he gives her a sermon on moral 
consequences, telling her that “‘there are enough inevitable turns of fortune which force us to see 
that our gain is another’s loss:—that is one of the ugly aspects of life.  One would like to reduce 
it as much as one could, not get amusement out of exaggerating it.’”123  Gwendolen’s reply to 
Deronda is, in this scene, a flippant one, but we can see in this exchange a map of the 
relationship that unfolds between these two characters over the course of the novel.  In every 
scene they are together there is a struggle between Gwendolen’s personal philosophy of “doing 
as she likes” and Deronda’s moral-sympathetic code of life; between Gwendolen’s belief that life 
should shape itself to suit her own wants and Deronda’s conviction that personal desire should 
come second to the needs of the outside world.   
Gwendolen asks Deronda during her visit to the Abbey how she might lessen the misery 
she feels in her marriage, and he encourages her to turn her attention outward by looking “on 
other lives besides your own.  See what their troubles are, and how they are borne.  Try to care 
about something in this vast world besides the gratification of small selfish desires.  Try to care 
for what is best in thought and action—something that is good apart from the accidents of your 
own lot.”124  In this way, Deronda attempts to make a lesson of Gwendolen’s situation, urging 
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her to see her own sufferings as an opportunity to widen her moral compass—to expand her 
sympathies to include the hardships of others unconnected to herself.   
When Gwendolen describes her perpetual fear since her marriage, which is a kind of 
moral dread of future calamity, he tries to convince her that her fear can be morally useful:  
Turn your fear into a safeguard.  Keep your dread fixed on the idea 
of increasing that remorse which is so bitter to you.  Fixed 
meditation may do a great deal towards defining our longing or 
dread.  We are not always in a state of strong emotion, and when 
we are calm we can use our memories and gradually change the 
bias of our fear, as we do our tastes.  Take your fear as a safeguard.  
It is like the quickness of hearing.  It may make consequences 
passionately present to you.  Try to take hold of your sensibility, 
and use it as if it were a faculty, like vision.125 
With meditation and study, Deronda says, strong feelings—like fear or dread—can be the 
beginning of a moral reeducation of the emotions.  The idea of emotion proposed here is far from 
passive: feeling can be a faculty like hearing or vision; it can be cultivated to bring about a 
greater attentiveness to the specifics of human life and a keener sensitivity to the moral effects of 
our own actions.  But this reeducation of the emotions requires that we bring self-reflection to 
our own emotions, an attunement to our own states of mind.    
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4.4 MIXED NARRATIVE 
I have described how Gwendolen and Deronda are introduced at the start of the novel 
with certain limitations of sympathy, which are a result of the rootlessness of their upbringing.  
The reader, too, experiences a kind of rootlessness in Daniel Deronda, the narrator’s critical 
interjections in nearly every scene dividing the reader’s attention from the immediate happenings 
of the novel’s storyline.126  These interruptions urge a certain freedom of the mind in the reader, 
creating opportunities for an independent contemplation of the novel’s objects, both concrete and 
abstract.   The passage that begins Chapter three, quoted above, may be used as an example.  The 
chapter begins with the sentence “Pity that Offendene was not the home of Miss Harleth’s 
childhood, or endeared to her by family memories.”127  Immediately following this specific 
comment about Gwendolen is the narrator’s reflection that “A human life, I think, should be well 
rooted in some spot of a native land…”  Here the reader is asked to move from the particulars of 
Gwendolen’s life to the generalities of the narrator’s interjection and then back again.  Before we 
can get to the scenes of Gwendolen’s introduction to her new home at Offendene, we must first 
contemplate the abstract idea of “home” and its importance for the cultivation of sympathetic 
feeling.  While the idea of home links the details of Gwendolen’s life to the common experience 
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of humankind, the specifics of her situation provoke analysis of an abstract concept that has only 
vague meaning in common usage.     
Here and elsewhere, the mixed narrative of Daniel Deronda does not allow the reader to 
get too rooted in the immediate happenings of the novel, the interjections of the narrator 
continually taking us away from the specifics of character or event.128  This is a technique 
evident in all of Eliot’s previous novels, but which is perhaps even more prevalent in Daniel 
Deronda.  The opening epigraphs to each chapter of the novel, for instance, function in a way 
similar to the example above.  They begin chapters with short quotes, excerpts, or poems that 
express some philosophical principle, cultural anecdote, or literary theme relevant to the events 
narrated in that section of the novel.  These epigraphs move the reader from the particular 
happenings of the novel to the abstract ruminations of the narrator and then back again, bringing 
commonplace ideas about human nature, abstract moral principles, or philosophical precepts into 
closer relationship with concrete referents.   
Chapter Eleven, for instance, interrupts the description of Gwendolen’s introduction to 
Grandcourt (begun in Chapter Ten) with a general observation about first meetings.  This is a 
truism that will be upheld by the events that follow: “The Beginning of an acquaintance whether 
with persons or things is to get a definite outline for our ignorance.”129  This comment interrupts 
the final words of Chapter Ten, spoken by Lord Brackenshaw, “‘Will you allow me to introduce 
Mr. Mallinger Grandcourt’” and the first words of Chapter Eleven,  
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“Mr. Grandcourt’s wish to be introduced had no suddenness for 
Gwendolen; but when Lord Brackenshaw moved aside a little for 
the prefigured stranger to come forward and she felt her face to 
face with the real man, there was a little shock which flushed her 
cheeks and vexatiously deepened with her consciousness of it.  The 
shock came from the reversal of her expectations: Grandcourt 
could hardly have been more unlike all her imaginary portraits of 
him.”130 
The way this epigraph works is characteristic of the novel, disrupting one of the more dramatic 
moments of the novel’s first book with a critical reflection that cautions the reader not to rely too 
much upon the estimations of the novel’s characters.  Although the epigraph and the opening 
paragraph of Chapter Eleven both center upon the theme of expectations, the epigraph actually 
refers to the new image of Grandcourt that is—in this moment—being created in Gwendolen’s 
mind.  Replacing the picture of what she had imagined Grandcourt would be like, this new image 
is no less mistaken than the one that has just been dispelled, as we soon find out.   
For the scene being related, this epigraph’s interruption underscores the mental events 
that are occurring, unseen, in the short moment of this introduction—preparing us, in this way, 
for a chapter as much about the internal drama of Gwendolen’s mind as the external happenings 
of the Archery party.  The epigraph also has an effect upon the reader’s relationship to this scene: 
as much happens in this short moment for the reader as for Gwendolen, the epigraph pulling us 
away from the concrete details of the introduction to contemplate, on an abstract level, the 
difficulty of estimating the internal nature of a human being.  Going back to the scene at hand, 
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the reader is encouraged to consider the situation in at least two ways: from the individual 
perspective of Gwendolen, with whom we have been allied up until this point in the novel, and 
from the general perspective of the narrator, who has warned us not to accept too quickly 
Gwendolen’s initial estimation of Grandcourt.  In one sense, the epigraph asks that we look at 
Gwendolen with a more critical eye, but in another sense it deepens our sympathetic 
understanding of this character.  If Gwendolen is mistaken in the image that she has formed of 
Grandcourt in her imagination, her error is only one that any human being is liable to make.  
The epigraph that prefaces Chapter Sixteen is not only a general statement that serves to 
elucidate the events of that chapter, but also a larger explanation of the priorities of the novel as a 
whole: 
Men, like planets, have both a visible and invisible history.  The 
astronomer threads the darkness with strict deduction, accounting 
so for every visible arc in the wanderers orbit; and the narrator of 
human actions, if he did his work with the same completeness, 
would have to thread the hidden pathways of feeling and thought 
which lead up to every moment of action, and to those moments of 
intense suffering which take the quality of action—like the cry of 
Prometheus, whose chained anguish seems a greater energy than 
the sea and sky he invokes and the deity he defies.131 
Like the astronomer who reveals complex and unseen planetary movement by means of 
deduction, the novelist must portray the intricacy of thought and feeling that precede every 
human action.  Internal suffering can have the vividness and distinction of action, the narrator 
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asserts, the drama of the mind at times exceeding that of the external world.  The truth of this 
statement can be tested in the chapter that follows, which focuses on the early life of Daniel 
Deronda and the internal suffering he experiences regarding the uncertainty of his parentage.  It 
also, of course, describes a central concern of the novel as a whole, which makes the moral 
development of Deronda and Gwendolen its primary subject.  In a way, the epigraph begs the 
question of what the novel would look like without its careful depiction these internal 
developments—without any insight into the small shifts of Gwendolen’s perspective or the slight 
alterations of Deronda’s affections.  The answer to this question, the narrator suggests, is not 
only that Daniel Deronda would be a less interesting novel and an incomplete narrative of human 
life.  It is also that it would be limited in its capacity to inspire sympathetic understanding.   
There is usually a clear connection between the novel’s epigraphs and the happenings of 
the chapter that follows, the novel’s characters or events affirming the truth or significance of 
what the epigraph has expressed.  In the two cases studied above, the epigraph offers a summary 
statement about human nature, and the chapters that follow serve to explicate this generalization.  
But in many cases, the narrator’s interjections correct or qualify summary views of human 
existence—especially those that simplify the complexity of human nature or the mixed qualities 
of human mind.  To give one example of many, in Chapter Fourteen after Gwendolen has met 
Lydia Glasher at the Whispering Stones, the narrator asserts that “Gwendolen’s uncontrolled 
reading, though consisting chiefly in what are called pictures of life, had somehow not prepared 
her for this encounter with reality.”  Despite all of Gwendolen’s novel reading, she is shocked to 
discover that Grandcourt has a mistress and three children.  But reading about love affairs is one 
thing, the narrator explains, and seeing one up close is another: “Perspective, as its inventor 
remarked, is a beautiful thing.  What horrors of damp huts, where human beings languish, may 
 126 
not become picturesque through aerial distance!  What hymning of cancerous vices may we not 
languish over as sublimest art in the safe remoteness of a strange language and artificial phrase!  
Yet we keep a repugnance to rheumatism and other painful effects when presented in our 
personal experience.”  Fiction that keeps the reader at a distance from the ugly details of human 
existence, the narrator asserts, cannot extend experience or teach us anything about human 
nature.132  There is a contrast, then, between the kinds of fiction that Gwendolen is in the habit of 
reading and Daniel Deronda.  This novel, the narrator seems to be saying, will not shy from the 
raw materials of everyday life; it will not escape into the picturesque or the sublime.  The reader, 
like Gwendolen herself, will be acquainted with the unpleasant details of Grandcourt’s 
relationship with Lydia Glasher, just as we will experience the disparity between Gwendolen’s 
preconceptions about Grandcourt and the painful realities of their married life together.     
Other interjections link the small happenings of the novel’s characters to broader 
historical movements.  For instance, as Gwendolen deliberates upon the benefits of a marriage to 
Grandcourt, the narrator waxes upon the theme of the smallness of women’s lives within the 
greater scheme of history.  At the close of Chapter Eleven, the narrator asks:    
Could there be a slenderer, more insignificant thread in human 
history than this consciousness of a girl, busy with her small 
inferences of the way in which she could make her life pleasant? – 
in a time, too, when ideas were with fresh vigour making armies of 
themselves, and the universal kinship was declaring itself fiercely: 
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when women on the other side of the world would not mourn for 
the husbands and sons who died bravely in a common cause, and 
men stinted of bread on our side of the world heard of that willing 
loss and were patient: a time when the soul of man was waking to 
pulses which had for centuries been beating in him unfelt, until 
their full sum made a new life of terror or of joy.133    
Although Gwendolen’s thread is the one that has fully occupied the first book of the novel, and 
the world of her social scene is a vivid and large one for the reader, the narrator reminds us of the 
broader contexts of her historical moment.  The events of the novel, being set ten years prior to 
its publication, are simultaneous with the “mighty drama” of the American civil war and the 
shortage of raw cotton in England, making hardships for British textile workers who nevertheless 
supported abolition.  These are events of which Gwendolen has either no knowledge or no 
interest; but the reader is not allowed her ignorance.  Here, as elsewhere in the novel, the narrator 
prevents the reader from getting too engrossed in the world of the novel’s characters, in this case 
the drama of Grandcourt’s courtship of Gwendolen.  Drawing us up and out of the immediate 
happenings of the novel, the narrator’s reference to these worldly events makes the reader 
wonder, perhaps, why we are giving so much attention to the fairly routine events of the British 
countryside—and to the matrimonial deliberations of a comparatively unexceptional young girl.  
But the major events of history are made up of the same materials as the “small inferences” of 
Gwendolen Harleth’s mind, as this passage makes clear; Gwendolen’s matrimonial deliberations, 
like the struggles of ideological wars, are made up of states and alterations of mind. 
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While this interjection provides a broader historical perspective, others seek to correct 
certain habits of mind that might, in the narrator’s estimation, prevent our ready sympathy with 
the novel’s characters.  In chapter Four, which introduces us to Gwendolen’s virtual tyranny over 
her family, the narrator inserts a backhanded caution to the reader not to judge Gwendolen too 
harshly.  Giving some explanation for her mother and sister’s deference by pointing to 
Gwendolen’s beauty and a certain “decision of will” in her manner, the narrator nevertheless 
advises the reader to “beware of arriving at conclusions without comparison.  I remember having 
seen the same assiduous, apologetic attention awarded to persons who were not at all beautiful or 
unusual, whose firmness showed itself in no very graceful or euphonious way, and who were not 
eldest daughters with a tender, timid mother, compunctious at having subjected them to 
inconveniences.  Some of them were a very common sort of men.”134  This is a characteristic 
interjection from the narrator, whose criticisms of Gwendolen are often tempered through 
comparative commentary and a sense of wit.  The narrator’s suggestion that we would hardly 
remark upon Gwendolen’s behavior if she were a man aims to surprise the reader into rethinking 
a conventional distinction between women and men.  This comparison, in turn, invites a more 
tempered judgment of Gwendolen’s behavior.   
While they ask for different kinds of reflection upon the novel’s subjects, both concrete 
and abstract, each of the narrator’s interjections encourage the reader to be multiply-oriented to 
the narrative of Daniel Deronda.  Interrupting the immediate action of the novel, they encourage 
the reader to bring a certain freedom of thought and feeling to the contemplation of the novel, to 
attend to its central concerns with an increased intellectual flexibility and readier sympathy.  
Correcting overly simplified ideas about social life or entrenched assumptions about human 
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nature, they serve to check summative judgments of the reader’s characters.  In this sense, they 
practice the reader in the many operations of mind that ought to be undertaken before making 
judgments in real life.  Expanding the reader’s knowledge of human life and cultivating human 
faculties of reason, judgment, reflection, imagination, and affection, these interjections make the 
novel educational in the broadest sense of the word.  
4.5 MIXED MIND 
In numerous instances in Daniel Deronda the narrator’s critical interruptions allow the 
reader to make a more nuanced estimation of a character, scene, or concept, the novel’s multi-
layered narration giving confidence that we have judged the situation fairly and sympathetically.  
There are also, however, many other places in the novel where the narrator’s additions, 
commentaries, and corrections leave the reader in a more suspended state of mind.  In these 
moments, we may know more, having greater perspective, richer context, and improved critical 
awareness; but we are less secure in our ability to judge the situation with assurance.  In these 
instances, the narrator provokes indecision in the reader, creating long moments in which the 
reader is held in a state of irresolution.  Indeed, all of the narrator’s interruptions may be read as 
serving to prolong more open-ended states of mind in the reader, even when they eventually 
bring us to a more decided evaluation of the novel’s subjects.  The novel promotes, in this way, 
the same kind of mental transition or development in the reader as it dramatizes in Deronda and 
Gwendolen—the narrator’s interjections provoking moral estimations that are later revised or 
self-reflections that gradually become broader sympathies.   
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We need only return to the questions that open the novel to consider in what ways Daniel 
Deronda is centrally concerned with encouraging open-ended states of mind:  
Was she beautiful or not beautiful? and what was the secret of 
form or expression which gave the dynamic quality to her glance?  
Was the good or the evil genius dominant in those beams?  
Probably the evil; else why was the effect that of unrest than of 
undisturbed charm?  Why was the wish to look again felt as 
coercion and not as a longing in which the whole being 
consents?135 
In the paragraphs that follow, we learn that these are questions Daniel Deronda asks himself 
about Gwendolen Harleth.  But even though the opening epigraph of the novel cautions that no 
knowledge can be produced without first creating a place to begin,136 the first line of the novel 
asks the reader to consider Gwendolen without a beginning—without even knowing who it is we 
are judging.  The novel, then, opens with the indecision that comes from a question without 
context.137   
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The effect of Gwendolen in this scene, then, prefaces an idea articulated by the narrator a 
few pages later: that human thinking can be many things at once, that the most contrary ideas 
may be held in the mind in the same moment.  Deronda’s questions bear the weight of competing 
evaluations of Gwendolen’s beauty and goodness.  Gwendolen is, in this long moment, both 
beautiful and not beautiful, both good and evil.  As this scene is set in the contexts of a gambling 
hall, there is also the suggestion that the answers to these questions may be more a matter of 
chance than the result of purposeful deliberation.  Gwendolen’s beauty, like the roulette game, 
evokes a multiplicity of possibility—Deronda’s questions seeming to hang in the moment 
between a stake wagered and a stake won or lost.   
The effect the opening paragraphs of the novel signal that Daniel Deronda will be a novel 
primarily interested in the multiple possibilities of mind: more a study of mixed emotion than 
decided action, more a narrative of moral indecision than certain judgment.  It also suggests that 
the reader, like Deronda, will need the length of the novel to decide whether Gwendolen is 
beautiful or not beautiful, good or evil.  Indeed, in a narrative of development and mental 
transition in which the possibilities of interior mind are of more interest than the certainties of 
exterior world, she is more thought-provoking when she is both.  Moreover, in a novel that sets 
out to reform the minds of its readers, it matters less what we decide about Gwendolen than the 
phases of mind that bring us to some resolution.       
Where Deronda resists the disquieting effect that Gwendolen has upon him, the narrator 
regularly celebrates it.  Describing the mixture of fondness and fear that Gwendolen inspires in 
others in Chapter One, the narrator explains that these feelings are heightened  
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by what may be called the iridescence of her character—the play 
of various, nay, contrary tendencies.  For MacBeth’s rhetoric about 
the impossibility of being many opposite things in the same 
moment, referred to the clumsy necessities of action and not to the 
subtler possibilities of feeling.  We cannot speak a loyal word and 
be meanly silent, we cannot kill and not kill in the same moment; 
but a moment is room wide enough for the loyal and mean desire, 
for the outlash of a murderous thought and the sharp backward 
stroke of repentance.138 
Where Deronda is disturbed by the uncertainty Gwendolen provokes in him, the narrator is 
intrigued by the mixed effect she has upon other characters.  This effect serves to highlight all 
the unseen possibilities of human mind.  For MacBeth was wrong about the impossibility of 
being many contrary things at once, the narrator asserts.  Action is one thing or another in the 
world but human thinking can be many-sided, with opposite thoughts or emotions contained in a 
single moment.  This is a difference of possibility, many more things being possible in thought 
than in action, as Deronda’s reaction to Gwendolen reminds us.  
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
It is fitting, then, that Daniel Deronda does not provide a clear resolution to Gwendolen’s 
storyline at the close of the novel; and it is likely that the reader is still of two minds about 
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Gwendolen.139  Deronda, who has been torn between Gwendolen and Mirah for the length of the 
novel, finally decides in the final chapters of the narrative that he will marry Mirah.  Without the 
prospect of marriage to Deronda, or even his friendship, Gwendolen’s ending is as undecided as 
her beginning.  While Deronda’s Jewish heritage promises multiple paths of thought, study, and 
action at the conclusion to the novel, the possibilities for Gwendolen’s life appear to be closed by 
Deronda’s marriage to Mirah.  Her sympathetic transformation over the course of the novel, 
unlike Deronda’s, does not urge her toward any purpose larger than a quiet family existence at 
Offendene.  At the close of the novel, we know only what she tells Deronda at their last 
meeting—that she will be “better for having known him.”  
On the one hand, we can conclude that there is a kind of cruelty in Deronda’s moral 
education of Gwendolen, because it has brought Gwendolen a broader sympathetic imagination 
without greater prospects of possible action.140  Indeed, the parameters of Gwendolen’s life at 
the close of the novel are just as narrow as they were at its start; her state of mind has changed, 
but the good that comes of her moral transformation appears limited.  She learns to care better 
for her family, telling Deronda her intention to put their happiness before her own; and in the 
final chapters of the novel we can see how her small kindnesses towards her mother and sisters 
begin to lighten her feelings of guilt about Grandcourt’s death.  Back at Offendene with her 
                                                 
139 Critics have struggled with Gwendolen’s ending in Daniel Deronda, as they have with 
Dorthea’s in Middlemarch.  See Gillian Beer for an overview of critical responses to the 
ending of Daniel Deronda as well as a comparison of Gwendolen and Dorthea.  Gillian 
Beer, George Eliot (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 220. On the problem of 
endings in Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda, and the difficulty they pose to feminist 
readings of her novels see also Ashton, George Eliot: A Life, 327-28. 
 
140 For a broader treatment of the problem of action in Eliot’s novels, including Daniel 
Deronda, see Markovits, Stephanie. "George Eliot's Problem with Action." SEL 41, no. 4 
(2001): 785-803. 
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family, the narrator tells us that she begins to experience “some of that peaceful melancholy 
which comes from the renunciation of demands for self, and from taking the ordinary good of 
existence, and especially kindness…as a gift above expectation.”  By this standard, Gwendolen’s 
ending is a lesson in finding meaning in a life less than extraordinary, in accepting the small 
comforts of everyday life.  Gwendolen’s prospects are limited, the narrator tells us, but she has 
escaped the misery of her marriage and is thankful for it.   
On the other hand, we can judge Gwendolen’s ending as Deronda does: as preface.  In 
Chapter Sixty Five, near the close of the novel, Deronda encourages Gwendolen to think of her 
past as only a preparation for her future life:  “‘This sorrow, which has cut down to the root, has 
come to you while you are so young—try to think of it, not as a spoiling of your life, but as a 
preparation for it…Think of it as a preparation.  You can, you will, be among the best of women, 
such as make others glad that they were born.’”141  The idea that the phases of Gwendolen’s life 
chronicled in Daniel Deronda are only a preparation—or education—for what is to come 
supports the idea of the novel as a narrative primarily concerned with characters that are “in the 
midst” of slow transformations—of gradual becomings.  Deronda’s words, like the narrator’s 
commentary throughout the novel, stress the potential over the actual—focusing on the good that 
can come from the sufferings of Gwendolen’s past.     
In this sense, Gwendolen’s ending reaffirms the novel’s status as a “history of the 
unhistorical,” which is in Daniel Deronda a history of the possible, the potential, or the 
forthcoming.  This kind of history has the ability to open the reader’s eyes to the many 
dimensions of internal life that regularly escape our notice.  Paying attention to these dimensions, 
                                                 
141 DD, 658.   
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like contemplating Gwendolen herself, is both unsettling and enlivening.  We may not always 
enjoy the novel’s depiction of the “mixed entangled affair”142 of human life; but an attunement 
to the details of human difference and development is the stuff of both moral cultivation and 
sympathetic extension—inviting in the reader a greater self-awareness of their own changing 
states of mind, and a broader consideration for the internal lives of others.   
 
                                                 
142 The internal lives of real people are not always what the reader would like, as Eliot 
imagines in Chapter 17 of Adam Bede: “Perhaps you will say, ‘Do improve the facts a 
little, then; make them more accordant with those correct views which it is our privilege to 
possess.  The world is not just what we like; do touch it up with a tasteful pencil, and make 
believe it is not quite such a mixed entangled affair….” Eliot, Adam Bede, 177-78. 
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5.0  CHAPTER FOUR: JOHN STUART MILL’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF 
ATTENTION  
The critical work of John Stuart Mill is a ready analogue to the novelistic projects of 
Charles Dickens and George Eliot.  Each of these writers was troubled by the forces of 
conventional thinking in contemporary society; each believed that the challenges of modern life 
demanded a renewed attention to the unnoticed specifics of life in time.  For Dickens and Eliot, 
poetic attention to the seemingly useless details of life has the capacity to animate everyday 
experience and awaken human capacities of thought, feeling, and imagination.  For Mill, a 
critical attunement to these disparate details is the central practice of liberal culture—and the 
special responsibility of the liberal social critic.     
Whether writing on science, society, or government, Mill aimed to shed light on the 
unnoticed specifics of human existence, giving special attention to those aspects of life that resist 
abstract representation or categorization: to empirical facts that do not fit within existing 
scientific principles or theories, to human eccentricities that stand outside of broader social 
norms, to local practices that deviate from national traditions.  But, like Darwin, Mill recognized 
that a renewed attention to the details of life in time required a certain liberty of mind too often 
discouraged in contemporary culture.  Mill’s critical essays, such as On Liberty (1869) and The 
Subjection of Women (1859, actively promote this freedom of mind.  Taking full advantage of 
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the looser and more flexible form of the essay, these works make arguments for social liberties 
while simultaneously encouraging liberal-mindedness.  
In this way, these essays are critical interventions; they seek to make a difference in the 
minds of their readers.  They are also historical interventions, encouraging a greater attentiveness 
to the effects of the major social and political changes of the Victorian period: most importantly, 
the growth of industrial economy and the gradual expansion of political enfranchisement over 
the course of the nineteenth-century.  The growth of economic and political power among the 
middle classes, the normalization of middle class morality, the improved political organization of 
the working classes, and the increase of political activism in the professional classes: in Mill’s 
estimation these developments held both promise and danger.  They demanded a reevaluation of 
both the institutions and ideals of British culture in light of the specifics of contemporary life;  as 
we will see in On Liberty and The Subjection of Women, for Mill this reevaluation is guided by 
one aim and end, the cultivation of human character.   
5.1 SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 
It is not difficult to read Mill’s early work in scientific logic as preparatory to later critical 
essays like On Liberty and The Subjection of Women if we recognize that these texts are 
motivated by a common set of aims.  The most central of these is Mill’s conviction that modern 
life demands a renewed attention to the specifics of the natural and social world.  This was as 
true, for Mill, in the arena of society and government as it was in the logic of scientific method.  
In his Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive (1843), Mill sought to rewrite the tenants of British 
logic without appeals to a-priori knowledge.  With this work, Mill answered an intuitionist 
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tradition in British moral philosophy and natural theology143 that was resurfacing in the new 
sciences of man and society.  In Mill’s estimation, this tradition served to uphold entrenched 
orthodoxies, giving justification for unexamined habits of thought and preventing needed social 
reforms.  
In the sixth book of the Logic, entitled “On the Logic of the Moral Sciences,” Mill calls 
for a renovation of the moral and social sciences in light of the empirical principles laid out in 
the first five books of the work.144  Revising the utilitarian model of social science articulated by 
Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, which explained all social phenomena deductively from a 
single principle of human nature,145 Mill proposes a science of society that studies the basic 
                                                 
143 For Mill, this tradition was exemplified by the work of William Whewell, whose 
writings on the history and philosophy of science inspired Mill to write his Logic in 
response.  Following the first edition of the Logic, Mill and Whewell debated the issue of 
inductive methodology through the multiple editions of their works.  See William Whewell, 
Theory of Scientific Method (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989).  On the specifics of this debate 
see Snyder, "The Mill-Whewell Debate: Much Ado About Induction."  E.W. Strong, 
"William Whewell and John Stuart Mill: Their Controversy About Scientific  Knowledge," 
Journal of the History of Ideas 16, no. 2 (1955). For the broader contexts of their 
disagreement, especially its relevance to contemporary discussions of geology, morality, 
and social policy, see Snyder, Reforming Philosophy: A Victorian Debate on Science and 
Society 33-94. See also Nicholas Capaldi, John Stuart Mill (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 159. 
    
144 For Mill’s articulation of this aim, see Chapter One, “Introductory Remarks.”   John 
Stuart Mill, The Logic of the Moral Sciences (Chicago: Open Court 1994), 19-21.   
  
145 This principle is that human beings are driven by their own interests—that they will 
seek pleasure and avoid pain.  The influence of James Mill and Jeremy Bentham—as well 
as Auguste Comte and Samuel Taylor Coleridge—on John Stuart Mill’s thinking about 
psychology and moral science is treated in Fred Wilson, "Mill on Psychology and the 
Moral Sciences," in The Cambridge Companion to John Stuart Mill, ed. John Skorupski 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 203-54.  For a highly readable evaluation 
of Mill’s philosophy of moral science see John Skorupski, John Stuart Mill (London: 
Routledge, 1989), 248-82.  Nicholas Capaldi and John Robson also discuss, at length, 
Mill’s relationship to both utilitarian and Comtean models of social science.  See Capaldi, 
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principles of human psychology in conjunction with the specifics of historical circumstance.  
Using a “historical method,”146 as Mill names his methodology, social science would be able to 
predict to degrees of probability the outcomes of proposed changes in social, political, or 
economic policy.147  Mill’s science of society is, in this way, always a science of the 
contemporary social moment.  This is because no amount of knowledge of human nature will 
begin to explain the complexities of either social life or human character without diligent 
attention to the details of the present.   
In “The Logic of the Moral Sciences,” Mill envisions social science taking on roles 
traditionally held by theology or moral philosophy as the authority on moral and social life.  But, 
while a scientifically rigorous study of man and society would inform, for instance, new laws 
concerning political representation or national education, it must not dictate the aims or ends that 
these decisions seek.  Science, to use Mill’s words, must restrict itself to studying human life “in 
the indicative” and not seek to answer questions expressed in the “imperative”; what life is 
                                                                                                                                                             
John Stuart Mill, 157-91.  See Chapter One and Chapter Four in John Robson, The 
Improvement of Mankind (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968). 
 
146 For a discussion of Mill’s choice of methodology for the sixth book of the Logic see 
Alan Ryan, J.S. Mill (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 84-94.  
 
147 This information can then be used to shape policy based upon human aims, as Mill 
explains in Chapter Five of “On the Logic of the Moral Sciences”: “When the 
circumstances of an individual or of a nation are in any considerable degree under our 
control, we may, by our knowledge of tendencies, be enabled to shape those circumstances 
in a manner much more favourable to the ends we desire than the shape which they would 
of themselves assume.”  Mill, The Logic of the Moral Sciences, 55. 
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science can tell us in a more objective and historically nuanced way, but what life ought to be 
must be left to the arbiters of moral and social life.148      
Reading this bold proposal of a new advisory role for science in social and political 
policy in the Logic, it is perhaps surprising that Mill did not publish any scientific study in the 
social sciences, beyond his Principles of Political Economy (1848).  Nor did he offer any fuller 
explanation of the discipline he saw as central to the renovation of social science, ethology, or 
the science of the formation of character.  Instead, for the next thirty years, Mill was almost 
entirely devoted to those questions expressed in the “imperative” that are the domain of the poet 
or philosopher (as he puts it in “On the Logic of the Moral Sciences”) or the domain of the 
public critic (as we might put it). 149   
But while he may have abandoned the science of character after the publication of the 
Logic, the work that followed is dedicated to the articulation and justification of the aim of 
character.  This aim is the common thread linking a remarkably diverse group of essays, 
pamphlets, and books written between 1843 and 1873 on subjects as diverse as political 
economy, government, poetry, international relations, slavery, education, and public health.  It is 
                                                 
148 The scientist must not, in other words, become a cleric or legislator but rather an advisor 
and helpmate to the moral and political leaders of the day.  Here Mill differentiates his 
social scientific system from that of his contemporary and correspondent August Comte.   
 
149 Capaldi describes Mill’s turn from social science to social critique in the following 
terms: “Intellectual leadership consisted in vision—the combination of the artistic or 
imaginative discernment of the inherent norms, a store of reliable but qualified social 
generalizations, an understanding of their historical context and ongoing development, and 
a logical sense of how they held together.  This was neither the program of the 
Benthamites, nor the alleged sciences of “ethology” as articulated in the Logic, nor the 
rigid historicism of continental historicists such as Comte.  This was uniquely Mill.  The 
role of intellectual leadership was not to be sullied by political activism or confused with 
journalism.  Secure in this self-conception, Mill felt released from any attempt to 
compromise with the upper classes and reverted to a more Socratic stance with regard to 
society as a whole.”  Capaldi, John Stuart Mill, 186.  
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also the central concern of his major critical essays (in his estimation and in ours): On Liberty 
and On the Subjection of Women.  Reading these works, it is not difficult to conclude that Mill’s 
abandonment of the social scientific project laid out in the Logic may have been more deliberate 
than has been typically allowed.150  In these works, Mill pursues a critical rather than scientific 
study of society, choosing the looser and more flexible form of the essay over that of the 
scientific treatise to examine the formation of human character.  In this way, as we will see, Mill 
devotes himself to producing work that examines the components of liberal culture while 
simultaneously promoting liberal thinking—that both studies character and cultivates it.151    
5.2 SOCIAL INATTENTION  
In his critical works, Mill is differently concerned with the historical developments that 
so worried contemporary social critics like Thomas Carlyle and Matthew Arnold, including the 
expansion of industry, the growing political and economic power of the middle classes, and the 
concentration of the working classes in the urban centers of England.  The danger, in Mill’s 
opinion, was not these changes in and of themselves; the real threat was a lack of attention to the 
details of these developments and their relationships to the central institutions of British social, 
political, and economic life.  This lack of attention to the historical present was indicative of a 
                                                 
 
150 Capaldi argues in his biography of Mill that even in the Logic Mill shows a level of 
hesitancy regarding social scientific systems.  Mill was never comfortable with the idea of 
a totalizing conceptualization of the natural and social world, seen for instance in the social 
science of Comte.  Capalidi, John Stuart Mill, 179.     
 
151 Indeed, it is worth noting that Mill’s most comprehensive study of the formation of 
character is undertaken in his most literary of works—his Autobiography.   
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disconnect, as Mill saw it, between British institutions (of law, government, social policy, etc.) 
and the concrete facts of everyday existence.  Some form of this disconnect was, Mill allowed, a 
permanent part of any culture, of any community of individuals.  But when institutional 
traditions and social customs operate without question or revision despite real changes in the 
circumstances of British social and political life, this disconnect threatened the basic conditions 
of liberal culture.   
In a liberal society, where free-minded individuals actively and continually discuss the 
central aims and ideals of their culture, institutions are the subject of continual interrogation.  
Following such interrogation, any disconnect between individuals and institutions may be 
corrected by adapting institutions to their contemporary moment.  As he most fully articulates in 
On Liberty, Mill believes that this process can only be realized in a diverse and intellectually 
vibrant culture that is educational in the largest sense of the word.  In this culture, our knowledge 
of difference encourages a process of self-interrogation that is, for Mill, the first step toward the 
marked character of the self-cultivated individual.152  This marked character, in turn, promotes 
self-interrogation in other members of society.  There is a direct relationship, in this way, 
between internal and external culture for Mill: liberal culture is conducive to self-culture, just as 
                                                 
152 For a thoughtful discussion of the central ideal of free thought in Mill’s liberal 
philosophy, including its relationship to the work of other philosophers such as Descartes, 
Kant, and Nietzsche see John Skorupski, Why Read Mill Today (London: Routledge, 
2006), 5-8.  Importantly, for Mill, free thought is only justified by the evidence of history, 
rather than by any a-priori authorization.  As Skorupski explains, Mill believed that “free 
thought has only the vindication it can have: its own success in practice, as shown by its 
history.  On its own record it does not lead to disaster but to the growth of knowledge and 
to an outlook that is humanistic and liberal.” Skorupski, Why Read Mill Today, 10-11.    
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the marked character that emerges through self-culture brings about an increasingly varied and 
intellectually lively society.153   
But, as Mill warns in On Liberty, the force of custom in contemporary life tends to rub 
out the human differences that are the impetus for liberal culture.  Following more generalized 
standards of morality, public opinion currently inclines toward both intellectual moderation and 
increased regularity of conduct.  “These tendencies of the times,” he tells us in Chapter Three, 
“cause the public to be more disposed than at most former periods to prescribe general rules of 
conduct, and endeavor to make every one conform to the approved standard.  And that standard, 
express or tacit, is to desire nothing strongly.  Its idea of character is to be without any marked 
character; to maim by compression, like a Chinese lady’s foot, every part of human nature which 
stands out prominently, and tends to make the person markedly dissimilar in outline to 
commonplace humanity.”154  There are, here, two competing ideas of character.  For the majority 
of Victorians, having “character” means following faithfully the conventional rules of propriety; 
this form of character is defined by a lack of difference.  For Mill, having “character” means 
being an individual, or having habits, thoughts, and desires that are peculiar to you; this form of 
character is defined by difference. 
                                                 
153 Remember that in Mill’s system, our own individual freedoms are integrally linked to 
those of our neighbor: we only assure our own ability to improve ourselves by encouraging 
improvement in others.  This is why, for Mill, liberty must always accompany democracy.  
Only self-cultivated individuals are fully prepared for citizenship in a democracy, in which 
individuals are responsible for the continual evaluation and adaptation of social, political, 
and economic institutions.  At the same time, only a liberal culture has the capacity to 
educate the masses for the responsibilities of citizenship.   
 
154  John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty," in On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. John Gray (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 77.  Hereafter cited as OL. 
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Under the current standard of character, individuals look without rather than within when 
making decisions—even when these decisions affect only themselves:  
In our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest, 
everyone lives as under the eye of a hostile and dreaded 
censorship.  Not only in what concerns others, but in what 
concerns only themselves, the individual or the family do not ask 
themselves—what do I prefer?  or, what would suit my character 
and disposition?  or, what would allow the best and highest in me 
to have fair play, and enable it to grown and thrive?  They ask 
themselves, what is suitable to my position?  what is usually done 
by persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances?”155   
It is not, Mill explains, that individuals disregard their own preferences in order to bow to 
convention, but that it “does not occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is 
customary.  Thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke…”156  Individual inclination, in this way, 
falls into preconditioned categories, with each person making choices based upon the norms of 
their gender, class, nationality, and so on.  This has consequences for both individuals and 
institutions: it is not just that people are unable to think and act outside of abstract categories like 
“woman,” “middle class,” or “English,” but also that broader society operates on the assumption 
that all of human life can and should be understood in terms of these general types.157   
                                                 
155 OL, 68. 
 
156 OL, 68.   
 
157 It should be noted that Mill himself is often guilty of these generalizations in On 
Liberty, especially in his portrayal of the middle class—showing a lack of attention to the 
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In this way, conformity to designated norms not only wears away the distinctiveness of 
each individual, but also stunts our capacity to recognize the difference of others.  This is 
because difference is what draws our attention to each other: as Mill explains, “we should think 
we had done wonders if we had made ourselves all alike; forgetting that the unlikeness of one 
person to another is generally the first thing which draws the attention of either to the 
imperfection of his own type, and the superiority of another, or the possibility, by combining the 
advantages of both, of producing something better than either.”158  Without difference, we have 
no incitement to pay attention to each other; and without any specific knowledge of others, we 
have no occasion for the kind of comparative self-reflection that, for Mill, leads to self-
improvement.  For individuals, the opportunity to contemplate and evaluate ideas and ways of 
life contrary to our own is the central practice of self-culture.  For culture as a whole, a 
community of diverse characters serves to check the homogenizing effects of custom that make 
this kind of self-culture difficult or even impossible.  
5.3 QUIRKS OF CHARACTER 
Mill’s theory of progress places importance upon so called “exceptional individuals” who 
lead remarkable lives no matter their historical circumstances, the actions and ideas of lone 
                                                                                                                                                             
individual and local differences seen within the “business classes.”  That said, Mill’s 
priority in On Liberty is to articulate a moral philosophy by which different aspects of 
social life may be evaluated; it is less concerned with a detailed examination of society in 
light of this moral philosophy.  The Subjection of Women, taking up just one component of 
modern life, is more nuanced in its social analysis.   
   
158 OL, 79. 
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individuals doing much to advance scientific knowledge, alleviate physical suffering, or bring 
about greater freedom of religion.159  But however much Mill values exceptional individuals, a 
culture that nurtures the development of every person is his ultimate aim.  This is because we 
only assure our own freedoms by protecting the freedoms of our fellow citizens, by making sure 
that every individual has the opportunity for self improvement.  Indeed, he makes it clear in On 
Liberty that the problems of his own contemporary moment cannot be solved by a few free-
thinking individuals.  He explains that it is not “solely, or chiefly, to form great thinkers that 
freedom of thinking is required.  On the contrary, it is as much and even more indispensable, to 
enable average human beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable of.  There have 
been, and may again be, great individual thinkers, in a general atmosphere of mental slavery.  
But there never has been, nor ever will be, in that atmosphere, an intellectually active people.”160  
The world will always have a few original thinkers, but a culture of free-minded individuals who 
have daily opportunities for self-reflection and growth of mind is what is needed to make human 
progress a normative tendency in modern culture.  It is for this reason that the protection of 
liberty and the cultivation of character should be a central priority in contemporary Victorian 
society—the aim and end of British institutions of government, religion, and education.   
But these institutions can only promote the conditions for the growth of character; 
character itself must originate in the individual.  This is because character, for Mill, is a 
                                                 
159 These figures are also prone to persecution, as Mill explains in Chapter Two of On 
Liberty, and the importance of their ideas is often only fully recognized after their deaths.  
In this chapter, Mill uses both Socrates and Jesus as examples of figures whose visionary 
thinking were at odds with the majority opinion of their own historical period.  The short-
sighted actions of their historical peers now exemplify the fallibility of majority rule for 
Mill.  OL, 29-30. 
 
160 OL, 39. 
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condition of practice—the practice of choice.  “Human faculties of perception, judgment, 
discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference,” Mill tells us, “are exercised 
only in making a choice.”  Without the daily use of these faculties, individuals can hardly be 
called human:   
He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of 
life for him, has no need of nay other faculty than the ape-like one 
of imitation.  He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his 
faculties.  He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment 
to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination 
to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to 
hold to his deliberate decision.161    
Character (like truth) is not something that can be permanently achieved, but is rather a quality 
dependent upon daily practices of thought, feeling, and judgment.162  Without this daily practice, 
man is no more than an ape or a machine whose thoughts and actions are a mindless repetition of 
                                                 
161 OL, 65. 
 
162 John Skorupski provides an extensive discussion of the importance of the activity of 
choice in Mill’s conception of character formation, explaining the relationship between 
choice and happiness in Mill’s system in the following way: “The general rule, Mill thinks, 
should be that everyone pursues their own happiness in their own way, under the 
limitations set by the equal rights of everyone else.  And even when it comes to pursuing 
other ends and achieving happiness by the way…The reasons for this have to do with some 
basic truths about what human beings are like, their history, and their shared situation.  
They best discover their own forms of happiness by making their own mistakes, they 
discover happiness by and large at least as much in heir own personal spheres of self, 
family and friends as in the impersonal sphere of ethical or political activism; above all, for 
human beings, the most cherishible forms of happiness require personal freedom, the 
freedom to get on with one’s own life in one’s own way.”  Skorupski, Why Read Mill 
Today, 15-18.  On this issue see also Capaldi, John Stuart Mill, 283. 
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what has come before.  We can distinguish character when an individual, who has self-
knowledge of his own uniquely formed nature, makes a choice that is an expression of that 
unique nature: “a person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the expression of his own 
nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture—is said to have a character.  
One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam-engine 
has a character.”163  The difficulty is that British culture, wary of strong desire and individual 
impulse, presently prefers the behavior of machines over men—of humans whose individuality 
has been whittled down to the point that they are hardly distinguishable from any other human 
being.   
Reading Mill’s discussion of character in On Liberty,164 we can see that it constitutes a 
moral philosophy—a set of standards by which to evaluate all aspects of life based upon whether 
or not they encourage character.  By Mill’s standards we are most human when we are actively 
engaged in self-enculturation, when we have “character” in his definition of that term.  We are 
most human, then, when we are most distinct from each other—when we do not fit easily into 
the normative categories of our social moment.  When our thoughts and actions are expressions 
of choice rather than adherences to unthinking custom, it is likely (although not necessary) that 
these thoughts and actions will deviate from the conventions of current society, especially in 
                                                 
163 OL, 67.  In his earlier work, “The Logic of the Moral Sciences,” Mill defines character 
in more utilitarian language: “It is only when our purposes have become independent of the 
feelings of pain or pleasure from which they originally took their rise that we are said to 
have a conformed character.  A ‘character,’ says Novalis, ‘is a completely fashioned will.’”  
Mill, The Logic of the Moral Sciences, 29. 
 
164 This discussion is prefigured by the focus upon character in the sixth book of Mill’s 
Logic, especially in Chapter Five “Of Ethology, Or the Science of the Formation of 
Character.”  The cultivation of character continues to be a major concern in essays like The 
Subjection of Women, as well as Mill’s posthumous Autobiography.  
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periods where freedom of thought is in short supply.  In this way, we might call the moral 
philosophy Mill articulates in On Liberty a moral philosophy of quirk—a set of rules for private 
and public life that seek to bring about a liberal culture of distinct and even eccentric individuals.  
This culture is not so much a coherent community, in which individuals are connected by 
convention, but a group of diverse individuals who share only the common value of freedom. 165  
Although less connected through convention, individuals in this liberal society would be more 
attentive to each other—having daily incitement to reflect upon the differences between 
themselves and others.       
We can understand, then, why Mill would prefer to see progress that originates with 
individual thought and action—even if it is uneven or halting—rather than more coherent 
improvement that emanates from some centralized body (such as national institutions of 
education or centralized systems of charity, etc.).  “The spirit of improvement is not always a 
                                                 
165 Remember the purpose of On Liberty as an argument—and as a critical intervention in 
contemporary British society: to find and set the proper limit of interference of majority 
opinion over individual independence.  The principle of human liberty, which is Mill’s 
articulation of that limit, is justified by one aim and end—the cultivation of character.  The 
utility of human liberty, in other words, is its promotion of the cultivation of character, 
because the cultivation of character is the best means of ensuring the progress of human 
civilization in Mill’s system, as we have seen.  This is, as several Mill scholars have noted, 
an expansion of the utilitarian aim of the greatest good for the greatest number, as it is 
articulated by Jeremy Bentham.  As Mill explains in Chapter One of On Liberty, “I regard 
utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest 
sense, grounded upon the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.”  OL, 15.  
Mill gives an earlier explanation of the relationship between character formation and 
progress in the sixth book of his Logic: “The character itself should be, to the individual, a 
paramount end, simply because the existence of this ideal nobleness of character, or of a 
near approach to it, in any abundance, would go further than all things else towards making 
human life happy, both in the comparatively humble sense of pleasure and freedom from 
pain, and in the higher meaning of rendering life, not what it now is almost universally, 
puerile and insignificant, but such as human beings with highly developed faculties care to 
have.” Mill, The Logic of the Moral Sciences, 143.    
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spirit of liberty,” Mill explains in Chapter Three, “for it may aim at forcing improvements on an 
unwilling people; and the spirit of liberty, in so far as it resists such attempts, may ally itself 
locally and temporarily with the opponents of improvement; but the only unfailing and 
permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are as many possible independent 
centres of improvement as there are individuals.”166  Across the numerous and diverse works of 
his career, Mill almost always comes down on the side of individual and local choice over a 
centralized governing power—even when individual and local choice is in error.167  This is 
because, for Mill, real progress is only assured when there are greater and better opportunities for 
the development of character; improvements that do not begin with personal and local choice 
cause the kind of disconnect between individuals and institutions that is Mill’s central concern in 
On Liberty.168    
                                                 
166 OL, 79.  See Chapter Two, “The Good for Human Beings” in Skorupski for a general 
discussion of the (sometimes fraught) relationship between free choice, happiness, and 
progress in Mill’s system.  Skorupski, Why Read Mill Today, 15-38. 
 
167 On Mill’s localism and his views on decentralization of governing power, see Capaldi, 
John Stuart Mill, 301.  See also Skorupski, Why Read Mill Today, 50-51.   
  
168 Put another way, Mill believed that social reform must be preceded by moral reform.  
Capaldi quotes Mill’s December 19, 1842 letter to Robert Barclay Fox: “‘[It] is becoming 
more and more clearly evident to me that the mental regeneration of Europe must precede 
its social regeneration & also that none of the ways in which that mental regeneration is 
sought, Bible Societies, Tract Societies, Puseyism, Socialism, Chartism, Benthamism &c. 
will do.’”   Capaldi, John Stuart Mill, 256. 
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5.4 HISTORICAL MISFITS 
In a culture that prefers the behavior of machines over men, in Mill’s estimation, custom 
is a formidable opponent to the cultivation of character.  Custom has such power, Mill tells us, 
because of its almost magical resistance to critique.  In Chapter One of On Liberty, Mill explains 
that “no two ages, and scarcely any two countries, have decided alike; and the decision of one 
age or country no more suspect any difficulty in it, than if it were a subject on which mankind 
had always been agreed.  The rules which obtain among themselves appear to them self-evident 
and self-justifying.  This all but universal illusion is one of the examples of the magical influence 
of custom…”169  This is why, as Mill asserts in the sixth book of his Logic, intuitionist 
philosophy is so often the helpmate of orthodox custom, providing logical support for beliefs and 
practices that have little truth beyond their familiarity as conventions.   
Given the magical force of custom, difference need not be useful to society in the grand 
scheme of things to be beneficial during a historical period in which conformity outweighs 
individuality.  Eccentricity, Mill asserts, is important right now whether it does service to 
humanity as a whole or not: “In this age, the mere example of non-conformity, the mere refusal 
to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service.  Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such 
as to make eccentricity a reproach, it is desirable, in order to break through that tyranny, that 
people should be eccentric.”170  Whether or not an idea or practice has the potential to be 
adopted by British culture at large in the future, any aspect of life that distinguishes itself from 
the dominant conventions of contemporary society has social and moral value for Mill.  That is, 
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as long as it does not impinge upon the liberty of others.171  These peculiarities of thought or 
eccentricities of action call into question custom’s appearance of ubiquity and permanence, 
checking both conformity and complacency in individuals and institutions. The mere presence of 
eccentricity is, in this way, a heuristic to anyone who pauses long enough to notice it.   
We can see, then, why Mill gives so much attention in On Liberty and The Subjection of 
Women to aspects of British culture that do not fit within their own historical moment: customs 
from the past that have been marginalized in the present, “experiments in living” that may or 
may not be more widely adopted in the future, and practices that are at a disconnect with the 
norms of the present.  Such “historical misfits” serve to reawaken us to the details of our present 
moment, jogging our capacity for self-evaluation and inciting our interest in the status of 
institutions that shape British social life.  These misfits are, however, easily ignored in a culture 
that encourages conformity in individuals and complacency in institutions.  For this reason, one 
of the central tasks of the liberal social critic is to draw our notice to these historical misfits.     
Some historical misfits run counter to the negative tendencies of contemporary society.  
For instance, it is in the interest of diversity that minority groups maintain customs that were 
once dominant in the past but now have only a marginal presence in current society (to give a 
key example, the traditions of Catholicism).  Moreover, since the progress of humanity is halting 
and uneven, such traditions probably have intellectual, moral, or practical value long after they 
have been discarded by the majority of British culture.  As Mill explains, 
                                                 
171 This is the thorny question of what constitutes “harm” for Mill in On Liberty.  There are 
instances where the state must limit the freedoms of some in order to secure the freedoms 
of all.  In the final chapter of the work, “Applications,” Mill attempts to deal with this 
question in the concrete.     
 153 
Even in revolutions of opinion, one part of the truth usually sets 
while another rises.  Even progress, which ought to superadd, for 
the most part only substitutes, one partial and incomplete truth for 
another; improvement consisting chiefly in this, that the new 
fragment of truth is more wanted, more adapted to the needs of the 
time, than that which it displaces.172  
With this view of human progress, marginalized or superseded customs are our only real access 
to the forgotten truths of the past.  This is not only because these practices are a living record of 
past custom; it is also because these minority groups (for instance, a minority religion) are 
constantly called upon to explain their beliefs and practices to majority groups.  Because of this, 
they have for Mill more “living truth” than many customs maintained by the majority of British 
people.  Remember the distinction Mill makes between truth and dogma in Chapter Two of On 
Liberty.  Most dogma was at one time truth, Mill warns: “However unwillingly a person who has 
a strong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved 
by the consideration that however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly 
discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.”173  Truth is, in this way, a 
condition of human thinking in Mill’s system: unless it is the subject of active and continual 
interrogation, truth quickly becomes dogma.174  For this reason, anything that has the capacity to 
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174 Of course, the interrogation of established knowledge has new truths or new dogma as 
its aim.  The important point is that, for Mill, all knowledge should be continually and 
mindfully evaluated in light of the contemporary moment—even new truths that have 
recently emerged out of current historical conditions.  At the institutional level, this means 
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spur reevaluation of held truths has social value for Mill—even minority opinions that appear to 
have no use or relevance in present society.  
Just as discarded non-majority customs can offer access to past truths, “experiments in 
living” can provide entrance to future truths.  Mill says in Chapter Three of On Liberty: “As it is 
useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that there 
should be different experiments in living; that free scope should be given to varieties of 
character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved 
practically, when any one thinks fit to try them.”175  Experiments in living can be any choice that 
runs counter to the conventions of the contemporary moment.  As I have already discussed, Mill 
puts a great amount of value upon “exceptional individuals” whose original thinking and 
forward-looking deeds bring society closer to the ideal of liberal culture.  Such exceptional 
individuals surely lead experimental lives in Mill’s sense of the term.  But experiments in living 
may also be practices or ideas that may or may not turn out to be beneficial to mankind as a 
whole or to be conducive to progress in any way.  For instance, Mill was enthusiastic about 
several experiments in communal living that were undertaken during the early and mid-Victorian 
period.  It was not so much that he thought a socialist society was a better or more practical 
system for England; indeed, he clearly states across numerous writings that he thinks a 
predominantly free market system is preferable to any other, given the current conditions of 
                                                                                                                                                             
that Mill is most concerned with keeping the systems of society in close relationship with 
the details of the present.  At the individual level, this means that Mill always values the 
activity of human thinking over the accumulation of human knowledge.  
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British society.176  It was more that Mill valued the heuristic that alternative ways of life 
provided to the culture at large.  Looking at experiments that followed the socialist systems of 
the Saint-Simonians or Robert Owen,177 Mill imagines, British citizens would be prompted to 
reflect upon their own economic system by comparison.  They would ask: what makes our 
present system better than these alternatives?  What might these other ways of life offer that we 
do not have now?  How might we adapt our present system to include some of the benefits of 
these alternatives?  
Although truth is constant in Mill’s theory of progress, what can be seen as truth is a 
condition of historical circumstance, and access to non-dominant truths is only possible through 
a culture of free and active dissent.  Even if current ways of life are working well (for instance, 
the free-market economy), non-normative practices or beliefs may contain a portion of truth that 
we are lacking.  Indeed, minority opinions should be nurtured, Mill asserts, because they are the 
opinions that “represent the neglected interests, the side of human well-being which is in danger 
of obtaining less than its share…When there are persons to be found, who form an exception to 
the apparent unanimity of the world on any subject, even if the world is in the right, it is always 
probable that dissentients have something worth hearing to say for themselves, and that truth 
would lose something by their silence.”178  In this way, attending to social and historical 
“exceptions” is a way of accessing a broader range of thought and action within a particular 
                                                 
176 See especially Mill’s 1848 Principles of Political Economy.  See Chapter Seven of 
Capaldi for a discussion of Mill’s views on Victorian ideas of capitalism and communisim.  
Capaldi, John Stuart Mill, 192-224. 
 
177 See Capaldi for Mill’s interest in the Saint-Simonians during the late 1830s.  Ibid., 78-
81.  See also Robson, The Improvement of Mankind, 76-80. 
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historical moment.  Or, put another way, it is a means of locating the unnoticed possibilities of 
the present.  Bringing into question the self-evidence of custom, such exceptions may be used to 
reopen discussions that appear settled—to interrogate established systems of economy, 
government, education, and so on.   
5.5 HISTORICAL RELICS  
There are also historical misfits that run counter to the positive tendencies of 
contemporary society (such as progress toward broader enfranchisement and greater equality of 
opportunity).  Often these aspects of life may have been justified in the past, but have become 
anachronisms in modern England.  For instance, Mill agreed with utilitarians like his father 
James Mill and Jeremy Bentham that a feudal system of economy and social rank were British 
traditions that had outlived their usefulness.  The Subjection of Women (1869) is Mill’s most 
sustained analysis of a custom that has lived past its historical relevance and efficacy: the social, 
political, and economic inequality of women.   
As Mill shows in both On Liberty and The Subjection of Women, custom makes it easy 
to live in a culture without actually seeing it for what it is; but attention to historical and social 
exception, Mill asserts, prepares us to resist social conformity, check institutional complacency, 
and recognize unacknowledged injustice.  These exceptions, such as the “experiments in living” 
discussed in On Liberty, are worthy of our consideration because they provoke individual self 
reflection and institutional reevaluation.  The current status of women, when recognized as 
discordant with the positive trends of modernity, also inspires the reinterpretation and 
reevaluation of individual belief and institutional tradition.  Indeed, for Mill, recognizing an 
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injustice so integral to everyday life has the capacity to instigate a moral renovation of Victorian 
culture at the most local level—by beginning with the human family.      
But to open his readers’ eyes to the incongruity of women’s status in modernity, Mill has 
to find ways of interrogating the seeming “natural order” of society in which women are 
subjugated by men—and to combat the “mass of feeling” behind popular opinion on this subject.  
Mill acknowledges that an argument based on reason alone would have little effect upon his 
readers, “for a cause supported on the one hand by universal usage, and on the other by so great a 
preponderance of popular sentiment, is supposed to have a presumption in its favour, superior to 
any conviction which an appeal to reason has power to produce in any intellects but those of a 
high class.”  It is, then, not a problem of his own ability to produce a reasoned argument, but the 
unreadiness of his readers to give a reasoned evaluation of this argument.  The majority of his 
audience, Mill explains, is ill prepared to rely entirely upon “their own power of estimating 
arguments, as to give up the practical principles in which they have been born and bread…”179  
This is not because they are lacking the capacity to reason, Mill asserts, but because they have 
not had enough practice.  Because of this, The Subjection of Women must be more than an 
argument; it must also be a text that finds ways of encouraging freedom of thought and 
imagination in the reader.  If, as Mill describes, the minds of his readers “need to be much better 
cultivated than has ever yet been the case” to judge this issue fairly and reasonably, this essay 
begins some of the work of this cultivation.   
To do this, Mill takes full advantage of the mixed and flexible form of the essay.  
Employing analogies, historical and cultural comparisons, and thought experiments, he attempts 
to sidestep habits of thought and to make strange one of the most routine aspects of 
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contemporary existence.  These rhetorical techniques are, in this way, more than components of 
Mill’s argument; they are also preparations of mind—exercises in the kind of free thinking that 
Mill’s argument demands.  With these techniques, Mill attempts to reopen the settled question of 
women’s status in modernity, taking on one by one the justifications for the present arrangement 
of society, especially the strongly-held belief that the power of men over women is “natural.”   
Beginning The Subjection of Women by describing the weight of strong feeling and 
staunch opinion that he is up against, Mill starts again in another direction, with a lengthy 
historical narrative that charts humanity’s progression from a primitive state ruled by the law of 
strength to its current civil state.  This history of force eventually reveals the anachronism of the 
state of inequality between men and women in modernity:  
…the course of history, and the tendencies of progressive human 
society, afford not only no presumption in favour of this system of 
inequality of rights, but a strong one against it; and that, so far as 
the whole course of human improvement up to this time, the whole 
stream of modern tendencies, warrants any inference on the 
subject, it is, that this relic of the past is discordant with the future, 
and must necessarily disappear….180 
Answering those that would use history to show the suitability and benefits of a system of 
inequality between the sexes, Mill asserts that the course of western history—and specifically its 
general tendency toward social, political, and scientific advancement—offers no argument in 
favor of this system beyond its conventionality.  Rather, a study of history enlightens the 
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“discordance” of this system with the future possibilities that may be inferred from past and 
present change.  It is a “relic” or artifact: its original historical contexts have passed away, and its 
will disappear given the tendencies of modernity.  As Mill elaborates later in Chapter One, its is 
“a single relic of an old world of thought and practice exploded in everything else, but retained in 
the one thing of most universal interest; as if a gigantic dolmen, or a vast temple of Jupiter 
Olympus, occupied the site of St. Paul’s and received daily worship, while the surrounding 
Christian churches were only resorted to on fasts and festival.”181   The plight of women in 
modern society, Mill analogizes, is like a pagan temple occupying a central site of Christian 
worship and never being recognized as a contradiction among the Christian churches that 
surround it.     
The reader is not, however, prepared to recognize this contradiction at the start of the 
essay.  It takes the mental work of Mill’s history of force to gradually reveal the status of women 
for what it is, a relic of the barbarous past.  Drawing an analogy between women and slaves, for 
instance, Mill sets out to show the disturbing similarity between two practices that at first glance 
appear to have no resemblance whatsoever.  But in order to use this analogy, Mill must reawaken 
his readers of aspects of their past that they would sooner forget.  His history of force in Chapter 
One is necessary, Mill tells us, because  
people are mostly so little aware how completely, during the 
greater part of the duration of our species, the law of force was the 
avowed rule of general conduct, any other being only a special and 
exceptional consequence of peculiar ties—and from how very 
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recent a date it is that affairs of society in general have been even 
pretended to be regulated according to any moral law; as little do 
people remember or consider, how institutions and customs which 
never had any ground but the law of force, last on into ages and 
states of general opinion which never would have permitted their 
first establishment.  Less than forty years ago, Englishmen might 
still by law hold human beings in bondage as saleable property: 
within the present century they might kidnap them and carry them 
off, and work them literally to death.182   
Here Mill describes a kind of cultural amnesia regarding the role of force in England’s past, 
reminding his readers that a society ruled according to moral law is of a comparatively recent 
date.  Whether it is the power of absolute monarchy over all British citizens or of individual 
masters over their slaves, forgetting the role of force in the nation’s past means that no lessons 
can be learned from history by means of comparison.  For Mill, the most important lesson of 
British history is that “unnatural generally means only uncustomary, and that everything which is 
usual appears natural.” 183  Custom will always uphold present norms as right and good, no 
matter how odious they are judged to be afterwards.  Of course, it is easier to learn this lesson 
from the past—from which the reader has some distance—than from the routine arrangements of 
social life.   
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As Mill is careful to point out, even the most intelligent and forward-thinking figures in 
history have often been unable to see that what is customary is not necessarily natural. 
Considering the belief that slavery was justified by a “natural order” of human civilization, Mill 
reminds his readers that “no less an intellect, and one which contributed no less to the progress of 
human thought, than Aristotle, held this opinion without doubt or misgiving; and rested it one the 
same premises on which the same assertion in regard to the dominion of men over women is 
usually based, namely that there are different natures among mankind, free natures, and slave 
natures: that the Greeks were of a free nature, the barbarian races of Thracians and Asiatics of a 
slave nature.”  Indeed, Mill says that he need not go back that far in western history to provide an 
analogous example: “Did not the slave-owners of Southern United States maintain the same 
doctrine, with all the fanaticism with which men cling to the theories that justify their passions 
and legitimate their personal interests?”184  Each of these historical examples reinforce Mill’s 
observation, central to his argument in The Subjection of Women, that human beings have a 
surprising capacity to live with exception and never acknowledge it as such.  These examples are 
meant, here, as a heuristic; they beg the question: if western culture has lived easily with moral 
injustice in the past, what wrongs are going unacknowledged in the present?     
Mill ends his history of force by trying to explain why it is that this modern form of 
slavery, women’s subjugation to men, has continued to survive in the present when the 
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analogous systems of absolute monarchy and slavery have passed away.  The power that men 
have over women has important differences from that of a monarch over his subjects or a master 
over his slave; according to Mill, the relationship between men and women exhibits a much more 
intimate form of force:   
Whatever gratification of pride there is in the possession of power, 
and whatever personal interest in its exercise, is in this case not 
confined to a limited class, but common to the whole male sex.  
Instead of being, to most of its supporters, a thing desirable chiefly 
in the abstract, or, like the political ends usually contended for by 
factions, of little private importance to any but the leaders; it 
comes home to the person and hearth of every male head of a 
family, and of every one who looks forward to being so.185   
This kind of power is not only more ubiquitous (it is not confined to a certain class of men); it is 
also more personal, being more intimately integral to everyday life than public forms of force.  It 
is a tradition desirable in the concrete rather than the abstract, as Mill puts it, and is therefore 
more resistant to the kind of self-reflective critique that would question the justice of women’s 
status in contemporary society.   
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5.6 HISTORICAL POSSIBILITY  
Historical analogies can only go so far for Mill; with them, he can begin to enlighten the 
injustice of women’s subjugation, but these comparisons cannot show what women could be and 
do without these social restraints.  Mill’s central strategy in The Subjection of Women is to 
awaken his readers to the reality of an integral aspect of everyday existence: the inequality of 
men and women.  But once the facts of this relationship have been examined in the comparative 
light of history, Mill must turn to other means to envision alternatives to present norms.  For 
instance, Mill employs thought experiments to ask his readers to imagine possibilities beyond 
those offered by history or their own experience.  Early in his argument, Mill asks his readers to 
consider the popular opinion that the inequality of the sexes has been conducive to beneficial 
ends.  This would be a perfectly good reason to maintain the custom, Mill says, if  
the authority of men over women, when first established, had been 
the result of a conscientious comparison between different modes 
of constituting the government of society; if, after trying various 
other modes of social organization—the government of women 
over men, equality between the two, and such mixed and divided 
modes of government as might be invented—it had been decided 
on the testimony of experience, that the mode in which women are 
wholly under the rule of men, having no share at all in public 
concerns, and each in private being under the legal obligation of 
obedience to the man with whom she has associated her destiny, 
was the arrangement most conducive to the happiness and well-
being of both; its general adoption might then be fairly thought to 
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be some evidence that, at the time when it was adopted, it was the 
best…186 
Here Mill asks his readers to consider historical processes scientifically and consider an 
imaginary scenario in which history is a product of reasoned choice rather than convention.  
Implicitly, Mill asks: when we make choices about the best theory to explain the physical 
operations of the universe or the most efficient mode of manufacturing a product, we do so by 
testing all possibilities and making a reasoned and informed choice between them.  Although 
social history will not allow this kind of experimentation, this thought experiment allows us to 
see that there are no grounds for supposing our present system to be the most beneficial to 
mankind.  It stretches the limits of established thought on this subject, inviting readers to see that 
the current system, although justified by custom, need not be the only one.   
The larger thought experiment of The Subjection of Women is, of course, the question of 
what society would look like if men and women were equal.  In Chapter Two, Mill asks what 
marriage would look like if power was more evenly divided between husband and wife.  It is not 
only that this change would make marriage a more just institution under the law; this change 
would also have the potential to transform society as a whole—by making the family a center of 
moral education and character formation.  “The equality of married persons,” Mill asserts, “is the 
only means of rendering the daily life of mankind, in any high sense, a school of moral 
cultivation.”187  This is because the “only school of genuine moral sentiment is society between 
equals,” the ideal of liberal culture being grounded upon not only equality but also “cultivated 
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sympathy,” which is the understanding that comes from imagining what it is like to be someone 
else.188   
Unfortunately, there is little in modern life that can give individuals practice in this kind 
of sympathetic exchange: “Citizenship, in free countries, is partly a school of society in equality; 
but citizenship fills only a small place in modern life, and does not come near the daily habits or 
inmost sentiments.  The family, justly constituted, would be the real school of the virtues of 
freedom.” 189  For Mill, equality in marriage does not mean sameness in marriage.  It means, 
rather, that both husband and wife should have equal opportunity to pursue their own 
development as individuals, and that marriage should be a primary arena for the exchange of 
ideas between two free-minded individuals.  In this way, Mill’s ideal of marriage mirrors his 
ideal of liberal society: with greater equality between men and women, marriage would provide 
daily practice in many of the skills necessary for active and mindful citizenship in a liberal 
democracy—including a more sympathetic consideration of difference than is readily seen in 
more public venues.   
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Eliot’s idea of sympathetic extension.  In this sense, both the sympathetic communion 
between husband and wife and the expansion of sympathy invited by the novel are 
preparations for the broader responsibilities of citizenship in a liberal democratic culture. 
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5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Examining the argument of The Subjection of Women, we can see that Mill’s aim in this 
work is not limited to bringing his readers’ attention to an injustice that has gone 
unacknowledged in contemporary society.  This work also seeks to prepare its readers, as does 
On Liberty, for a more mindful engagement with Victorian culture at large and a more self-
reflective attention to the specifics of everyday life.  This preparation, as Mill demonstrates in 
these two essays, is the central task of the liberal social critic.  Through analysis, evaluation, and 
interpretation of the present social moment, social critics are both a part of and separate from 
contemporary culture.  In this way, they inhabit the persona of the “historical misfit,” not 
because they are exceptional or eccentric but because the critique of culture requires that they 
maintain a somewhat contrary relationship to the conventions of society.  In On Liberty and The 
Subjection of Women, Mill stands apart from his fellow men—if only for the space of the 
essay—in order to see the circumstances of social life anew.   
These two essays invite this apartness in the reader as well, making strange some of the 
most fundamental and familiar aspects of social life through reasoned analysis, historical 
comparison, and thought experiments.  In this way, On Liberty and The Subjection of Women 
are not only arguments for liberal culture, but also exercises in liberal critical practice.  This 
practice is multiple, attending to the unnoticed exceptions of human life at both the social and 
individual level.  As we have seen, some of these exceptions link us to our past and some provide 
entrance into our future; some incite greater freedom of thought and others check moral 
complacency.  But all have the capacity to awaken us to possibilities that are present—but too 
often unnoticed—in the details of everyday social life.   
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But as Mill demonstrates in The Subjection of Women, many of these possibilities can 
only be accessed by means of the imagination; often we can only see what contemporary society 
is—and what it could be—in the light of imagined alternatives.  Mill shows that the social critic 
must do more than attend to the “historical misfits” of the present.  He must also find ways to 
acknowledge individuals who might have stood out from the norm if only their historical 
circumstances had been different—who could have been exceptions if only they had lived in a 
different time or place.  Concern for such individuals requires that Mill’s readers extrapolate 
from the facts of British history to imagine what might have been, given another set of historical 
conditions.   
For instance, in On Liberty, Mill describes the wasted possibilities of potential dissenters 
whose characters are stunted by social circumstance: “Who can compute what the world loses in 
the multitude of promising intellects combined with timid characters, who dare not follow out 
any bold, vigourous, independent train of thought, lest it should land them in something which 
would admit of being considered irreligious or immoral?”190  Similarly, in The Subjection of 
Women, Mill describes the efforts of British women who have begun to publicly protest their 
political, legal, and economic status in society, wondering: “How many more women there are 
who silently cherish similar aspirations, no one can possibly know; but there are abundant tokens 
how many would cherish them, were they not so strenuously taught to repress them as contrary 
to the proprieties of their sex.”191  For Mill, the waste of potential described in these two 
passages acts as a heuristic; it prompts the following questions: What possibilities of mind are 
currently going unnoticed?  Which experiments in living are never undertaken because of social 
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restraints?  What kinds of local changes are being thwarted by a cultural climate of conformity?  
But perhaps more important than these questions is another: What are the preparations of mind 
necessary for recognizing these unnoticed possibilities?  Mill’s critical essays, like the other 
central texts of this dissertation, promote these preparations of mind—asking the reader to bring 
an acute attention to difference, a comparative style of analysis, and a flexible imagination to the 
examination of the details of contemporary life.   
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6.0  CHAPTER FIVE: WALTER PATER AND THE ART OF PAYING ATTENTION 
The late Victorian work of Walter Pater may seem an unlikely capstone to the preceding 
chapters of this dissertation.  But reading Pater alongside Dickens, Darwin, Eliot, and Mill, 
certain unexpected affinities emerge.  Each of these writers sought to extend and amplify 
experience through their writing; each aimed to check habits and conventions of thought, and to 
awaken human capacities of thought, feeling, or imagination—all by bringing attention to the 
unnoticed or disregarded details of life in time.  An attunement to these details, as we will see, is 
the basis of Pater’s aesthetic philosophy—and the central concern of his novel Marius the 
Epicurean, His Sensations and Ideas (1885).192   
Pater, like Dickens and Eliot, sought to create fiction that acted upon its audience, that 
made some difference in its readers’ relationship to reality.193  It is not just that Pater created 
                                                 
192 Marius is Pater’s only complete novel.  It was intended to be the first in a three volume 
series; the second novel, Gaston de Latour, was unfinished at Pater’s death.  Pater’s other 
fictional works include his 1887 collection of fictional portraits Imaginary Portraits.  See 
Walter Pater, Imaginary Portraits (London: Macmillan and Company, 1910). Also, Gaston 
De Latour: An Unfinished Romance.  (London: Macmillan and Company, 1906).   
 
193 Pater has typically been studied as a representative or forerunner of a larger literary 
category or movement, such as aestheticism or modernism.  When he is read in the light of 
mid-Victorian predecessors, scholars have focused upon his relationship to writers like 
Matthew Arnold or John Ruskin who were similarly interested in the criticism of art.  But 
when we study Pater in his own terms (rather than, for instance, Oscar Wilde’s or T.S. 
Eliot’s), his fiction and criticism becomes less estranged from the mid-Victorian realism of 
Dickens and Eliot.  The first two chapters of Denis Donoghue’s critical biography of Pater 
give an overview of twentieth-century literary critical discussions of Pater, and gives 
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fiction that was, in the broadest sense of the word, educational—fiction that spurred human 
thinking.  It was also that his writing aimed to make life more educational, in the sense that it 
prepared the minds of its readers for a more vital and mindful engagement with the details of 
everyday experience.  In this sense, Pater’s allegiance was not to literature itself but what art 
could do in the world, what effect fiction could have upon the minds of its readers.   
Pater’s idea of aesthetic cultivation is not, in this way, so very different from Mill’s idea 
of liberal education.  For Mill an attunement to the unnoticed details of life in time is the central 
practice of liberal culture; for Pater it is the central practice of aesthetic culture.  For both writers, 
self cultivation is promoted by encounters with the unfamiliar or strange, difference being the 
impetus for human thinking and self-making.  For Pater, as for Mill, the study of history provides 
such encounters, inviting a comparative perspective that clears the mind of habit and convention, 
making it possible to see the details of present life anew.   
In his criticism and fiction, Pater’s attention to aspects of the forgotten past was a way of 
addressing the present; or more precisely, it was a way of preparing his readers for the conditions 
of the present.  Pater’s practice of aesthetic criticism, as it is articulated and modeled in his 
essays and fiction, asks that we attend to both art and life just as we attend to the discarded 
details of history.   The everyday experience of life, and even art, is too often mediated by the 
conventions of contemporary life.  By contrast, we can experience the discarded details of 
history with some distance from the norms of their own period, without any pressing concern for 
their scientific significance, rational truth, or practical usefulness.  We are free, in short, to 
                                                                                                                                                             
special focus to Pater’s relationship to British modernism.  Denis Donoghue, Walter Pater: 
Lover of Strange Souls (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995). 
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experience these details aesthetically.  In Pater’s work, then, attention to the historical past—or 
the imagined historical past—prepares the mind for a fuller aesthetic experience of the present.   
As we have seen in each of the central texts of this dissertation, there is a level of artistry 
or creativity involved in creating novels and essays that bring a renewed attention to the 
unnoticed details of life in time.  There is, in Pater’s vocabulary, an art to paying attention.  We 
can see this in Marius the Epicurean, a novel that has ready similarities with Daniel Deronda, its 
narrator continually interrupting descriptions of the material world with philosophical 
reflections, literary quotations, historical comparisons, and modern commentary.  Even more 
than Eliot, Pater merges the genre of the novel with that of the essay, the mix of styles inviting a 
more reflective and sympathetic notice of the details of everyday Roman life in the second 
century A.D.  But in Marius, even the most straight-forward descriptions of the physical world 
are infused with ideas; and in this sense the novel has just as many affinities with Dickens’s 
Bleak House.  Matching its discursive style to its subjects, the novel invites the reader to 
experience the religions and philosophies of ancient Rome aesthetically.  In this way, the novel’s 
narration transforms the abstract teachings of Epicureanism, Stoicism, and early Christianity into 
the kind of aesthetic experience Pater promotes in his criticism. 
6.1 THE MODERN RELATIVE WORLD 
The first section of this chapter considers Pater’s literary critical work, focusing on his 
early essay “Coleridge” and his collection The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry.  
Developing a theory of aesthetic experience and a practice of aesthetic criticism, these essays are 
responses to—and interventions in—Pater’s contemporary moment.  In these writings, Pater 
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portrays the nineteenth century as a period in which the meaning of human life has been hedged 
by scientific empiricism on one side and philosophical skepticism on the other.  As Pater 
expresses in his early essay “Diaphaneite,”194 modernity is a deadening existence for most: 
“Most of us are neutralised by the play of circumstances.  To most of us only one chance is given 
in the life of the spirit and the intellect, and circumstances prevent our dexterously seizing that 
one chance.  The one happy spot in our nature has no room to burst into life.  Our collective life, 
pressing equally on every part of every one of us, reduces nearly all of us to the level of a 
colourless uninteresting existence” (252).  For Pater, the narrowness of human life in the present 
demands a new stance towards the external concrete world—a way of knowing alternative to 
empiricism and skepticism that has the potential to reanimate human experience.  This 
enlivening of human life will not be accomplished by an appeal to utility,195 which seeks to 
enrich human life by stressing its usefulness, or to collective culture,196 which aims to enlarge 
human experience through systematic enculturation.  Instead, Pater suggests in his essay 
“Coleridge,” individuals must seek out the possibilities remaining in our “modern relative world” 
through individual aesthetic experience.   
                                                 
194 Never published, this essay was circulated among Pater’s friends and colleagues in the 
early 1860s.  
  
195 As in the aims of utilitarianism in the works of Jeremy Bentham or James Mill.  John 
Stuart Mill, as we have seen, recognized that utility as an immediate aim cannot sustain 
human existence.  It can only be an indirect aim that is achieved in the process of some 
other end.  As I have suggested, Pater and Mill are in agreement that self-culture is what 
makes life worthwhile; but Pater does not theorize, as Mill and Arnold do, the civic 
importance of self culture.  
 
196 The clearest example here is Matthew Arnold’s idea of culture in Culture and Anarchy, 
which Pater revises in the “Preface” to The Renaissance.  Pater asserts in this preface that 
cultural consensus is impossible in modernity.   
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Pater’s first published essay “Coleridge”197 is typical of his critical approach: its subject 
is historical but its central concerns are contemporary.  In this essay, a critical portrait of 
Coleridge occasions a discussion of the “relative spirit” of the modern era, a spirit that has taken 
the place of older absolutisms such as those sought for and promoted by Coleridge.  For Pater, 
Coleridge’s idealism, which draws from German transcendentalism, is currently losing ground to 
modern relativism: 
Modern thought is distinguished from ancient by its cultivation of 
the ‘relative’ spirit in place of the ‘absolute.’  Ancient philosophy 
sought to arrest every object in an eternal outline, to fix thought in 
a necessary formula, and the varieties of life in a classification by 
‘kinds,’ or genera.  To the modern spirit nothing is, or can be 
rightly known, except relatively and under conditions.  The 
philosophical conception of the relative has been developed in 
modern times through the influence of the sciences of observation.  
Those sciences reveal types of life evanescing into each other by 
inexpressible refinements of change.  Things pass into their 
opposites by accumulation of indefinable qualities.  The growth of 
those sciences consists in a continual analysis of facts of rough and 
                                                 
197 This essay was published in 1866 in the Westminster Review and later included in the 
1889 volume Appreciations; with an Essay on Style.  
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general observation into groups of facts more precise and 
minute.198 
No longer organizing the world through absolutes, as in the essential forms of Plato’s 
metaphysics or the fixed categories of Aristotle’s biology, modernity creates knowledge of the 
world only “relatively and under conditions.”  While absolute and relative modes of knowledge 
can be seen throughout human history, Pater explains, the modern dominance of the relative 
spirit has attended the rise of the empirical sciences.  These sciences have demanded a 
reevaluation of the concept of change: for instance, biology replaces an ancient understanding of 
the species as fixed with a modern theory of evolution.  The advance of the modern sciences, 
Pater asserts, is dependent not upon their ability to uncover the fixed categories of the natural 
world but upon their ability to analyze the raw facts of observation.  Observation and analysis 
must be “continual,” in Pater’s characterization, because scientific knowledge must always be 
subject to revision in the light of new historical conditions.199  As a result, in the modern 
sciences there is more confidence in the truth of the particular than the general, because “the 
faculty for truth,” Pater explains, “is recognized as a power of distinguishing and fixing delicate 
and fugitive detail.”200   
                                                 
198 Walter Pater, "Coleridge," in Appreciations, with an Essay on Style (London: 
Macmillan and Company, 1910), 66. 
 
199 Here Pater could easily be paraphrasing Mill’s 1843 A System of Logic.  Pater read 
many of the major works in science and philosophy of science in the Victorian period, 
including those by William Whewell, John Stuart Mill, Charles Darwin, and Thomas Henry 
Huxley.  See Chapter Three of Donoghue, Walter Pater: Lover of Strange Souls. 
 
200 Pater, "Coleridge," 66. 
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Pater concludes that while the desire for absolute knowledge or fixed order in the world 
is a longing inherent to human nature, the time of systemic belief in absolutes has passed.  But in 
the final passages of “Coleridge,” Pater dwells more upon the possibilities offered by the modern 
relative world than the difficulties it poses.  As science becomes more relative so has modern 
morality: more flexible means of ethical evaluation replace the moral codes of earlier eras that 
were based upon abstract and unchanging absolutes.201  A modern morality, in Pater’s 
estimation, is more attuned to the complex specifics of individual experience: the “relative spirit, 
by its constant dwelling on the more fugitive conditions or circumstances of things, breaking 
through a thousand rough and brutal classifications, and giving elasticity to inflexible principles, 
begets an intellectual finesse of which the ethical result is a delicate and tender justice in the 
criticism of human life.”202  Like Dickens, Eliot, and Mill, Pater characterizes modern morality 
as a practice of sympathetic attention.  Older systems of absolute morality were “rough and 
brutal” because they were disconnected from the specifics of everyday life.  A relative system of 
morality, by contrast, is attuned to the human complexities of ordinary existence; its judgments 
are not inflexible, rough, or brutal but tender, elastic, or delicate.   
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6.2 ECSTATIC EXPERIENCE, OR THE ART OF PAYING ATTENTION 
Pater’s early essay on Coleridge can be read as a preface to his famous “Conclusion” in 
The Renaissance (1888), which returns to the status of human knowledge and meaning in the 
modern relative world.  While “Coleridge” considers the consequences of relative thinking in 
modern science and morality, the “Conclusion” explores the possibilities it affords for both art 
and aesthetic experience.  Pater begins with a description of two prevailing strains of relative 
thinking in nineteenth-century British intellectual culture, the first in science and the second in 
philosophy.  Pater looks first at sensual experience from the viewpoint of empirical science, 
describing the human body within the vast organic complexity of the external physical world, 
then at psychological experience from the viewpoint of skeptical philosophy, picturing the 
inescapable circularity of the internal human mind.  These sections are descriptive rather than 
prescriptive: it is not that Pater sees special value in either of these two ways of looking at the 
world, but needs to explicate these two points of view before suggesting an alternative.203   
Pater begins with “that which is without—our physical life,” looking first at our sensual 
experience and uncovering its basic physical and chemical elements.  These elements are in 
constant movement of combination: what appears on the surface to be static experience is in fact 
the “perpetual motion” of processes like the “passage of the blood, the waste and repairing of the 
lenses of the eye, the modification of the tissue of the brain under every ray of light and 
                                                 
203 In this, I agree with Carolyn Williams; she notes the tendency in Pater scholarship to 
read the opening section of the “Conclusion” as an endorsement rather than an explication.  
See especially chapter one in Carolyn Williams, Transfigured World: Walter Pater's 
Aesthetic Historicism.  (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1989).  See also Chapter Five in 
Donoghue, Walter Pater: Lover of Strange Souls. 
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sound.”204  With this scientific view, Pater reveals the hidden life of natural processes too small 
or two slow to be apparent to the naked eye of the everyday observer—processes which science 
makes even more unrecognizable by reduction into their basic elements.  This unseen world of 
chemical change and physical action is one we share with our external environment; at the 
elemental level, there is no distinction between the human and inhuman because the same 
processes are at work in the human body as in any other substance in nature.   
Where we end and the rest of the physical world begins—this is a product of our faculties 
of perception: “That clear, perpetual outline of face and limb is but an image of ours, under 
which we group them—a design in a web, the actual threads of which pass out beyond it.  This is 
at least of flame-like our life has, that it is but the concurrence, renewed from moment to 
moment, of forces parting sooner or later on their ways.”205  At the microscopic level, we are just 
a cluster of elements within a larger web, with no clear boundary between the elements that 
constitute our bodies and those that make up the world.  Any distinct physical presence that we 
have is only a “concurrence of forces” which changes with each unfolding moment.  Using a 
metaphor of flame, Pater suggests that our most intense moments of sensual experience are the 
result of these concurrences, the possibility for such moments being renewed by the passage of 
time.     
Pater begins again from another direction in the second paragraph of the “Conclusion,” 
offering another view of human experience by analyzing the “inward world of thought and 
feeling.”  Although common experience assures us that a “sharp and importunate” reality exists, 
                                                 
204 Walter Pater, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, ed. Adam Phillips (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 150. 
 
205 Ibid. 
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the concreteness of the physical world fades under the analysis of reflection.  Once it is revealed 
that objects are composed of various sensual impressions, such as color, odor, and texture, the 
“cohesive force” of the physical world suddenly “seems suspended like some trick of magic.”  In 
this view, Pater explains, perception becomes a mass of “impressions, unstable, flickering, 
inconsistent, which burn and are extinguished with our consciousness of them.”  With perception 
circumscribed by individual impression, any ‘objective’ contact with the external world is 
impossible.  The relationship between humans and their physical and social surroundings is, in 
this view, not an interconnected “web” of common elements, but a string of solitary cells within 
which each individual is a “prisoner” of his own mind.206   
Continued analysis shows that our impressions are in “perpetual flight, that each of them 
is limited by time, and that as time is infinitely divisible, each of them is infinitely divisible also; 
all that is actual in it being a single moment, gone while we try to apprehend it…To such a 
tremulous wisp constantly re-forming itself on the stream, to a single sharp impression, with a 
sense in it, a relic more or less fleeting, of such moments gone by, what is real in our life fines 
itself down.”207  Impressions are only actual for an instant, and in the time it takes to apprehend 
them, they have disappeared.  Infinitely divisible, our impressions of the world are a perpetually 
changing stream.  Like the river in Heraclitus’s paradox,208 our experience of the world is both 
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207 Walter Pater, Marius the Epicurean, His Sensations and Ideas, ed. Anne Kimball Tuell 
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1926), 151.  Hereafter cited as ME.   
 
208 Quoted variously throughout classical literature, Heraclitus’s maxim states that “no one 
can step twice into the same river.”  Pater opens the “Conclusion” with an epigraph taken 
from the fragments of Heraclitus: “Heraclitus says ‘All things are in motion and nothing at 
rest.’” Pater, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, 174.   
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one and many: it appears to be a coherent whole, a perception supported by fixed language, but 
analysis shows that it is in fact infinitely divisible in time, our impressions of the present moment 
different from impressions of an instant past. 
Thus the psychological view of human experience ends much like the scientific view, 
with the limits imposed upon human knowledge by time.  But it is in the process of time that 
Pater sees possibility for a new stance toward human experience, alternative to the two he has 
just described.  Taking the smallness of what we can know about the world as a given, Pater 
inquires what can be done to allow us as much access as possible to “what is real in our life.”   
Because “a counted number of pulses only is given to us of a variegated, dramatic life,” he asks: 
“How may we see in them all that is to be seen in them by the finest senses?  How shall we pass 
most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the focus where the greatest number of 
vital forces unite in their purest energy?”209  The question becomes, then, not how we can get 
around the relativity or subjectivity of human knowledge, but how we can train ourselves to 
move with the flux of time, so that we may experience as many “flame-like” moments as 
possible.     
In answer to this question, Pater offers the first prescriptive statement of the essay: “To 
burn always with this hard, gem-like flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life.  In a sense 
it might even be said that our failure is to form habits; for, after all, habit is relative to a 
stereotyped world, and meantime it is only the roughness of the eye that makes any two persons, 
things, situations, seem alike.”210  What was the enemy of certain knowledge about the world or 
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the self in the first two paragraphs, time, is now the necessary condition of ecstatic, aesthetic 
experience.  Of course at this point in the “Conclusion,” Pater is speaking in possibilities rather 
than likelihoods: habit, like a “stereotype,” reduces the variety of experience in time.  It virtually 
guarantees our failure at the kind of continual, heightened experience Pater prescribes—just as, 
for Mill, habit presents a constant challenge to self-culture.  The fullest possible experience of 
the present, Pater asserts, is a matter of perceiving difference:211 while habit makes us see 
likeness among actual differences, ecstatic experience requires an acuteness of attention so that 
we can distinguish one moment from the next.    
Although it may initially sound as if Pater is merely promoting a passive reception of 
sensual phenomena, ecstatic experience actually requires an active preparation of mind, a 
“quickened, multiplied consciousness” as Pater puts it in the “Conclusion.”  Human experience, 
described in the opening passages of the “Conclusion” as a flickering flame or wisp of 
impression, becomes “hard” and “gem-like” only when certain capacities of mind are brought to 
bear upon the raw materials of experience.  Ecstasy is, in this sense, less of an experience than a 
creation—the result of human capacities of discernment.   
This is why, for Pater, education is a necessary preparation for ecstatic experience—just 
as it is a needed preparation for sympathetic extension in the fiction of Eliot and self-culture in 
the essays of Mill.  Philosophy or “speculative culture” is valuable, Pater asserts in the 
“Conclusion,” not as a guide to life but as a tool for clearing the habits of perception.  A varied 
and eclectic study, ranging over the whole of human thought has the ability to “rouse” the human 
spirit, to “start it to a life of constant and eager observation.” Critical study, then, makes for a 
more attentive, livelier mind which in turn “may help us to gather up what might otherwise pass 
                                                 
211 Here Pater joins both Eliot and Mill in his belief that difference spurs human thinking.   
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unregarded by us.”212  This kind of mind is more attuned to the slight variations of historical 
experience, giving notice to details of everyday life that are likely to pass by unconsidered.   
But for Pater it is art,213 more than anything else, that teaches us how to make the most of 
our fleeting experience of the world, because “art comes to you proposing frankly to give 
nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moments’ 
sake.”214  Art gives form to sensual experience, allowing us to register qualities of structure, 
color, melody, expression, etc. outside of the worldly concerns of routine existence.  
Experiencing the artist’s capacity for discernment, for selection from the raw materials of sensual 
experience, our own capacities of attention and selection are “quickened” and “multiplied.”215  
We are able to experience life as a landscape painting that changes from moment to moment, as a 
poetic narrative unfolding before our eyes, or as the movements of a complex musical score.   
                                                 
212 Pater, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, 152-53. 
 
213 Here Pater means art in the broadest sense of the word, including sculpture, painting, 
literature, music, and so on.  In the “Conclusion” Pater only mentions two artists by name: 
Voltaire and Victor Hugo.   
 
214 Pater, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, 153. 
 
215 As Pater asserts in his imaginary portrait “Duke Carl of Rosenmold,” “In art, as in all 
things of the mind, again, much depends upon the receiver; and the higher informing 
capacity, if it exists within, will mould an unpromising matter to itself, will realize itself by 
selection, and the preference of the better in what is bad or indifferent, asserting its 
prerogative under the most unlikely conditions.”   Pater, Imaginary Portraits, 129. 
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6.3 MODERN HUMANISM  
This explains Pater’s choice to include the “Conclusion,” which makes no explicit 
reference to Renaissance art, at the end of his book of essays The Renaissance.  As is 
characteristic in Pater’s criticism, The Renaissance looks to the past in order to articulate 
something about the present, asking what sort of humanism is possible in the “modern relative 
world.”  Pater has two answers to this question in the final essay of The Renaissance, 
“Winckelmann,” on Goethe’s mentor Johann Joachim Winckelmann.  The central practice of a 
modern humanist is the “quickened, multiplied consciousness” employed by the aesthetic critic.  
The art form that exemplifies this modern humanism, and that promotes this kind of 
consciousness, is the novel.   
In contemporary life, Pater explains, the kind of systemic humanism of the Italian 
Renaissance is only possible in the aesthetic realm of art, since it is only in art that the idea of the 
human may still order the world.  That is, the artist or aesthetic critic directs his energies towards 
the only arena in which the possibilities of man’s mind and will are still limitless: the imagined 
world created by a painting, a poem, or a novel.  Literature, more than painting and music, is the 
medium that has the facility to create this realm in modernity.  Only the “varied literary form” of 
literature, Pater asserts, can “command that width, variety, delicacy of resources, which will 
enable it to deal with the conditions of modern life.” 
The novel in particular has a special capacity to meet this pressing need in modernity, 
which is a desire for a sense freedom that has been lost: “That naïve, rough sense of freedom, 
which supposes man’s will to be limited, if at all, only by a will stronger than his, he can never 
have again.  The attempt to represent it in art would have so little verisimilitude that it would be 
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flat and uninteresting.”216  This is a freedom that had been upheld in the past by a systemic belief 
in man’s individual will and his preeminence in the natural world—a belief made untenable by 
modern developments in the geological, biological, and social sciences.217  In modernity, the 
human point of view has shifted, Pater explains, and man becomes only one aspect of the natural 
and moral world—subject to the same laws of necessity, which are “a magic web woven through 
and through us.”218   
For Pater the question becomes, then, not whether modern humans can somehow recover 
this sense of freedom and preeminence but whether it is possible to create a comparable feeling 
of freedom and possibility in the fictive world of literature. Can the modern novel “represent 
men and women in these bewildering toils so as to give the spirit at least an equivalent for the 
sense of freedom?”219  The novel’s capacity to recreate this feeling of independence and 
possibility is, Pater asserts, a function of its form rather than its content—its mixed and eclectic 
                                                 
216 Pater, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, 148.   
 
217 Here, and throughout Pater’s collected works, there is a reworking of Friedrich 
Schiller’s theory of aesthetic education, as articulated in On The Aesthetic Education of 
Man.  Schiller’s discussion of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister is especially relevant.  Friedrich 
Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, trans. Reginald Snell (Mineola, New York: 
Dover Publications, 2004).  Pater taught himself German and French while a student at 
Oxford, reading Schiller and Hegel in the original German.  See Donoghue, Walter Pater: 
Lover of Strange Souls, 27. 
 
218 Pater, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, 148.  This is a favorite metaphor for 
Eliot and Mill as well.  Eliot uses the idea of a web throughout Middlemarch to evoke the 
laws of necessity that order both human action and thought.  In Book III of Mill’s Logic, he 
speaks of the uniformities of the natural world as “a web composed of distinct threads, and 
only to be understood by tracing each of the threads separately; for which purpose it is 
often necessary to unravel some portion of the web, and exhibit the fibers apart.”  John 
Stuart Mill, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive. (Honolulu: University Press 
of the Pacific, 2002), 208. 
 
219 Pater, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, 149. 
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style promoting a flexibility and freedom of mind that makes ecstatic experience possible.  The 
novel can be, in this way, an instrument of self culture.  It can teach its readers how to be free in 
the only way possible in a probabilistic universe: by bringing the human will to bear upon the 
circumstances of life through self-making.  
Pater’s own novel Marius upholds one of the most important traditions of Renaissance 
humanism: its assured belief in the life of all things human—even those aspects of life left 
behind by history.  “For the essence of humanism,” Pater explains in The Renaissance, “is that 
belief…that nothing which has ever interested living men and women can wholly lose its 
vitality—no language they have spoken, nor oracle beside which they have hushed their voices, 
no dream which has once been entertained by actual human minds, nothing about which they 
have ever been passionate, or expended time and zeal.”220  The dead language, the forgotten 
custom, the obsolete object—each may be brought back to life given the right frame of mind.  A 
modern humanism, for Pater, is this frame of mind: a particular stance towards humanity and its 
history which refuses to concede the death of anything that once held meaning, purpose, or 
possibility for humans.  As we see in Pater’s novel Marius the Epicurean, the whole of human 
history is available to the modern novelist, regardless of its scientific factuality, philosophical 
validity, practical usefulness, or contemporary relevance.  Indeed, those details of history that 
have been forgotten or discarded have special value for the novelist.  Because they stand outside 
the conventions and habits of the contemporary moment, we are free to experience these aspects 
of human life aesthetically. 
                                                 
220 Ibid., 32. 
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6.4 MARIUS THE EPICUREAN  
Walter Pater’s novel Marius the Epicurean exhibits art’s capacity to animate the dead: to 
revive by imaginative invention the objects, figures, actions, and ideas of past ages; and at the 
same time, to awaken capacities of mind in the reader that have been deadened by the effects of 
convention and habit in contemporary life.  The novel is both a revitalization of a past era of 
human history, much like The Renaissance, and a dramatization of its central character’s quest 
for animation in his own life.  While Marius searches for a more enlivened experience of his 
external concrete world, the narrator seeks to revive Roman beliefs, philosophies, and ways of 
life that have lost the vitality and immediacy of their origins over the course of human history.  
Just as Marius adopts an epicurean philosophy of life in order to free himself from the effects of 
custom and tradition, the narrator aims to enliven ancient ideas that have become deadened by 
the passage of history.  Marius’s Epicureanism, as we will see, urges him to experience his own 
life as if it were art.  The novel’s narrator, too, encourages the reader to experience the religions 
and philosophies of ancient Rome aesthetically, transforming abstract categories like “paganism” 
or “stoicism” into vivid sensual experience.   
As we will see, the narrator is never single-minded in the depiction of the ancient past. 
Marius is more than anything else a comparative text, in ways both large and small, both 
thematic and textual.  In this way, the novel both models and promotes a “quickened, multiplied 
consciousness,” its mixture of discursive styles, eclectic incorporation of historical and literary 
texts, and comparative point of view inviting a liveliness and flexibility of mind in the reader.  
We see this at the level of the novel’s construction: the mixed discourse of the narrative shuttles 
between the general view of the historian or critic, interjecting a summary of the central ideas of 
Heraclitus or briefly noting the affinity between Marius and Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, and the 
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particular view of the literary realist, describing in detail the objects of the palace of Marcus 
Aurelius or the thoughts that go through Marius’s mind as he walks from Pisa to Rome.  We also 
see it in the syntax of the narrator, which regularly brings a doubleness to the immediate action 
of the novel: even the most straight-forward descriptions of the concrete world, in the narrator’s 
hands, make subtle references to the experience of the modern reader.   
 
Marius the Epicurean opens with a comparative view that will be employed throughout 
the novel, the narrator using knowledge of the present or more recent past to enlighten and 
enliven the events of second-century Rome: 
As, in the triumph of Christianity, the old religion lingered latest in 
the country, and died out at last as but paganism—the religion of 
the villagers, before the advance of the Christian Church; so, in an 
earlier century, it was in places remote from town-life that the 
older and purer forms of paganism itself had survived the longest.  
While, in Rome, new religions had arisen with bewildering 
complexity around the dying old one, the earlier and simpler 
patriarchal religion, “the religion of Numa,” as people loved to 
fancy, lingered on with little change amid the pastoral life, out of 
the habits and sentiments of which so much of it had grown.221 
We begin with the long-view of the scholar-narrator who has the dexterity of mind to shed light 
upon an obscure pagan religion, called the “religion of Numa” after the second king of Rome, 
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through comparison with a more familiar period of early Christianity.  Here the historical 
distance of the narrator allows him to distinguish affinities between dissimilar moments of 
history, breathing life into dead traditions through comparison with a more recent past.   
Beginning with the description of this rural religion, all but lost to history except through 
classical pastoral poetry, it is not until the second paragraph of the novel that the narrator 
provides an explicit historical setting: the death of Antoninus Pius and the succession of Marcus 
Aurelius in the second century A.D.  This is a telling choice, since the major events of orthodox 
history222 will not be at the forefront of the novel, but will rather create a historical backdrop for 
its central character Marius.  Marius is not a historical figure himself, but witnesses figures such 
as Marcus Aurelius and events such as the rise of early Christianity.  Here the opening passages 
of the novel suggest that this will be a story interested in the details of experience lost to the 
broad terms of traditional history,223 and that it will engage historical abstractions like 
“paganism” or “Christianity” through the representation of concrete human practices.  However, 
the novel does not seek to dispose of such abstract terms.  Indeed, the narrator of Marius, like 
that of Daniel Deronda, often revels in the broadly-drawn categories of philosophy and, as we 
have seen, the sweeping statements of comparative history.  Rather the novel aims to tie these 
general terms to the everyday circumstances of an unhistorical individual.      
And yet, the novel takes time to introduce Marius himself, who is not mentioned until the 
middle of the second paragraph of Chapter One.  The construction of the sentence that names 
Marius is characteristic of the narrator’s treatment of this central character: “More than a century 
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and a half had past since Tibullus had written; but the restoration of religious usages, and their 
retention where they still survived, was meantime come to be the fashion through the influence, 
or imperial example; and what had been in the main a matter of family pride with his father, was 
sustained by native instinct of devotion in the young Marius.”224  The syntax of this sentence is 
Latinate, its lengthy dependent clauses and use of passive voice pushing the subject “Marius” to 
the end of the sentence.225  The novel’s treatment of Marius on the whole is like this sentence 
writ large, the central character often getting lost in the midst of the narrator’s lengthy 
commentaries and extensive quotations.   
This is perhaps off-putting for readers that have undertaken to read a book entitled 
Marius the Epicurean (in the same way that Eliot’s long epigraphs can sometimes be in Daniel 
Deronda).  But it is also consistent with the “multiplied consciousness” that the narrator 
promotes, at every turn, in the novel.  We see, for instance, how the narrator unsettles an abstract 
understanding of Roman paganism with the details of daily religious practice; at the same time, 
the narrator is just as careful to disrupt the immediate action of Marius’s early life with more 
general ruminations on the importance of pagan ritual.  At every moment in the novel, in other 
words, we are meant to be multiply occupied, never getting too absorbed by the commentary of 
the narrator nor too rooted in the concrete world of the narrative.     
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6.5 OBJECTS ANIMATED 
Another way of saying this is that, in Marius, objects are never separated from ideas and 
ideas are never divorced from objects.  One of the ways that the narrator accomplishes this is 
through scholarly commentary that brings a broader comparative perspective to the concrete 
practices of the ancient world, as we have seen in the opening passages of the novel.  But even 
the novel’s most straight-forward depictions of the physical world are infused with ideas, the 
narrator using sensual description to transform religious concepts and philosophical principles 
into vivid aesthetic experience.  The pagan “religion of numa,” a neo-Platonic “religion of 
beauty,” Epicureanism, Stoicism, and early Christianity; in the treatment of each of these 
religions or philosophies, the narrative matches its style of representation to its subject.226  
See for instance how the narrator introduces the reader to Marius’s childhood religion in 
Chapter One and Two.  What distinguishes the old religion of Marius’s country home from the 
newer religions of Rome, the narrator explains, is its unity with the natural world.  This pagan 
religion grew from the concrete habits of everyday rural life: it was “a religion of usages and 
sentiment rather than of facts and belief, and attached to very definite things and places—the oak 
of immemorial age, the rock on the heath fashioned by weather as if by some dim human art, the 
shadowy grove of ilex, passing into which one exclaimed involuntarily, in consecrated phrase, 
Diety is in this Place!”227  The narrator, maintaining a comparative view, registers the 
strangeness of this pagan religion to a modern reader: in contrast with Christianity, it is a religion 
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of external reverence rather than internal belief; it bows to the claims of immanent divinity rather 
than to the rules of a religious doctrine.   
But this strangeness subsides once the narrator turns to the immediate events of the 
chapter, recounting the celebration of Ambarvalia, an agricultural holiday held in honor of Mars.  
In this description, unfamiliar concepts of external reverence and immanent divinity are 
represented concretely in an account of this pagan holiday.  Here the style of the narration 
matches its subjects: the narrator adopts a reverential tone that conveys the quiet purposefulness 
of the rituals being depicted, and brings somber illustration to the material details of the scene.  
Through the eyes of the narrator, we see the tools of the laborers set aside and hung with 
“wreaths of flowers,” the dry paths of the vineyard and cornfields, the cherry and apple blossoms 
set before the rustic altars of Ceres and Bacchus, and the “stiff” and “antique” robes of the 
priests.  We smell the green herbs that are thrown into the sacrificial fire and the “scent of the 
bean-fields” mingling with “the cloud of incense.”  We hear the “monotonous intonation” of the 
Latin liturgy, the words of the chant having “long since become unintelligible.”           
The devotional rituals of this holiday are repeated daily, on the small scale, in Marius’s 
childhood home.  The narrator relates, in vivid detail, the urns of the dead in the family chapel 
and the simple gifts laid upon the altar: “a few violets, a cake dipped in wine, or a morsel of 
honeycomb.”  We see Marius leaving the table to place a “portion of his family meal” beneath 
his father’s ashes.  Turning from description to commentary, the narrator explains how the use of 
the everyday objects of farm life in religious service instills in them a meaning greater than their 
everyday functions.  “Those simple gifts,” the narrator tells us, “like other objects as trivial—
bread, oil, wine, milk—had regained for him, by their use in such religious service, that poetic 
and as it were moral significance, which surely belongs to all the means of daily life, could we 
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but break through the veil of our familiarity with things by no means vulgar in themselves.”228  
This interjection is decentering: the narrator tells us that these objects “had regained” for Marius 
a poetic or moral significance through their use in religious ritual.  But surely these objects have 
had religious meaning for Marius since his earliest memories.  Here, as elsewhere, the narrator’s 
words are more descriptive of the experience of the reader than of Marius.  Indeed, the second 
part of the sentence clearly refers to a modern reader’s view of everyday objects, the “we” being 
the narrator and his readers.  That is, it is us the readers, not Marius, who regard these useful 
objects as vulgar, our familiarity with them making it difficult to perceive their poetic or moral 
significance.  It is us, the readers, who are offered an opportunity, through the novel’s depictions, 
to look again at these objects and perhaps “regain” a view of their significance.  Although, for us 
they reclaim an aesthetic rather than a religious significance, the beauty of the scenes of Marius’s 
early life breaking through “the veil of our familiarity with things.”   
 
Chapter Three recounts Marius’s childhood visit to a temple of Aesculapius,229 a trip that 
introduces a new way of living to Marius and foreshadows his later adoption of an Epicurean 
philosophy of life.  The narrator’s description of this temple stands in stark aesthetic contrast to 
the earlier depictions of Marius’s country home, the shadows of the farmhouse giving way to the 
brightness of the temple.  As in the depiction of the pagan holiday in Chapter One, the sights, 
sounds, and smells of the temple of Aesculapius interrupt the general commentary of the 
narrator, who spends the first three paragraphs of Chapter Three ruminating on the history and 
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philosophy of the Roman priesthood of Aesculapius.  The narrator describes Marius’s arrival at 
the temple: “the evening came as they passed along a steep white road with many windings 
among the pines, and it was night when they reached the temple, the lights of which shone out 
upon them pausing before the gates of the sacred enclosure, while Marius became alive to a 
singular purity in the air.  A rippling of water about the place was the only thing audible, as they 
waited till two priestly figures, speaking Greek to one another, admitted them into a large, white-
walled and clearly lighted guest-chamber…”230  The description of the temple concretizes what 
the narrator has told us about the medical philosophy of Aesculapius, which stresses the healing 
of the body through the lightening and purification of the soul.  The narrator’s prose, which has a 
heaviness about it in Chapter One, full of muted tones and muffled voices, becomes clearer, 
brighter, more distinct—more “alive” to colors and textures.231   
At the temple, as at Marius’s home, there is a correlation between the philosophy of life 
being introduced (to both Marius and the reader) and the aesthetics of the place.  On the night of 
Marius’s arrival, a young priest speaks to him at his bedside, and Marius “caught a lesson on 
from what was then said, still somewhat beyond his years, a lesson in the skilled cultivation of 
life, of experience, of opportunity” in the principle of the “diligent promotion of the capacity of 
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the eye.”232  The priest tells him to “have all about thee like the colours of some fresh picture, in 
a clear light…to keep the eye clear by a sort of exquisite personal alacrity and cleanliness, 
extending even to his dwelling-place; to discriminate, ever more and more fastidiously, select 
form and colour in things from what was less select; to meditate much on beautiful visible 
objects…”233  Describing a cultivation of both internal and external life through the deliberate 
arrangement of the physical world, the priest articulates a kind of religion of beauty.  The central 
tenant of this religion is selection, the choice of material surroundings refining the interior world 
of impression.  This tenant is exemplified for Marius in the tranquil beauty of the temple and its 
surrounding gardens, which he sees in “full sunlight” when he awakes in the morning.  In this 
moment, Marius feels that “simply to be alive…was a delight; and as he bathed in the fresh water 
set ready for his use, the air of the room about him seemed like pure gold, the very shadows rich 
with colour.”234   
 For Marius, then, the priest’s lesson is entirely at one with his experience of the temple, 
both the lesson and the beauty of this place quieting his mind and sharpening his senses.  The 
reader experiences this too; but at the same time, perhaps, we feel the loss of the narrator’s 
commentary in these sections.  We wonder: who is this priest?  What are the historical sources of 
this religion of beauty?  How does this religion relate to the medical teachings of Aesculapius?  
But we need not wait long for an elucidation; the narration explains the words of the priest were 
“conceived from the point of view of a theory Marius found afterwards in Plato’s Phaedrus, 
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which supposes men’s spirits susceptible to certain influences, diffused, after the manner of 
streams or currents, by fair things or persons visibly present—green fields, for instance, or 
children’s faces—into the air around then, acting in the case of some peculiar natures, like potent 
material essences, and conforming the seer to themselves as with some cunning physical 
necessity.”235  With the narrator offering a philosophical source for the priest’s lesson, the other 
aspects of this scene (the priest’s dialogue with Marius, the feeling of health Marius experiences 
when he awakes, the physical description of the temple, and so on) are given another layer of 
meaning and significance.  At the same time, the narrator provides multiple entrances to a 
difficult abstract idea (which has sources in both the medical teachings of Aesculapius and the 
philosophy of Plato), asking us to consider this religion of beauty in both the concrete and the 
abstract.     
6.6 A REVISION OF MIND 
 The visit to the temple enlarges Marius’s experience of the world, introducing a 
new stance toward the concrete world.  But it is not until the death of his friend and schoolfellow 
Flavian at the end of Part One of the novel that Marius is shaken into a definite refusal of the old 
religion of his childhood home.  As in the depiction of the farmhouse and temple of Aesculapius, 
the narrator links the state of Marius’s mind to the conditions of his material surroundings.  At 
the end of the first Part of the novel, Marius stands by the body of Flavian:   
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watching, with deliberate purpose to fix in his memory every 
detail, that he might have this picture in reserve, should any hour 
of forgetfulness hereafter come to him with the temptation to feel 
completely happy again…The fear of the corpse, which surprised 
him in his effort to watch by it through the darkness, was a hint of 
his own failing strength…It was the recurrence of the thing—that 
unchanged outline below the coverlet, amid a silence in which the 
faintest rustle seemed to speak…”236 
Attempting to fix the image of Flavian’s body in his memory, Marius is struck by the physicality 
of death.  He is surprised by his fear of his friend’s corpse, and recoils from its “recurrence,” or 
the unmoving and silent presence of its concrete form under the sheet.  It is the continued 
existence of Flavian’s body after his mind has passed way that most horrifies Marius, the 
presence of Flavian as a thing or inanimate object rather than a human being.  Marius begins to 
see death not as a spiritual transition, the narrator explains, but as an extinguishing of mind or 
soul: “To Marius…the earthly end of Flavian came like a final revelation of nothing less than the 
soul’s extinction.”237  Marius associates this extinction of soul with the unmoving, fixed, and 
repetitious qualities of Flavian’s corpse—qualities that Marius will eschew in his search for a 
new philosophy of life in Part Two of the novel.    
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When Flavian’s death forces the finitude of human life upon Marius, the teachings of his 
childhood religion suddenly appears “wholly inhuman and morose.”238  Commencing a program 
of independent study, which he describes as a reevaluation of human experience, Marius 
concludes that all that is real in the world is our fleeting impressions of physical life: 
And so the abstract apprehension that the little point of this present 
moment alone really is, between a past which has just ceased to be 
and a future which may never come, became practical with Marius, 
under the form of a resolve, as far as possible, to exclude regret 
and desire, and yield himself to the improvement of the present 
with an absolutely disengaged mind.  America is here and now—
here, or nowhere: As Wilhelm Meister finds out one day, just not 
too late, after so long looking vaguely across the ocean for the 
opportunity of the development of his capacities.   It was as if, 
recognising in perpetual motion the law of nature, Marius 
identified his own way of life cordially with it, “throwing himself 
into the stream,” so to speak.  He too must maintain a harmony 
with that soul of motion in things, by constantly renewed mobility 
of character.  Omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res.—
Thus Horace had summed up that perfect manner in the reception 
of life attained by his old Cyrenaic master…239   
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This long excerpt exemplifies the mixed narration at this point in the novel, the narrator’s style 
of writing matching the Epicurean philosophy that Marius is studying.  As in the “Conclusion” to 
The Renaissance, Marius seeks the possibilities of experience still available to the skeptic and 
resolves upon a state of mind that is “disengaged” from both past memories and future hopes.  
He aims for a “mobility of character” that will maintain a “harmony” with the flux of time, 
renewing itself with each present impression.  But following this fairly clear statement of 
Marius’s “practical resolve” is a jumble of philosophical and literary comparisons that make it 
difficult to pinpoint the specific historical sources of Marius’s Epicureanism.  While Marius is 
apparently studying a variety of specific classical texts (for instance, the fragments of 
Heraclitus), the reader does not have access to these writings except through the narrator’s short 
quotations or summaries, included alongside more modern references.  Although we may have a 
fairly distinct idea of what this “practical resolve” means for Marius at this stage of the novel, in 
terms of his everyday life, our understanding of Epicureanism is multiple and historically 
dispersed.  Here the narrator appears to prefer that the reader be more channeler than scholar, 
receiving a stream of cultural references much like Marius aims to receive the flow of sensory 
impressions in the present moment.   
When, in the same chapter, the narrator describes Marius’s aim to become a “complex 
medium of reception,” the narrator is also depicting the intended role of the reader:   
And towards such a full or complete life, a life of various yet select 
sensation, the most direct and effective auxiliary must be, in a 
word, Insight.  Liberty of soul, freedom from all partial and 
misrepresentative doctrine which does but relieve one element in 
our experience at the cost of another, freedom from all 
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embarrassment alike of regret for the past and of calculation on the 
future: this would be but preliminary to the real business of 
education--insight, insight through culture, into all that the present 
moment holds in trust for us, as we stand so briefly in its 
presence.240 
The aim of ecstatic experience is not pleasure but the insight that comes from a “completeness of 
life.”  Freeing the mind from habit, received doctrine, regret, and desire is only the first step 
towards the aim of insight; this only clears the “tablet” of the mind.  It is culture, gained through 
education, that offers the insight needed to experience the present as fully as possible.  Culture 
trains our faculties of perception and thought, exercising our multiple capacities for ecstatic 
experience.  In other words, culture develops the “quickened, multiplied consciousness” 
described in the “Conclusion” to The Renaissance, a liveliness and multiplicity of mind required 
for the fullest experience of the world.  This kind of mind is invited in the reader of the novel, 
and the process of enculturation described here is the central aim of the novel’s mixed narration.   
6.7 A REFORM OF SYMPATHY 
After the death of Flavian, Marius gives up his childhood religion for an Epicurean 
philosophy, maintaining this way of life even after he becomes a secretary for the stoic Marcus 
Aurelius in Rome.  But at the start of Book Three, a speech by the rhetorician Cornelius Fronto 
inspires Marius to reevaluate his philosophy of life yet again.  The subject of Fronto’s speech is 
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the reconciliation of the Cyrenaic or Epicurean philosophy of life with the weight of Roman 
custom and tradition.  Here Fronto asks his audience to weigh the aim of “ecstatic experience,” 
which is hindered by received ideals or moralities, with a wider sympathy for humanity, which 
demands some deference to the rules of conduct in present Roman life.   
Fronto’s words at the forefront of his mind, Marius begins to see the emotional 
narrowness of his Epicurean philosophy, which denies a sympathetic connection with humanity.  
As the narrator tells us, “the discourse of Cornelius Fronto, with its wide prospect over the 
human, the spiritual, horizon, had set him on a review—on a review of the isolating narrowness, 
in particular, of his own theoretic scheme.”241  On the one hand, Marius concludes that “all that 
is real in our life” is our impression of the present moment; on the other hand, he longs for 
something larger and more permanent than this conclusion.  Although his current life philosophy 
offers the possibility of a complete sensory experience, “yet these moments were a very costly 
matter: they paid a greater price for them in the sacrifice of a thousand possible sympathies, of 
things only to be enjoyed through sympathy.”  The Cyrenaic or Epicurean, explains the narrator, 
is detached from these sympathetic connections with wider humanity, “in intellectual pride, in 
loyalty to a mere theory that would take nothing for granted, and assent to no approximate or 
hypothetical truths.”242  The rigor of his personal philosophy, then, has denied Marius affective 
connections with his fellow men, and has offered no opportunity to commune with others who 
share his longing for an improved world.   
 In the pursuit of enlivened experience, however limited, Marius had given up his 
emotional ties to a system larger than himself—the collective experience of humanity: “a 
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venerable system of sentiment and idea, widely extended in time and place, in a kind of 
impregnable possession of human life—a system, which, like some other great products of the 
conjoint efforts of human mind through many generations, is rich in the world’s experience; so 
that, in attaching oneself to it, one lets in a great tide of that experience, and makes, as it were 
with a single step, a great experience of one’s own, and with great consequent increase to one’s 
sense of colour, variety, and relief, in the spectacle of men and things.”243  In his striving to stay 
in the present, Marius has detached himself from the combined experience of human history, 
sustained in the customs and traditions of contemporary Roman life (such as the rituals of 
Marius’s childhood “religion of Numa”).  This wealth of human experience is accessible to any 
who have a ready sympathy for the ways of the world; but up until now, Marius’s fierce 
independence of mind precludes this kind of sympathy.    
Soon after Marius hears Fronto’s speech, his friend Cornelius invites him to the home of 
Saint Cecelia, and there Marius experiences a “strange, new hope” as he stands among the stone 
tombs marking the graves of the Christian dead.  Here the narrator’s description of this scene 
transforms the abstract idea of Christianity into an aesthetic experience that recalls, in many 
ways, the reverent rituals of Marius’s childhood “religion of Numa.”  The care for the dead at the 
home of Saint Cecelia reveals, to Marius and the reader, an idea of divinity that is immanent in 
the material world—and a concept of charity that is made concrete through Saint Cecelia’s 
purposeful care for both the living and the dead.  In Marius’s private diaries, excerpted by the 
narrator in Chapter Twenty Five, we see the effects of this introduction to Christianity upon 
Marius’s thinking.  These diaries, which are written in the style of Marcus Aurelius’s 
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Meditations, register Marius’s loneliness and disconnection from other human beings.  They are, 
as the narrator describes, “conversations with himself”: lengthy and circular ruminations in 
which Marius weighs the different philosophies he has encountered over the course of his life, 
including his childhood Religion of Numa, the Epicureanism of the Cyrenaics, the Stoicism of 
Marcus Aurelius and Cornelius Fronto, and the Christianity of Saint Cecelia.  Ultimately, he 
must choose between Epicureanism, which offers a life of vivid sensual experience, and 
Christianity, which offers a life of human connection.   
It is the thought of his own approaching death that brings Marius closer to an adoption of 
the Christian faith.  Marius writes in his diaries that “death, and old age as it must needs be, and 
that watching for their approach, which makes every stage of life like a dying over and over 
again.  Almost all death is painful, and in every thing that comes to an end a touch of 
death…And what we need in the world, over against that, is a certain permanent and general 
power of compassion—humanity’s standing force of self-pity—as an elementary ingredient of 
our social atmosphere if we are to life in it at all.”244  What was in his youth a promise of 
renewal in every changing moment becomes in older age a continual reminder of the finiteness 
of human life.  Compassion, which Marius finds in the charity of Saint Cecelia and her 
followers, is the only balm for this inevitable grief.  For Marius, Christianity means the 
possibility of a “permanent and general” compassion in human society, and the assurance that his 
own death will be mourned by other human beings.  For the reader, Marius’s embrace of 
Christianity means a release from the stifling interiority of his diaries, so different from the 
mixed discourse of the earlier chapters of the novel.    
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 Following the excerpts from Marius’s diaries, the narrator becomes less and less 
obtrusive in the immediate action of the novel.  The constant quotation and commentary—
characteristic of the mixed and multiplied discourse of the narrator until this point—begins to 
subside.  The final chapters of the novel are quieter than what has come before, the narrator 
taking on the meditative tone of Marius’s diaries.  As Marius takes leave of Rome, setting out to 
visit his childhood home to pay honor to the ashes of his mother and father, he dreams “only of 
the dead before him…he journeyed on rapidly through the night; the thought of them increasing 
on him, in the darkness.  It was as if they had been waiting for him there through all those years. 
And felt his footsteps approaching now, and understood his devotion, quite gratefully, in that 
lowliness of theirs, in spite of its tardy fulfillment.”245  No literary quotation or comparative 
comment interrupts Marius’s thoughts on this journey; the multiple and comparative view of the 
narrator has disappeared entirely.  The strongest voices at the end of Chapter Twenty Seven are 
those of the dead, which Marius imagines he hears as the sun comes up: “To-day!”—they 
seemed to be saying…”To-day, he will come!”  Nor does the narrator offer many concrete 
details of Marius’s journey.  The focus is, at this point, not upon Marius himself but upon the 
dead that wait for him at the farmhouse: somehow it is not Marius that draws closer to the dead, 
but rather the dead that are “increasing on him.”     
Marius reaches the house and once he has freed the door from the weeds surrounding it, 
he is struck by an “odd air of neglect” inside, “the neglect of a place allowed to remain as when 
it was last used, and left in a hurry, till long years had covered all alive with thick dust—the 
faded flowers, the burnt-out lamps, the tools and hardened mortar of the workmen who had 
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something to do there.”246  For Marius, as for the reader, the familiar place has been transformed 
by its estrangement from human cares: the everyday objects that had held, in Marius’s 
childhood, so much significance rest discarded and in disarray.  And yet, there is more life in the 
dust-covered hearth and crumbling mortuary urns than in anything else in these scenes: with the 
narrator almost entirely silent, the reader’s attention—like Marius’s—is entirely given to the 
physical presence of the dead.  In a gesture that suggests Marius’s tentative acceptance of 
Christianity, which is never explicitly stated by either Marius or the narrator, he decides to bury 
the urns containing his family’s ashes, covering the graves with flowers as he has seen done at 
the home of Saint Cecelia.247  But if this gesture is religious, it affirms Marius’s Christian faith 
only on an aesthetic level: no priest attends this burial and Marius utters no prayers; we know 
nothing of Marius’s internal thoughts as he throws flowers upon the graves “one by one, to 
mingle with the dark mould.”248 
6.8 CONCLUSIONS 
On his return from this visit, Marius falls ill and dies in the care of Christian strangers far 
from this grave site.  He leaves the world with no family or friends nearby and, since his 
acceptance of Christianity is unconfirmed at the close of the novel, with no assurance of his 
soul’s immortality.  In the final scenes of the novel, his solitude is unbroken—he exchanges no 
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248 ME, 319. 
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words with his caregivers.  He receives some comfort in the kindly faces of these strangers, but 
looks longingly at “their simple, humdrum, everyday life, with a peculiar yearning to share it 
with them, envying the calm, earthy cheerfulness of all their days to be, still under the sun…”249  
Perhaps for the first time in the entirety of the novel, Marius yearns for the simple affections that 
link these people, an unphilosophical “feeling of human kinship” implicit in the way they go 
about the simple tasks of daily life.     
In these scenes, in the absence of the narrator’s additions and interjections, we recognize 
Marius’s essential solitariness, his apartness from other human beings.  This is not a solitariness 
that the reader has shared, up until the final chapters of the novel; unlike Marius, the reader has 
had the constant companionship of the narrator.  The feeling of human kinship and connection 
with the dead that Marius yearns for at the end of his life has been, from the start, a part of the 
relationship between the narrator and reader.  Introducing archaic beliefs, strange traditions, and 
forgotten ways of life with ready explanations, modern comparisons, or philosophical 
qualifications, the narrator is a teacher and helpmate to the uninitiated reader.  Inviting a 
multiplied perspective and a quickened intelligence, the narration is in many ways demanding; 
and yet the novel cannot be called didactic in tone.  It is educational, in the sense that it 
cultivates the mind of the reader; but the narrator’s manner is never severe but “delicate and 
tender,” to use Pater’s words from “Coleridge.”   
As we have seen, no detail of the world of ancient Rome is too small, no religious or 
philosophical reference too arcane for the narrator’s notice.  For the narrator of Marius the 
Epicurean, like the humanist of The Renaissance, there is an assured belief in the life of all 
things human, even if left behind by history.  These forgotten details, often unfamiliar and 
                                                 
249 ME, 326. 
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strange, are offered to the reader as incitements: they are intended to have effects beyond the 
pages of the novel, enlivening our aesthetic and sympathetic interest in the specifics of present 
life.  
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